The opinion of the court was delivered by: Michael M. Mihm United States District Judge
Now before the Court is Defendant Nord Cleaning Service's ("Nord") Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion [#30] is GRANTED.
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the claims asserted in the Complaint present federal questions under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. ("ADA").
Plaintiff Robert Idahosa ("Idahosa") began working for Nord Cleaning Service on January 22, 2001. He supervised various sites in the Peoria area at which Nord had cleaning contracts. Idahosa voluntarily terminated his employment with Nord on September 7, 2004. On December 2, 2004, Idahosa filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that Nord had violated his rights under Title VII and the ADA. The EEOC issued Idahosa a Right to Sue Letter October 13, 2005, and Idahosa, proceeding pro se, filed the instant action on January 12, 2006, naming Nord Cleaning Service, Curt Nord, and Linda Sears as defendants.
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss to which Idahosa filed a Response. By this Court's Order dated March 3, 2006, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. All of Idahosa's claims against Curt Nord and Linda Sears were dismissed, as was the claim of discriminatory failure to promote based on race and the claim for compensatory and punitive damages arising out of retaliatory discharge under the ADA. Idahosa's surviving claims under Title VII are that he was discriminated against because of his race in that he was (1) denied payment for mileage, (2) denied insurance benefits, (3) denied wage increases, and (4) denied medical leave. Idahosa's surviving claims under the ADA are that he was (1) discharged because of a disability, and (2) denied reasonable accommodation in the form of medical leave.
Nord filed this Motion for Summary Judgment on February 28, 2007, arguing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Idahosa's claims. Also on February 28, 2007, the Clerk of the Court sent notice to Idahosa that a case-dispositive motion had been filed, that his response was due within twenty-one days, and that under the Court's local rules, a motion would be deemed uncontested if no opposing brief was filed.
Idahosa's twenty-one days expired on March 26, and Idahosa has not filed a response, nor has he requested additional time to do so, despite the Clerk's warnings of the detrimental consequences of failing to respond. Accordingly, the Court accepts as true Nord's statement of undisputed facts and deems the motion to be uncontested. See Local Rule 7.1(D)(2). The Court will now briefly address the relevant law and facts pertaining to each of Idahosa's claims.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
The Court recognizes that the standards of review governing summary judgment motions become somewhat irrelevant in a situation such as this one, where the non-moving party has not responded to the motion or otherwise objected to it. Still, summary judgment should only be granted where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
II. Idahosa's Title VII Claims
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating "against any individual with respect to [his] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2404 (1986). Under Title VII, the plaintiff is required to establish that he has ...