The opinion of the court was delivered by: Michael M. Mihm United States District Judge
Before the Court is Nathandre Campbell's ("Campbell") Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, Campbell's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [#5] is DENIED and Respondent's Motion to Dismiss [#12] is GRANTED.
Petitioner Campbell was convicted in the Circuit Court of McLean County, Illinois, of two counts of armed violence, home invasion, armed robbery, and residential burglary. He was sentenced to 30 years of imprisonment. Campbell appealed his conviction, and on July 31, 2001, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. On August 29, 2001, Campbell filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. On October 6, 2004, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Campbell's petition for leave to appeal.
On January 17, 2001, Campbell filed a pro se post-conviction petition, which the trial court dismissed as frivilous and patently without merit in February 2001. On July 31, 2003, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed that denial of Campbell's post-conviction petition, and Campbell declined to seek a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.
On May 22, 2006, Campbell filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, claiming that the trial court violated his due process rights when it made no reference to mandatory supervised release at his sentencing hearing. On June 20, 2006, the trial court dismissed the petition, and Campbell did not appeal.
On November 15, 2006, Campbell filed with this Court a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis and a "Motion for Leave to File Late Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus," in which he asked the Court to consider his Petition, despite its noncompliance with the one-year statute of limitations under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA" or "the Act"). Campbell claimed that he had been "impeded and stymied from applying" the Act because the Illinois Department of Corrections had repeatedly transferred him among facilities and deprived him of access to his legal file.
In order to resolve the two motions, the Court ordered Campbell to file a supplemental pleading that provided details regarding the dates of transfers between correctional facilities and the specific legal documents to which he was deprived access. Campbell timely filed such a supplemental pleading. The Court denied Campbell's Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis, and Campbell submitted the required filing fee. The Court granted Campbell's Motion for Leave to File without ruling on the issue of timeliness, directed the clerk to file Campbell's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and instructed the Government to respond. Respondent moved to dismiss the Petition on February 1, 2007, and Campbell has filed a timely Response to that Motion. This Order follows.
Campbell argues that he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because (1) the trial court failed to employ the People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510 (1971), balancing to assess the admissibility of his prior convictions; (2) the trial court improperly allowed evidence of his prior convictions to be used for impeachment purposes based on the "mere fact" method; and (3) he was not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In response to Campbell's Petition, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition claiming that the Petition is time barred under the AEDPA.
The AEDPA imposes statutory time limits, which govern whether a district court can entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The present case is covered by 28 U.S.C. § 2244, which states in relevant part:
(d)(1) A 1 year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of -
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant ...