The opinion of the court was delivered by: Milton I. Shadur Senior United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Each of the defendants in this diversity-grounded lawsuit--BASF Aktiengesellschaft ("German BASF") and its subsidiary BASF Catalysts LLC ("Domestic BASF")--has filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule") 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the action brought against them by INEOS Polymers Inc. ("INEOS").*fn1 In turn INEOS has filed a single responsive memorandum addressing both motions. Because that filing displays a myopic (or perhaps more accurately astigmatic) view of the matter, this memorandum opinion and order will address some of the issues that bear on the viability of the Complaint. And because such limited treatment exposes at least one potentially fatal flaw in INEOS' lawsuit, no view needs to be (or is) expressed here as to the several other contentions advanced by German BASF or Domestic BASF.
There is no great mystery about the generous standards that have long applied to the sustainability of federal complaints, except for the Supreme Court's recent injection of a "plausibility" requirement in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 1973 n.14 (2007) that has tightened things up somewhat. But INEOS mistakes that generosity for a principle that would excuse its failure to satisfy a fundamental prerequisite: its showing of standing to bring this suit to begin with.
INEOS charges that Domestic BASF has breached some provisions of the 1992 Catalyst Supply Agreement ("Agreement") originally entered into between Amoco Chemical Company ("Amoco") and Catalyst Resources, Inc. ("CRI"), and it charges German BASF with tortious interference with the performance of the Agreement. But the difficulty with all of INEOS' contentions is that Agreement ¶19.A set out this highly constricted provision as to permitted assignments of the Agreement:
Assignment. Neither party may assign this Agreement or any part thereof, without the prior written consent of the other, except that Amoco may assign this Agreement in its entirety only without the consent of CRI at any time to any entity owned fifty percent (50%) or more, directly or indirectly, by Amoco Corporation, and CRI may assign this Agreement in its entirety only without the consent of Amoco to any company one hundred percent (100%) owned, directly or indirectly, by Phillips. Any other attempted assignment without the other party's consent shall be void. The terms of this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their successors and permitted delegatees and assignees.
And although none of the parties has discussed the justification for that constraint, the reason is evident from the extraordinarily detailed 106-page Agreement (exclusive of its also detailed and complex exhibits). What the Agreement revealed was a close interrelationship and interdependence of the original parties, so that the situation was really no different from that of a partnership in which neither partner can foist a stranger off on the other.
On that score INEOS' Amended Complaint ("AC") explains how it got into the act. AC ¶1 says in part:
INEOS is the successor entity to the rights and duties of Amoco Chemical....
Pursuant to a series of transactions, as of January 2006, Plaintiff INEOS had succeeded to the rights and obligations of Amoco Chemical, and Engelhard Corporation ("Engelhard") had succeeded to the rights and obligations of CRI and Phillips under the Supply Agreement.
And AC ¶12 describes the sequence of events through which INEOS ultimately entered the picture:
In 2006, Innovene Polymers Inc. was the successor entity to Amoco Chemical under the Supply Agreement following the assignment of Amoco Chemical's rights to Amoco Polymers Inc. ("Amoco Polymers"), which was subsequently renamed BP Amoco Polymers Inc. ("BP Amoco Polymers") and later Innovene Polymers Inc. Innovene Polymers Inc. was renamed INEOS Polymers Inc. following the acquisition of its parent company by the INEOS group in December 2005. INEOS Polymers is the subsidiary of INEOS USA LLC, which markets and sells the catalysts purchased under the Supply Agreement, principally through its office in Lisle, Illinois.
In that respect, although INEOS' Mem. 6 says that "[t]he only assignment alleged in the Complaint, from Amoco to Amoco Polymers, was an intra-corporate transfer between commonly-owned Amoco subsidiaries," that assertion glosses over--or more precisely ignores entirely--the fact that when what AC ¶12 calls "the INEOS Group" acquired the Amoco parent company, the consequence was that the Agreement was no longer in the hands of "any entity owned fifty percent (50%) or more, directly or indirectly, by Amoco Corporation" (Agreement ¶19.A). And what that means, it would appear, is that INEOS is attempting to advance its claims as an impermissible assignee of the Agreement via several mesne transfers.
INEOS seeks to avoid that issue by calling upon the doctrine that well-pleaded allegations in a complaint must be credited for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes. But that concept is inapplicable where the allegations are controverted by the very document or documents on which a plaintiff claims--in such a situation the controverted allegations are not, of course, "well-pleaded." In sum, INEOS must come to grips (as it has not) with ...