The opinion of the court was delivered by: Charles P. Kocoras, District Judge
This matter is before this Court on Plaintiff Gabriela Ptasinska ("Ptasinska") and all other similarly situated individuals ("the purported class")'s motion to alter or amend this court's dismissal of Ptasinska's Complaint on November 1, 2001. For the following reasons, Ptasinska's motion is denied.
Ptasinska, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated ("the purported class"), filed a five-count class action lawsuit against Defendant United States Department of State; Defendant Condoleeza Rice; Defendant United States Department of Homeland Security; Defendant Michael Chertoff; Defendant United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; Defendant Emilio T. Gonzalez; and Defendant F. Gerard Heinauer ("Defendants"). Ptasinska's claims were rooted in the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS")'s denial of her I-485 Application ("I-485 Application") to Register for Permanent Residence or Adjust Status.
In August 2007, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Ptasinska's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). After considering Defendants' motion to dismiss, we determined that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear Ptasinska's suit because Ptasinska's I-485 Application had been accepted and her claims of denial had consequently become moot. We also concluded that because Ptasinska was the only individual named as a class representative and all of her individual claims were moot, the purported class's claims were also moot.
Within the time permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, Ptasinska brought the instant motion, contending that we made a manifest error of law in finding that Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank, Jackson, Miss v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980), stood for the proposition that a defendant could "pick off" a named plaintiff as long as none of the named plaintiffs had not yet applied for class certification.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motions to alter or amend a judgment "must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence." LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995). "A 'manifest error' is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party." Oto v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000). Instead, a "manifest error" consists of "the 'wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.'" Oto, 224 F.3d at 606.
Ptasinska'sFed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion argues that our interpretation of Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank, Jackson, Miss v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980), was incorrect and resulted in a manifest error. More specifically, Ptasinska contends that we made a manifest error in concluding that Roper supported the notion that "Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 currently allows defendants to 'pick off' plaintiffs as long as such action takes place before the class certification is filed." Ptasinska, 2007 WL 3241560 at *3.
In Roper, plaintiffs, holders of credit cards issued by defendant bank, brought a class action against defendant. 455 U.S. at 326. The District Court in Roper denied plaintiffs' application for class certification and the Fifth Circuit denied plaintiffs' motion for interlocutory appeal. Id. at 329. When the defendant tendered to plaintiffs the maximum amount each plaintiff could recover including legal interest and court costs, the plaintiffs refused. Id. Consequently, "the District Court, over [plaintiffs'] objections, then entered judgment in [plaintiffs'] favor on the basis of that tender and dismissed the action, the amount of the tender [was] deposited by [plaintiffs] in the court's registry." Id. at 325. The plaintiffs subsequently sought review of the District Court's denial of class certification. Id. Upon review, the Fifth Circuit "concluded that the case had not been mooted by the entry of judgment in [plaintiffs'] favor and reversed the [District Court's] adverse certification ruling." Id. at 331.
The United States Supreme Court granted writ and discussed the limited issue of "whether a tender to named plaintiffs in a class action of the amounts claimed in their individual capacities, followed by the entry of judgment in their favor on the basis of that tender, over their objections, moots the case and terminates their right to appeal the denial of class certification." Id. at 327. The Supreme Court conducted the following discussion in Roper to support its decision that the class representatives had standing to appeal the District Court's class certification decision:
A district court's ruling on the certification issue is often the most significant decision rendered in these class-action proceedings. To deny the right to appeal simply because the defendant has sought to "buy off" the individual private claims of the named plaintiffs would be contrary to sound judicial administration. Requiring multiple plaintiffs to bring separate actions, which effectively could be "picked off" by a defendant's tender of judgment before an affirmative ruling on class certification could be obtained, obviously would frustrate the objectives of class actions; moreover it would invite waste of judicial resources by stimulating successive suits brought by others claiming aggrievement. It would be in the ...