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Brennan v. AT&T Corp.

August 2, 2007


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Herndon, District Judge


I. Introduction

Before the Court is a motion submitted by Defendant AT&T ("Defendant") to compel arbitration and to dismiss as to Plaintiffs Edward Brennan and Suzanne McGee. (Doc. 185.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs Edward Brennan and Suzanne McGee were AT&T customers, as defined by AT&T's customer service agreement, and therefore bound by the arbitration provision therein. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is DENIED. (Doc. 185.)

On June 22, 2004, Cheryl Hall, on behalf of others similarly situated, brought an action against Defendant alleging unjust enrichment, money had and received, and various statutory violations related to Defendant's allegedly unfair billing practices. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs amended their complaint slightly more than a month later and added Loretta Sanford, Sandra Wiles, and Annie Crawford as named Plaintiffs. (Doc. 6.) On March 1, 2005 the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's first motion to dismiss, dismissing Plaintiffs Cheryl Hall and Sandra Wiles. (Docs. 70, 71.) Plaintiffs then filed a seven-count second-amended complaint, adding named Plaintiffs Edward Brennan, Kathleen Mittelsteadt, Suzanne McGee, and Deane Stokes, Jr., and dropping Lorretta Sanford. (Doc. 74.) In response, Defendant filed various motions, including a motion to dismiss (Doc. 85) and a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss (Doc. 96). On February 8, 2006, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to dismiss, dismissing Counts I-V and Count VII of Annie Crawford's action and Count III of Stoke's action. (Doc. 161.) In addition, the Court denied at the time Defendant's motion to compel arbitration and dismiss, finding that additional facts were required to support these motions. (Doc. 161.) Subsequently, Defendant filed the present motion to compel arbitration as to Plaintiffs Edward Brennan and Suzanne McGee. (Doc. 185.) Plaintiffs responded in opposition (Doc. 187) and Defendant filed a reply in support of the motion (Doc. 188).

Following the filing of Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. (Doc. 191.) The Court granted this motion. (Doc. 219.) Plaintiffs' third amended complaint withdraws the claims of named Plaintiffs Suzanne McGee and Kathleen Mittelsteadt without prejudice. The third amended complaint alleges violations of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, et seq. ("Communications Act") (Counts I and II); violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505 et seq., and similar laws in other states (Count VI); violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS 510, et seq., and similar laws in other states (Count V); for unjust enrichment (Count III) and for money had and received (Count IV). The third amended complaint also redefines the putative class as: "All persons who were charged the Basic schedule $3.95 MRC by AT&T on or after January 1, 2004 and did not use AT&T telecommunication services at any time on or after August 1, 2001."

II. Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss (Doc. 185)

A. Legal Standard

Defendant moves to compel arbitration as to Plaintiffs Brennan and McGee on the ground that these Plaintiffs were AT&T customers at the time of the alleged injuries, and therefore their claims are subject to arbitration. (Doc. 185, p. 1.) Plaintiffs respond that Brennan and McGee were not AT&T customers when they were injured, and therefore that arbitration is inappropriate. In light of Plaintiffs' third amended complaint, which withdraws the claims of Plaintiff Suzanne McGee, the portion of Defendant's motion to compel arbitration that addresses McGee's claims is DENIED AS MOOT. Therefore, this Order will only address whether Plaintiff Brennan was a customer of AT&T at the relevant times and, therefore, must arbitrate his claims.

There is little doubt that if Plaintiff Brennan contractually agreed to submit all his disputes with AT&T to arbitration, then he is bound by that agreement and must pursue his claims through arbitration. See Boomer v. AT&TCorp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). Absent an agreement to arbitrate, however, arbitration cannot be compelled. Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50, 53 (7th Cir. 1995); Farrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 993 F.2d 1253, 1255 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986)); Adamovic v. METME Corp., 961 F.2d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 1992). Thus, the issue here is whether Plaintiff Brennan entered into a valid arbitration agreement with Defendant.

Defendant continues to rely on Boomer in support of its argument that Brennan must arbitrate his claims. In Boomer, the Seventh Circuit found, under Illinois law, that an individual in Illinois to whom AT&T sent a customer service agreement ("CSA")*fn1 with an arbitration provision agreed to the arbitration provision by the act of using AT&T's services, because the document clearly indicated that acceptance can be accomplished by those means. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 414-17. In other words, the court found that the CSA was an offer that was accepted by the consumer's act of using AT&T's services. Id. At this point, there is no real dispute that the CSA contains a valid, enforceable arbitration clause that applies to all AT&T customers. The question, instead, is whether Brennan was in fact an AT&T customer. In the prior motion to compel arbitration (Doc. 96), the Court held that it was unclear whether the named Plaintiffs were actually AT&T customers at the time the CSA was sent and thereafter. This time around, Defendant attempts to offer even more evidence in support of its contention that Brennan was, in fact, an AT&T customer at the relevant times.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that the arbitration clause is invalid based upon Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama-Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that the party resisting arbitration bears the burden "of proving that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration" and "of establishing that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the statutory claims at issue." Id. at 90. On the other hand, Plaintiffs assert that the "party moving to compel arbitration bears the burden of showing an enforceable arbitration agreement" based upon Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, 121 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997). Federal courts must "look to the state law that ordinarily governs the formation of contracts" when deciding whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. Id. Gibson is based upon Indiana state law. The Court is unaware of any Arizona case*fn2 that addresses the question of who bears the burden of proving that a valid arbitration agreement exists; however, the Court finds that an Illinois case reasonably addresses the dispute: "The party seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of proving that an arbitration agreement exists and that the claims are raised within the agreement's scope. If an arbitration agreement is valid, the party opposing the agreement has the burden of defeating it." Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 121, 359 Ill. App. 3d 976, 983 (2005) (citations omitted). Likewise, the Court finds that AT&T bears the burden of proving that an arbitration agreement actually existed between the parties. Only then would the burden shift to the Plaintiffs to prove that even though a valid arbitration agreement existed between the parties, they nonetheless should not be compelled to arbitrate.

B. Analysis

To determine whether Brennan was an AT&T customer and therefore bound by the terms of the arbitration provision contained within the CSA, the Court looks to the terms of the CSA. The CSA defines who is bound by the terms of the CSA: "BY ENROLLING IN, USING, OR PAYING FOR THE SERVICES, YOU AGREE TO THE PRICES, CHARGES, TERMS AND CONDITIONS IN THIS AGREEMENT." (Doc. 187, p. 10.) AT&T maintains that Brennan received the CSA as a stand-alone mailing. (Doc. 186, p. 11.) AT&T asserts that "the CSA Mailing was received by Brennan" based on the declaration of Ellen Reid, Director of Strategic Pricing and Regulatory for AT&T Consumer. Ms. Reid stated in her declaration that a "review of the Returned Mail List shows that the CSA Mailing sent to the attention of Mr. Brennan has not been returned to AT&T." (Reid Decl., ΒΆ 14.) Brennan counters that he does not recall receiving the CSA Mailing, but concedes that he does not read every piece of mail that he receives. Silence may constitute acceptance. "Where a letter is properly addressed and ...

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