The opinion of the court was delivered by: Harold A. Baker United States District Judge
The parties' respective motions for summary judgment are before the Court.
Summary Judgment Standard
A party moving for summary judgment must show, from the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, . . ." that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the "moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2001), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986);Fed. R. Civ. P.56(c). This burden can be satisfied by "'showing'--that is, pointing out to the district court--that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the non-movant to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Outlaw, 259 F.3d at 837. A nonmoving party cannot rest on pleadings, but must come forth with admissible evidence. Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 23 F.3d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1994). In determining whether factual issues exist, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Beraha v. Baxter Health Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1440 (7th Cir. 1992). However, Rule 56(c) "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
This case is proceeding on the following claims, which all regard conditions of confinement Plaintiff experienced as a protective custody inmate in Menard Correctional Center from August 2003 to August 2004 (Case Management Order, d/e 7):
1. Denial of access to the courts caused Plaintiff to suffer actual injury in a criminal proceeding in New Mexico (case no. CR-95-66) and actual injury in a civil action in the Northern District of Illinois, Crawford v. Snyder, case no. 03-4513.
2. Placement in a smoking cell/with a smoking cellmate violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights.
3. Denial of religious services/opportunities violated Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000cc-1(a).
4. Denial of barber services violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights.
5. Different treatment of Plaintiff as a Level E, protective custody inmate in the above respects violated Plaintiff's right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Defendant Eugene McAdory was the Chief Administrative Officer at Menard from January 1, 2003 to May 15, 2004. (McAdory Aff. ¶ 1). Defendant McAdory is currently retired.
2. Defendant Charles Hinsley was the Chief Administrative Officer at Menard from June 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004. (Hinsley Aff. ¶ 1). Defendant Hinsley is currently retired.
3. Defendant Melody Ford was an Administrative Review Board Member during the relevant time frame.
4. Defendant Debi Middendorf was a Grievance Counselor at Menard during the relevant time frame.
5. Defendant Roger Walker was the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections during the relevant time frame and continues in that role at present.
6. Plaintiff was sentenced by the State of New Mexico and is incarcerated in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The IDOC website states that he is serving a life sentence for murder, and his other offenses include a prison escape, aggravated kidnaping, and possession of a stolen vehicle. http://www.idoc.state.il.us.
7. Plaintiff has been classified as a "Level E" inmate by the Illinois Department of Corrections since December 8, 1995 to the present. (Exhibit E, Plaintiff's deposition, p. 7, l. 5-24; p. 8, l. 1-4). Level E means Plaintiff is considered an extremely high escape risk. As such, special security precautions must be taken. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 13; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 13). For example, Plaintiff is routinely transferred between maximum security prisons in the IDOC. (Amended Complaint, d/e 10, ¶ 10).
8. Menard is a maximum security prison in which Plaintiff has been incarcerated four times.
9. Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in Pontiac Correctional Center.
10. Inmates who have known enemies or fear for their safety because of the notoriety of their crimes or other reasons can request protective custody ("P.C."). (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 16; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 16). A voluntary P.C. inmate is an inmate who has on his own accord requested placement in P.C. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 21; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 21).
11. P.C. is a housing unit that is separated from the general population inmates and, generally, Level E inmates. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 17; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 17). Plaintiff counters that many P.C. inmate are also Level E inmates (d/e 45 p.9), but does not dispute that P.C. inmates are housed separately from general population inmates.
12. At the time of Plaintiff's incarceration in Menard in 2003-2004, he was classified as a "voluntary P.C. inmate," housed in P.C. unit North One. (Amended Complaint, d/e 10, ¶ 9). Plaintiff was in P.C. before arriving at Menard. (Exhibit E, Plaintiff's deposition, p. 8, l. 11-14).
13. Plaintiff asserts that his P.C. status was not truly voluntary, as it was the only realistic choice available to him, since he had received threats of serious bodily harm or death (d/e 45, p.
