Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 03 C 3524-Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Posner, Circuit Judge.
Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiff is the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee of a company named marchFIRST. He brought this suit against KPMG, the accounting firm claiming that marchFIRST had been harmed as a result of the accounting firm's breaching its duty of care in violation of Illinois tort law. He seeks more than $600 million in damages. The district judge withdrew the case from the bankruptcy court and ultimately granted summary judgment in the defendant's favor.
KPMG was the auditor of a firm called Whittman-Hart, which offered consulting services in information technology. In the fall of 1999 Whittman-Hart became interested in buying a firm larger than itself called US Web/CKS, which provided consulting services primarily to companies that used the Internet to sell goods or services. The purchase was consummated on March 1, 2000; the date became Whittman-Hart's new name. Whittman-Hart paid the owners of US Web more than $7 billion. It paid entirely in the form of stock, a risky currency; for beginning in the following month many Internet-related ("dot.com") businesses experienced deep, often terminal, reverses. By virtue of the acquisition of US Web, marchFIRST was such a business, and the following April, thirteen months after the acquisition, it declared bankruptcy.
The trustee argues that while the acquisition was being negotiated, KPMG approved a statement of WhittmanHart's fourth-quarter 1999 earnings that it should have known was false. It should have known, the trustee argues, that Whittman-Hart had engaged in a form of what is called "round-tripping." A company makes a loan to a firm controlled by it, with the understanding that the borrower will purchase services from the lender in an amount equal to the amount of the loan, though the services may never be performed or if performed may have little value and thus cost the lender little or nothing. In effect the loan is reclassified from an account receivable by the lender to operating income to him minus only the zero or nominal cost of the services that he renders or pretends to render the borrower.
The trustee also complains that KPMG should not have approved Whittman-Hart's classifying prepaid consulting fees that it had received in the fourth quarter of 1999 as revenue in that quarter, rather than allocating them to 2000, when the fees were earned. Cf. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. v. Reinsurance Results, Inc., 513 F.3d 652, 653-55 (7th Cir. 2008).
As a result of these accounting maneuvers, WhittmanHart's fourth-quarter 1999 earnings were significantly overstated. We'll assume, without having to decide, that KPMG was negligent in approving the maneuvers that generated the overstatement. Had the earnings been correctly stated, US Web would have learned that they had been considerably lower than Whittman-Hart's third-quarter earnings and its anticipated as opposed to realized fourth-quarter earnings. Therefore, the trustee argues, US Web would have lost interest in being acquired by Whittman-Hart and the acquisition would have fallen through. There is no "therefore." Whittman-Hart was eager to make the acquisition and so might have paid more for US Web to offset, as it were, the poor fourth-quarter results-in which event KPMG's alleged negligence would actually have saved Whittman-Hart's shareholders money had marchFIRST prospered. But we'll accept the trustee's argument, though just to move the analysis along, and also accept his further argument that had the acquisition fallen through, Whittman-Hart, though presumably not US Web, would have survived the travails of the dot.com sector. US Web was larger than Whittman-Hart and more of a dot.com business. It was, the argument goes, only because Whittman-Hart was chained to a drowning US Web by virtue of the acquisition that it too drowned.
An immediate problem, unremarked by the parties, is that the principal beneficiaries should the trustee prevail in this suit would be the former shareholders of US Web, even though there is no claim that US Web would have survived had it not been acquired. The trustee is asking for damages far in excess-more than $500 million in excess-of the $93.6 million owed marchFIRST's unsecured creditors. The bulk of the recovery would thus go to the shareholders, and US Web's shareholders received 57 percent of the stock of marchFIRST. Yet the linchpin of the trustee's case is that US Web pulled marchFIRST down to its doom. US Web cannot be at once the cause of the bankruptcy and its principal beneficiary.
More important, to say that had it not been for KPMG's negligence the acquisition would have fallen through and Whittman-Hart would have survived, and therefore KPMG was a cause of the debacle, conflates a necessary condition-confusingly called by lawyers a "but-for cause"-with a real "cause," confusingly called by them a "proximate cause" and enigmatically defined as something "that produces an injury through a natural and continuous sequence of events unbroken by any effective intervening cause." Cleveland v. Rotman, 297 F.3d 569, 573 (7th Cir. 2002) (Illinois law). Conventional as these usages are, they are unhelpful.
A necessary condition is a sine qua non, but it is rarely a "cause" in any meaningful sense of the word. No one would say that Whittman-Hart's demise was "caused" by the invention of the Internet, though had it not been invented and enticed US Web, Whittman-Hart would, if the trustee is correct, be fine. Cf. Movitz v. First National Bank of Chicago, 148 F.3d 760, 762 (7th Cir. 1998). Among the myriad of necessary conditions for anything to occur, the one designated "the cause" is the one that is significant from the standpoint of the person making the designation. There may of course be more than one such necessary condition, and there was here. There are also cases in which a condition that is not necessary, but is sufficient, is deemed the cause of an injury, as when two fires join and destroy the plaintiff's property and each one would have destroyed it by itself and so was not a necessary condition; yet each of the firemakers (if negligent) is liable to the plaintiff for having "caused" the injury. Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927); cf. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). This is not such a case.
The necessary conditions for Whittman-Hart's demise that are relevant to this appeal were first its decision to buy US Web and second the precipitate decline of the dot.com business. The decision to buy US Web was not influenced by KPMG's approving Whittman-Hart's accounting decisions, and neither, of course, were the dot.com troubles. US Web's agreement to be bought may have been influenced by KPMG's advice to Whittman-Hart, but that is irrelevant because US Web was doomed by the coming collapse of its market and so was not harmed by the advice.
The same conclusions can be reached by a different route, by asking what duty, enforceable by tort law, was assumed by KPMG as Whittman-Hart's auditor. It was the duty to protect creditors of and investors in Whittman-Hart from being misled to their harm by financial statements issued by Whittman-Hart that contained errors that would be material to a creditor or an investor. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4); 225 ILCS 450/30.1; FDIC v. Ernst & Young LLP, 374 F.3d 579, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2004) (Illinois law). It was not a duty to give the company business advice, such as advice on whether to acquire another company. Johnson Bank v. George Korbakes & Co., 472 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 2006) (Illinois law); Fehribach v. Ernst & Young LLP, 493 F.3d 905, 911-12 (7th Cir. 2007). The knowledge required to give such advice is possessed by the business itself and by business-consulting firms, as distinct from auditors. The auditors' concern is with the accuracy of the company's books rather than with the demand for the company's products or services or the attractiveness of its investment opportunities. It is true that many accounting firms offer business consulting as well as auditing services and that KPMG is one of them and did some consulting for Whittman-Hart and hoped to continue doing so for marchFIRST. But the suit complains only about KPMG's auditing services, and there is no contention that they were influenced by the firm's consulting wing.
The failure to state Whittman-Hart's fourth-quarter earnings accurately, insofar as it was due to KPMG, may as we said have been a wrong to US Web (though a wrong that did no harm if indeed that firm was doomed), but it was not a wrong to Whittman-Hart, as the auditor neither was asked to nor did advise Whittman-Hart to buy US Web. By swallowing a larger company, and one concentrated in the dot.com business, Whittman-Hart assumed the risk of being injured, fatally as it turned out, by a downturn in that business. It wants to make its auditor the insurer ...