The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge George M. Marovich
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff the United States of America ("United States" or the "government") filed suit against defendants Capital Tax Corporation ("Capital Tax"), Stephen J. Pedi ("Pedi") and William Lerch ("Lerch") alleging claims arising under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. The Court has already found each defendant liable to the government on Count I, pursuant to CERCLA §§ 107(a) and 113(g)(2). The United States has filed a second motion for summary judgment, this time with respect to damages. The United States seeks to recover from defendants costs it incurred taking remedial action at a hazardous waste site. In addition, in Counts II and III, the United States seeks civil penalties (pursuant to CERCLA § 106(b)) and punitive damages (pursuant to CERCLA § 107(c)(3)) against defendants for alleged violations of unilateral administrative orders. In Count IV, the United States asserts a claim against Lerch for failing to provide information in violation of CERCLA § 104(e)(5)(B).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part the government's motion for summary judgment.*fn1
Local Rule 56.1 outlines the requirements for the introduction of facts parties would like considered in connection with a motion for summary judgment. The Court enforces Local Rule 56.1 strictly. See Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817-818 (7th Cir. 2004). Facts that are argued but do not conform with the rule are not considered by the Court. For example, facts included in a party's brief but not in its statement of facts are not considered by the Court because to do so would rob the other party of the opportunity to show that such facts are disputed. Where one party supports a fact with admissible evidence and the other party fails to controvert the fact with citation to evidence admissible for summary judgment purposes, the Court deems the fact admitted. See Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817-818 (7th Cir. 2004). At the summary judgment stage, it is not sufficient merely to deny a fact or to claim a lack of knowledge (as defendants often have with respect to the government's statement of facts). The non-moving party must come forward with contrary evidence. This, however, does not absolve a party of its initial burden of putting forth admissible evidence to support his or its facts. Asserted "facts" not supported by deposition testimony, documents, affidavits or other evidence admissible for summary judgment purposes are not considered by the Court. For example, Capital Tax asserted in its statement of facts that "40% of the hazardous material removed originated on parcels 8 and 10." Although Capital Tax cites evidence to support the asserted fact, that evidence is not the record. Accordingly, the Court deems that asserted fact not supported, and the Court does not consider that fact.
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. The Court has already recounted the undisputed facts in another opinion. It reiterates here only those facts relevant to the issue of remedies.
This CERCLA suit concerns property located at 7411-7431 South Green Street (the "Site") in Chicago, Illinois. The Site is approximately one acre and contains seven parcels with the following Cook County index numbers: 20-29-230-005 ("Parcel 5"), 20-29-230-026 ("Parcel 26"), 20-29-230-008 ("Parcel 8"), 20-29-230-009 ("Parcel 9"), 20-29-230-010 ("Parcel 10"), 20-29-230-011 ("Parcel 11"), 20-29-230-012 ("Parcel 12") (collectively, the "Site Parcels"). A number of buildings sit on the Site. A warehouse sits on Site Parcel 5. A main office and a warehouse yard sit on Parcel 26. A main mixing room sits on Site Parcel 8. A roller mill room, a pigment room, a wash department and a ball mill room sit on Site Parcels 9, 10, 11 and 12, respectively. A storage yard, which is just west of those rooms, sits on Site Parcels 9, 10 and 11. Above the rooms is a laboratory.
Defendants' Involvement with the Site
Capital Tax became involved with the Site when the taxes became delinquent and Capital Tax obtained tax deeds to several parcels. Currently, Capital Tax owns parcels 5, 9, 11, 12 and 26. On October 30, 2001, Capital Tax obtained tax deeds for Parcels 5, 26, 9 and 11. It obtained the tax deed for Parcel 12 no later than February 14, 2003. By February 2001, Capital Tax was aware that the Site was a paint factory.
Prior to December 1995, a company called the National Lacquer and Paint Company, Inc. operated the Site. Pedi and Lerch took over in 2005. Technically, the National Lacquer Company (of which Pedi was the sole shareholder from its August 1995 incorporation until Lerch became a 50-percent shareholder in 2000) agreed to purchase the assets and property of the old National Lacquer and Paint Company, Inc. The real property was transferred to a trust, in which Pedi owned the sole beneficial interest. Pedi remains the beneficiary of the trust that holds title to Parcel 8 and Parcel 10. From December 12, 1995 to October 30, 2001, Pedi was the beneficial owner of the trust holding title to Parcels 5, 9, 11 and 26. From December 12, 1995 to February 14, 2002, Pedi was the beneficiary of the trust that held title to Parcel 12.