10). Plaintiff, however, does not dispute that he did request P.C. status.
14. Once an inmate requests P.C., he is taken to the P.C. unit as soon as possible where he is then interviewed for eligibility for placement. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 21; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 21).
15. At Menard, a Level E inmate could only be housed in certain cellhouses and had to be escorted whenever he moved within the facility. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 14-15; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 14-15). Plaintiff agrees, but asserts that all inmates had to be escorted, not just Level E inmates. (d/e 45, p. 9).
16. At some point in time Menard's P.C. Unit housed 400 inmates. However, this number later decreased to just around 40 inmates. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 42; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 42).
17. As a result of the decrease in inmates requesting P.C., the number of cells available for P.C. also decreased and the former P.C. cells were then used for other types of placement. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 42; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶42).
18. One of these designations alone (P.C. or Level E) would have required additional security measures to be applied to the Plaintiff's living arrangements and movement. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 20; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 20). P.C. inmates remain separate from general population inmates because allowing the two groups to mix would compromise the safety of the P.C. inmates, who seek protection from general population inmates. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 24; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 24).
19. Whenever a P.C. inmate is taken out of his unit and into areas used by general population inmates, it increases the chances of an assault on that inmate. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 22; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 22).
20. Defendants assert that any time a P.C. inmate needs to be moved to another area of the prison, the movement coordinator must be called and the movement of all other inmates along the way must be stopped, with general population inmates locked behind doors or gates. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 22; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 22). Plaintiff disputes this, stating that P.C. inmates are exposed to General Population inmates on a daily basis through inmate workers, line movements, and in the rooms for clothing, personal property and visiting. He characterizes the actual separation of the groups as "nominal," stating that P.C. and G.P. lines often pass each other with no physical barrier.
21. Because they could not interact with general population inmates since they have asked to be kept separate from those inmates, P.C. inmates received separate meals, recreation, showers, chapel, and law library. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 24-25; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 24-25).
Opportunities to Practice Religion
22. Plaintiff avers that he is a Pentecostal Christian, a religion which he maintains requires communion and the services of a Pentecostal minister. (Plaintiff Aff. ¶ 8).
23. Defendants assert that Chapel Services for protective custody inmates were provided once during the week from 11 a.m. to Noon and on the last Sunday of the month from 11 a.m. to Noon. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 26; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 26; Exhibit D, Middendorf Affidavit, ¶ 9). They assert that the exception to this would have been if the Chaplain was unavailable or security issues within the institution prevented inmates from being transported to the Chapel. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 26; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 26; Exhibit D, Middendorf Affidavit, ¶ 9). Defendants also maintain that, based on department records, Plaintiff attended the chapel from November 2003 to August 2004. The records, however, are not attached to the affidavits.
24. Plaintiff disputes the frequency of chapel visits, attaching the records he received from Defendants about movement to the chapel from PC. (Plaintiff's Ex. 15). However, those records do show (except for a few dates) that PC inmates were taken to the chapel nearly every Thursday from 11:00 a.m. until noon during the time in question. They also show that Plaintiff went to chapel over twenty times during the relevant time frame, which he does not dispute. What the records do not show is what the PC inmates did at chapel. Plaintiff admits that at Menard he was able to periodically go to Bible studies in the Chapel with other inmates and read his Bible. (Exhibit E, Plaintiff's deposition, p. 35, l. 11-24; p. 36, l. 1-10; p. 39, l. 6-19). However, Plaintiff says no services were conducted by the Chaplain and he had no opportunity to take communion.
25. Religious services were televised on the institutional T.V. channel for all inmates to access. (Exhibit B, McAdory Affidavit, ¶ 26; Exhibit C, Hinsley Affidavit, ¶ 26; Exhibit D, Middendorf Affidavit, ¶ 9). However, Plaintiff asserts the programming was irrelevant to his faith (Pentecostal), ...