The opinion of the court was delivered by: Charles P. Kocoras, District Judge
Before this Court is Respondent Nedra Chandler's*fn1 motion to dismiss Petitioner Sheldon Pittman's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the following reasons, Chandler's motion is granted and Pittman's petition is dismissed with prejudice.
After a 1995 jury trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Pittman was convicted of armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 22 years for the armed robbery conviction and 15 years each for the attempted armed robbery convictions. He appealed, and on July 18, 1997, the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed his convictions. Pittman did not file a petition for leave to appeal with the Illinois Supreme Court.
On September 10, 1998, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-1. The trial court granted the state of Illinois's motion to dismiss, and the appellate court affirmed. On March 29, 2006, the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal the denial of his post-conviction petition.
On February 2, 2007, Pittman filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus with this court. Chandler moved to dismiss on grounds that his petition is untimely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
District courts are empowered by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to entertain writs of habeas corpus on behalf of state prisoners on the ground that they are imprisoned in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Review by federal courts is appropriate only when a prisoner has exhausted his options to challenge his conviction in the state courts, and guidelines for determining the finality of a state court judgment and the availability of federal review are supplied by 28 U.S.C § 2244. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 added section (d) to § 2244, providing a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of habeas petitions that begins running from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which "a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review...is pending" does not ...