The opinion of the court was delivered by: Joan Humphrey Lefkow United States District Judge
On August 23, 2004, this court entered a memorandum opinion and order finding that the defendants, including the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services ("HFS") (collectively, "defendants" or "the State"), were in violation of their obligations under the federal Medicaid Act. This finding was based in part on the State's ongoing failure to ensure that the plaintiffs (a class of children in Cook County eligible for Medicaid coverage) were provided pediatric care and services to the extent that such care and services were available to the general population. Dkt. No. 390. The court assumes the reader's familiarity with that very lengthy opinion for the purposes of this order and will not attempt to summarize it here. After that finding of defendants' liability, the parties elected to negotiate a consent decree to determine an appropriate remedy. The court approved and entered the parties' proposed decree on November 18, 2005. Dkt. No. 422. Unfortunately, the parties have now come to a disagreement regarding the implementation of the decree and are before the court on plaintiffs' motion to enforce it. Dkt. No. 440. For the reasons that follow, plaintiffs' motion [# 440] is granted.
The most relevant portion of the consent decree is paragraph 25:
HFS will commission by May 15, 2006, to be completed without undue delay, a study regarding access to specialist services by class member and non-class member children. HFS, in consultation with plaintiffs, will retain a qualified contracting expert for this role, subject to plaintiffs' reasonable approval of the expert. The parties will discuss with the expert their views on methodology for the study. The expert shall decide on an appropriate methodology.
Consent Decree, Dkt. No. 422, at ¶ 25. Plaintiffs argue that defendants have violated this mandate of the consent decree in at least three ways. First and foremost, they allege that the expert that defendants retained to conduct the study, Health Systems of Illinois ("HSI"), is not qualified. Second, plaintiffs argue that HSI has effectively been replaced by a new expert, Infosurv, that was retained without their approval.*fn1 Third, plaintiffs argue that by now, there has been undue delay in the completion of the study. Defendants contest each of these points and also argue that according to the consent decree, they are not matters for the court to decide.
Courts treat consent decrees like contracts for purposes of interpretation and enforcement. United States v. Alshabkhoun, 277 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2002); Autotech Tech. Ltd. P'Ship v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., 2006 WL 1304949 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2006) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 29 L.Ed. 2d 256 (1971)) ("As with all contracts, the ultimate question is what was the parties' mutual intent. The answer to that question is to be found 'within the consent order's four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it.'"). This consent decree provides that the court retains jurisdiction "for all purposes, including to enforce, modify, or dissolve [the] Decree." Consent Decree, at ¶ 41. Therefore, the court has the power and the obligation to enforce the requirements of the consent decree.
The first task, of course, is to resolve the dispute as to what the consent decree means. To resolve the dispute, the court must refer not only to paragraph 25, cited above, but also to the consent decree's paragraphs four and five, which require defendants to comply with the Medicaid Act by providing plaintiffs with equal access to pediatric care and services. See John B. v. Menke, 176 F. Supp. 2d 786, 800 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (where the consent decree incorporated the Medicaid Act, "the court [was] bound to look to the law that serves as the foundation for the four corners of the consent decree."). Those requirements include the efficient completion of a study that can effectively promote the state's compliance with the Medicaid Act.
The plaintiffs first argue that HSI is not a qualified expert to undertake the study. Although they gave their approval to the hiring of HSI, plaintiffs now believe that they were provided with false information regarding HSI's qualifications. Specifically, plaintiffs' counsel represents that plaintiffs were told that HSI had "expertise in designing and conducting similar studies," but the HSI personnel working on the study later admitted that they had never before conducted either a mail survey or an audit survey (the two main contenders for the methodology to be used here). Plaintiffs conclude from this that they should not be bound by their approval approval of HSI. Therefore, they argue, the consent decree has been violated because they never gave reasonable approval to the retention of HSI. As an independent matter, they cite the admissions of the HSI employees regarding their lack of experience as evidence that HSI is not qualified, which leads to the conclusion that defendants also violated the decree by proposing an unqualified expert.
In response to this point, defendants argue that nothing in the consent decree allows plaintiffs to withdraw their approval of HSI and that plaintiffs must be bound by that approval. They say that plaintiffs have sophisticated lawyers who cannot be heard to argue that they did not do sufficient investigation and that if plaintiffs' lawyers really did have doubts about HSI's qualifications at the time, they should not (and would not) have approved HSI in the first place. Defendants do not dispute, however, that the statements described above about HSI's expertise were made or that the HSI employees in fact have never conducted a mail or audit survey.*fn2
Their substantive comment on HSI's qualifications is that "HSI is a federally-qualified health care quality improvement organization that is part of a multi-state operation with more than 20 years of experience in health care quality issues, having designed and administered health care focused quality studies and special projects." Defendants' response, at 10. Defendants also argue that the qualification of the expert is not a matter for the court to decide because the consent decree left it up to the agreement of the parties.
As further evidence that HSI is not a qualified expert, plaintiffs argue that HSI proposed a survey method that is inappropriate and that the survey itself is poorly designed. Some relevant background is necessary before addressing the parties' arguments on this point.
In discussions with defendants and HSI about possible survey methodologies, plaintiffs advocated for an "audit survey," in which testers call doctors' offices pretending to be patients and request an appointment. Some of the time they say they have private insurance and some of the time they report to use Medicaid. In this way, the test attempts to determine whether and how children with Medicaid are treated differently from those with private insurance.
HSI conducted a literature review to examine the survey methods used in similar studies and the advantages and disadvantages of those methods.*fn3 On March 14, 2007, HSI presented its proposal, which is to use a mail survey to ask doctors and office staff a list of eight or nine questions regarding whether Medicaid children are treated differently than children ...