The opinion of the court was delivered by: Magistrate Judge Maria Valdez
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on "Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration of the Order Partially Granting Defendant, City of Chicago's Motion to Bar Discovery" [Doc. No. 105]. For the reasons set forth below, the relief requested in Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
Plaintiff Kathleen Paine, mother and guardian of the estate of Christina Rose Eilman, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and Illinois common law against the City of Chicago (the "City") and unnamed individual police officers involved in the arrest, detainment, and release of her daughter. Plaintiff's three-count complaint alleges the following claims:
a. Count I-"1983 Action Against John and Jane Doe Chicago Police Officers for Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs" (Compl. at 8.);
b. Count II-"1983 Action (Monell Claim) Against the City of Chicago" (Compl. at 9.); and
c. Count III-Supplemental State Law Claim for Willful and Wanton Conduct Against Defendants City of Chicago and John and Jane Doe Chicago Police Officers" (Compl. at 11.)
On December 22, 2006, this Court bifurcated Count II from Counts I and III, pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has moved for this Court to reconsider this ruling. A motion to reconsider is proper to correct manifest errors of law or fact, or to present newly-discovered evidence. Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1998). Reconsideration is not available for arguments that have already been raised and rejected, or for arguments that could have been previously offered. Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996); LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is improper because Plaintiff (a) identifies no manifest error of law or fact, nor presents any newly-discovered evidence, (b) raises arguments that fail to comport with United States Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, and (c) offers arguments that already have been raised and rejected by this Court.
Plaintiff's principal argument is that this Court committed a manifest error of law because it failed to recognize "established case law" that holds that a plaintiff can still maintain a valid Monell cause of action even when the individual officers are not found liable for constitutional violations. (Pltf's Mot. for Reconsideration at 6.) Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is improper because, as Plaintiff concedes, she "has not found a Seventh Circuit case exactly on point applicable to this particular situation." (Pltf's Mot. for Reconsideration at 7.) A "manifest error" is defined as a "'wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent'" on the part of the court. Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir.2000) (quoting Sedrak v. Callahan, 987 F.Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D.Ill.1997)). Since Plaintiff concedes that no controlling Seventh Circuit authority exists to support her position there has been no "manifest error of law" committed by this Court.
Even with this concession, Plaintiff goes on to argue that a manifest error of law occurred because this Court did not, as Plaintiff suggested, "follow the well-reasoned decisions of other circuits holding Heller inapplicable." Id. Not only is this an invalid basis for filing a motion for reconsideration, the law in the Seventh Circuit is inapposite.
In City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986), the United States Supreme Court concluded that "neither Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services . . . nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional injury." 475 U.S. at 799. Relying on Heller, this Court bifurcated Count II of Plaintiff's complaint from Counts I and III. In addition to Heller, the law in the Seventh Circuit supports this Court's decision. In Treece v. Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh Circuit held that "it is well established in this Circuit that a municipality's liability for a constitutional injury requires a finding that the individual officer is liable on the underlying substantive claim." (citations omitted). Importantly, in a case addressing the "failure to train" and "failure to implement" claims raised under the instant complaint,*fn1 the Seventh Circuit found that "[a]s for the claim of municipal liability, a plaintiff must prove that the individual officers are liable on the underlying substantive claim in order to recover damages from a municipality under either a failure to train or failure to implement theory." Windle v. City of Marion, Indiana, 321 F.3d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
At the heart of Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is her reliance upon the Eighth Circuit's decision in Speer v. City of Wynne, 276 F.3d 980 (8th Cir. 2002). In Speer, the Eighth Circuit opined that the combined actions of employees may give rise to Monell liability even though the individual actions of those employees do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id. at 986. While Speer does contemplate the possibility of liability on a "collective action" theory, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has so held. The Seventh Circuit in its Windle decision is on point and nothing raised by the Plaintiff's reliance on other ...