IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
February 28, 2007
DONALD N. HORINA, PLAINTIFF,
CITY OF GRANITE CITY, ILLINOIS, DEFENDANT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Reagan, District Judge
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Before this Court is Granite City's motion to stay execution of judgment (Doc. 93). Therein, Granite City informs this Court that it has filed a notice of appeal from the monetary judgment entered in this matter (see Doc. 92) and requests a stay of execution of the damages award entered in favor of Plaintiff Donald Horina (see Doc. 93). Granite City moves for the stay pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 62(f) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 305(i), asserting that requiring a bond would result in an unnecessary expense to the City (Doc. 93, p. 2), and requesting that a stay of execution on Horina's award of damages be entered until the appeal is complete.
Rule 62(f) provides that a district court, in accordance with state law, can stay the execution of a judgment, and thereby waive the requirement that the appellant post a bond. See FED. R.CIV.P. 62(f). The burden is on the party seeking a stay of the enforcement to objectively demonstrate reasons to depart from the requirement that the party post a full supersedeas bond. Spellman v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., 1992 WL 80528 at *1 (N.D.Ill. 1992).
In Illinois, a judgment entered, once recorded, acts as a lien against the judgment debtor, in this case Granite City. As mentioned, Granite City asserts that requiring a bond in this matter would result in an unnecessary expense to the City. In response, Horina misconstrues Granite City's motion as one for an automatic stay, and fails to provide this Court with any reason that harm would accrue to the parties should this Court order a stay of the execution of the monetary judgment awarded Horina. Moreover, the Court notes that the monetary award in this matter is relatively trivial, amounting to only $2772.00 (see Doc. 84). While this Court likely would require a more convincing showing from Granite City were the amount at issue significantly larger, this lesser amount greatly diminishes the probability that any harm that would accrue to Horina from a stay in the execution of judgment.
Accordingly, pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.62(f), the Court FINDS that no harm would accrue to the parties should the Court enter a stay of execution pending appeal, and that a stay of execution would alleviate Granite City from an unnecessary expense. The Court therefore GRANTS Granite City's motion for stay of execution (Doc. 93), and WAIVES Granite City's requirement to post a bond pending its appeal. The Court clarifies that this stay applies only to the monetary judgment in this matter. The non-monetary judgment entered in this matter (i.e. the declaration of Granite City Ordinance 7861 as unconstitutional) remains in full force and effect.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
MICHAEL J. REAGAN United States District Judge
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