The opinion of the court was delivered by: Herndon, Chief Judge
On June 20, 2006, Plaintiff Bobbie Jo Martin filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Defendants Unum Life Insurance Company of America and UnumProvident Corporation ("Defendants") in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois. (Doc. 2-3.) Plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring that Carl Martin's death was accidental and that she is entitled to $46,000 in additional accidental death insurance benefits from Carl Martin's accidental death policy. On July 27, 2006, Defendants filed a timely notice of removal and removed this matter to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Doc. 2.) This matter is now before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 13.) In addition, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike Defendants' reply in support of Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 21.) As an initial matter, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion to strike. (Doc. 21.) Plaintiff's motion to strike posits that Defendants failed to file a timely reply pursuant to SDIL-LR 7.1. While Plaintiff is correct that Local Rule 7.1(c) provides that a reply shall be filed within 10 days after service, Defendants are correct that Local Rule 7.1 should be read in conjunction with FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 6(a) and (e). Reading all of these rules together, the Court finds that Defendants correctly computed the reply deadline and filed their reply a day in advance of the deadline. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion to strike is DENIED. (Doc. 21.)
The relevant facts in this case are as follows. Plaintiff was married to Carl W. Martin ("Decedent"). Decedent was employed by Northen American Nutrition Company, Inc. ("Northern American"). Through Northern American, Decedent was enrolled in three different group insurance policies issued by Defendants: 1) a basic group life insurance policy; 2) a supplemental group life insurance policy; and 3) a group accidental death and dismemberment policy ("AD&D Policy"). Plaintiff is the named beneficiary under Decedent's plans. The parties have stipulated that the plans are governed by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B) provides an express cause of action for those seeking to recover benefits due under the plan.
On the evening of July 5, 2003, Plaintiff and Decedent had been arguing and Plaintiff kicked Decedent out of the house. Initially, Decedent yelled to try to get back into the house, but Plaintiff refused to let him in. Around 12:30 a.m., a house guest, Darci, went out to the backyard to give some water to the dog and heard Decedent moving around inside of his semi truck. At approximately 2:45 a.m., Darci and her fiancee Bill discovered Decedent with a piece of electrical cord around his neck. The cord was attached to a large bolt hanging from a corner wall of the garage in the backyard. When Decedent's body was discovered, his legs were crouched 10-12 inches and his feet were on the ground. There was 10-12 inches of slack in the cord around Decedent's neck.
On July 20, 2003, an autopsy was performed on Decedent. The autopsy found that Decedent had a blood-alcohol level of .105% on the night he died and that the immediate cause of death was hanging by the neck. On October 3, 2003, Paul Petty, the Pike County Coroner convened a jury in inquest. The jury found that the death was accidental and was due to asphyxiation as a result of hanging. The Death Certificate reflects this finding.
B. Denial of Accidental Death and Dismemberment Policy Benefits
On January 28, 2004, Defendants denied Plaintiff's claim for AD&D benefits. Defendants found that 1) Decedent's death was not solely caused by external, violent, and accidental means that were independent of any other cause; and 2) the policy also excluded benefits for Decedent because his death was caused by, contributed to by, and/or resulted from self-inflicted injury. On February 15, 2004, Plaintiff appealed Defendants' denial of AD&D benefits. Plaintiff claimed that her husband had not intended to commit suicide and, therefore, she should be entitled to the AD&D benefits. On April 23, 2004, Defendants upheld their decision denying the AD&D benefits. Defendants maintained that regardless of Decedent's intention, Decedent died as a result of a self-inflicted injury.
A. Summary Judgment Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings and affidavits, if any, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Oats v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The movant bears the burden of establishing the absence of fact issues and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court does not determine the truth of asserted matters, but rather decides whether there is a genuine factual issue for trial. Celex Group, Inc. v. Executive Gallery, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1114, 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (Castillo, J.). The Court must consider the entire record, drawing reasonable inferences and resolving factual disputes in favor of the non-movant. Regensburger v. China Adoption Consultants, Ltd., 138 F.3d 1201, 1205 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant may not simply rest on the allegations in his pleadings. Rather, she must show through specific evidence that an issue of fact remains on matters for which she bears the burden of proof at trial. Walker v. Shansky, 28 F.3d 666, 670-71 (7th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 276 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). No issue remains for trial "unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted); accord Starzenski v. City of Elkhart, 87 F.3d 872, 880 (7th Cir. 1996); Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 23 F.3d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1994). "[Non-movant's] own uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Weeks v. Samsung ...