History of Hazardous Waste Disposal at the Site
Before the December 1995 sale, Pedi inspected the Site. He noticed "hazardous waste materials" at the Site. At the time of the sale, the Site contained: 1500 pounds of ethyl acetate, 500 pounds of xylene, 2000 pounds of methylene chloride, 600 pounds of methyl ethyl ketone, 375 pounds of methyl isobutyl ketone and 55 pounds of phosphoric acid. The parties agree that these substances are listed as hazardous under CERCLA. Pedi did not take any steps to safeguard the hazardous substances at the Site.
National Lacquer Company ("National Lacquer") operated at the Site from late l995 to late 2002. During that time, it reclaimed paint at the Site to produce specialized coatings. It also stripped furniture. Lerch, as manager, directed all National Lacquer operations--including paint reclamation--at the Site. Lerch ordered raw materials and was responsible for directing their use. In addition, Lerch directed his employees to send raw materials from another business to National Lacquer. Specifically, Lerch also operated a company called NiChem, and some of the materials used by National Lacquer were shipped to it from NiChem.
In addition, Lerch was also responsible for decisions regarding the handling and disposal of hazardous wastes for National Lacquer. Lerch admitted that the paints made by National Lacquer were hazardous. He was responsible for all decisions related to environmental problems at the Site. Among other things, Lerch contracted with Strong Environmental for the removal, disposal and analysis of hazardous substances at the Site.
Although Pedi believed that Lerch was not running the Site properly, Pedi did nothing about it.
At various points during the time National Lacquer operated the Site, hazardous materials leaked or spilled. The Site constantly smelled of solvents, which suggested (to Lerch, among others) that the facility was potentially flammable. In June 1997, a spill at the Site caused a solvent odor in the sewers on Green Street.
In January 1998, the Chicago Department of the Environment ("CDOE") inspected the Site. It found about 100 old cans of paint in a building with a leaking roof. It also found that the floor of the building was covered with water and paint from leaking cans. In May 1998, the CDOE and the Chicago Fire Department conducted an investigation at the Site. They found hundreds of rusty, damaged and leaking pails, cans and jars. They also found the roof was still leaking. Water mixed with product was flowing underneath an exterior door and into the street.
On or about July 30, 1998, Lerch and National Lacquer entered into a settlement agreement with the City of Chicago regarding hazardous waste at the Site. Under the settlement agreement, Lerch and National Lacquer agreed to "repair or dispose of in an approved manner defective containers which are permitting leakage or spillage throughout the premises."
More generally, the storage yard at the Site contained more than one hundred 55-gallon drums and drums of other sizes. The drums contained solvents and other hazardous materials. Throughout the time when National Lacquer operated the Site, the drums leaked. When the drums leaked, solvents evaporated and left behind a resin.
The warehouse (on Parcel 5) contained numerous damaged cans of paint, some of which leaked or spilled. Some of the cans continued to leak until the contents could be transferred to other containers. The leaked paint ran onto the concrete floor of the warehouse. In addition, the roof of the warehouse leaked during a portion of the time when National Lacquer operated the Site.
At some point, a National Lacquer employee took "sludge" from the bottom of machinery at the Site and deposited the "sludge" in a neighbor's garbage cans. The "sludge" contained methyl ketone, which the parties agree is a substance listed as hazardous under CERCLA.
Activity at the Site Since Capital Tax Became Involved
When Capital Tax obtained the deeds, it intended to resell the property. Capital Tax had already reached an agreement with Mervyn Dukatt ("Dukatt"), who had worked with Capital Tax in the past, to convey the parcels to Dukatt. Dukatt paid Capital Tax part but not all of the undisclosed purchase price. To this day, Dukatt has not paid the remainder of the purchase price.
Dukatt (on his own behalf) visited the Site several times. He was overseeing work in the garage at Parcel 12. Dukatt had hired workers who, over the course of two or three weeks, cut up and removed the paint machines that had been in the garage. They also repaired and replaced an overhead door and knocked down two walls. When he and his workers were not present, Dukatt kept the office and the garage locked.
Capital Tax, on the other hand, did very little with respect to the parcels it owned. For example, Capital Tax did nothing to safeguard the Site against acts or omissions of third parties. Capital Tax did not test any materials at the Site to determine whether they were hazardous. Capital Tax failed to notice a five-foot by three-foot hole in a door that allowed third parties to access the Site. Capital ...