IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
December 10, 2007
RUDOLFO GARCIA, PLAINTIFF,
CITY OF CHICAGO, DEFENDANT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Milton I. Shadur Senior United States District Judge
During the initial status hearing in this action, this Court learned that counsel for the City of Chicago had filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses without complying with the requirement of this District Court's LR 5.2(e) that mandates the delivery of a paper copy of all electronic filings to the judge's chambers. City's counsel has now done so (as promised), and this memorandum order is issued sua sponte because of one problematic aspect of that responsive pleading.
Whenever City's counsel has set out a properly-stated disclaimer pursuant to the second sentence of Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule") 8(b) to get the benefit of a deemed denial (see Answer ¶¶1, 5-11, 15 and 18), that proper disclaimer has concluded inappropriately with the phrase "and therefore denies the allegations in Paragraph --." That is of course oxymoronic--how can a party that asserts (presumably in good faith) that it lacks even enough information to form a belief as to the truth of an allegation then proceed to deny it in the same objective good faith that is required by Rule 11(b)? Accordingly the quoted phrase is stricken from each of those paragraphs of the Answer.
This memorandum order is intentionally limited to the just-described flaw. Although one or more of the Affirmative Defenses may perhaps be problematic as well, any challenges of that type are best left to opposing counsel rather than being raised by this Court sua sponte.
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