The opinion of the court was delivered by: Samuel Der-Yeghiayan United States District Court Judge
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant Cirilo's Inc.'s ("Cirilo"), Defendant Cirilo McSween's ("McSween"), Defendant Olawale Oladeinde's ("Oladeinde"), and Defendant Hugo Ramos' ("Ramos") (collectively referred to as "Cirilo Defendants") motion for summary judgment. This matter is also before the court on Defendant McDonald's Corporation's ("McD Corporation") motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, we grant both Defendants' motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiff Edward Mosley ("Mosley") alleges that in June 2002 he began working for Cirilo as a permanent maintenance worker. Mosley was allegedly regularly assigned to a McDonald's restaurant ("Restaurant") on State Street in Chicago, Illinois, that is owned by Cirilo. McSween is allegedly the principal owner and president of Cirilo. Ramos was allegedly a manager at the Restaurant and Oladeinde (referred to in the amended complaint as "Mr. Wally") was allegedly the general manager at the Restaurant when Mosley worked there. Mosley claims that he experienced "work related injuries." (A. Compl. Par. 18(a)). In July 2004, Ramos allegedly notified Mosley that Mosley's work hours were going to be reduced because of Mosley's injuries. Mosley further alleges that Oladeinde and Ramos, "acting in concert with, and with [t]he approval of McDonald's Corporation and Cirilo's, Inc., intentionally and knowingly ordered that . . . Mosley wrongfully have [sic] his work-hours reduced because he was African-American (Black) race." (A. Compl. Par. 39). Mosley also claims that he suffered "racial harassment" and gender discrimination and that other maintenance workers with less seniority did not have their work hours reduced. (A. Compl. Par. 49-63, 123). Mosley includes in his pro se amended complaint claims alleging race and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(Counts I and V), race discrimination claims based on violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981") and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") (Counts II and IV), Section 1983 equal protection claims (Count III), and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") claims (Count VI).
On December 6, 2006, the prior judge in this case granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions to dismiss, dismissing the following claims: (1) all Section 1983 claims, (2) all IIED claims, (3) the Title VII gender discrimination claim brought against McD Corporation, and (4) the Title VII claims brought against the individual Defendants. (12/6/06 MO).Cirilo Defendants and McD Corporation subsequently moved for summary judgment. This case was reassigned to the undersigned judge on March 10, 2008.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In seeking a grant of summary judgment, the moving party must identify "those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This initial burden may be satisfied by presenting specific evidence on a particular issue or by pointing out "an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. Once the movant has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest on the allegations in the pleadings, but, "by affidavits or as otherwise provided for in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A "genuine issue" in the context of a motion for summary judgment is not simply a "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000). The court must consider the record as a whole, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences that favor the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Bay v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000)
We first note that both Cirilo Defendants and McD Corporation have filed statements of material facts in accordance with Local Rule 56.1. On January 7, 2008, the court gave Mosley until March 17, 2008, to respond to Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The only response to Defendants' motions for summary judgment consists of two letters filed on March 13, 2008 ("March 13 Letter") and March 14, 2008 ("March 14 Letter"). Since Mosley is proceeding pro se, we construe the letters as his answer to the summary judgment motion. See Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2005)(stating that "pleadings of pro se plaintiffs should be liberally construed"). Mosley did not file any response to Defendants' statements of material facts. Even though Mosley is proceeding pro se, the record reflects that, in accordance with Local Rule 56.2, he was sent the proper notice for pro se litigants explaining summary judgment motions. The Seventh Circuit has also indicated that pro se litigants are not absolved from the obligation to comply with Local Rule 56.1. See, e.g., Greer v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, Illinois, 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001); Delgado v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 2008 WL 343474, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2008)(stating that "[a]lthough courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally, . . . a plaintiff's pro se status does not absolve him from complying with these Local Rules"); Banks v. Archer/American Wire,2005 WL 2007227, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2005)(stating that a pro se litigant must comply with Local Rule 56.1). Further, the Seventh Circuit has held "that a district court is entitled to expect strict compliance with Rule 56.1." Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004)(stating in addition that "[s]ubstantial compliance is not strict compliance"); see also Chelios v. Heavener, 2008 WL 746842, at *5 (7th Cir. 2008)(quoting Koszola v. Bd. of Educ., 385 F.3d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 2004) for the proposition that the court has "emphasized the importance of local rules and ha[s] consistently and repeatedly upheld a district court's discretion to require strict compliance with its local rules"). Thus, in the absence of a response by Mosley to Defendants' statements of material facts, pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, all the facts contained therein are deemed to be undisputed. LR 56.1; Dent v. Bestfoods, 2003 WL 22025008, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2003). We also note that aside from the lack of a Local Rule 56.1 response, Mosley has failed in either the March 13 Letter or March 14 Letter to rebut the arguments or evidence pointed to by Defendants.
II. McD Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment
McD Corporation argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the Title VII race discrimination and the Section ...