The opinion of the court was delivered by: Samuel Der-yeghiayan, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Bobby Lee Harrison's ("Harrison") motion to reconsider and motions for leave to file an amended complaint. For the reasons stated below, we deny the motion to reconsider and deny the motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
Harrison brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") against Defendants "Mr. Horan" ("Horan") and "Horan Interprise" ("Interprise"). Harrison alleged that on September 3, 2004, he entered Markam Food & Liquor, which is owned and operated by Horan. Harrison contended that while in the store, a woman entered and accused Harrison of raping her on a prior occasion. Harrison further alleged that Horan incited a private citizen in the store to inflict bodily injury upon Harrison due to the woman's rape accusation. Harrison contended that the private citizen used a monkey wrench to severely beat Harrison, causing Harrison to lose consciousness. Harrison alleged that he was taken to the hospital where he was treated for his injuries. Harrison claimed that the incident has caused memory loss and serious headaches, which required numerous doctor visits.
On October 13, 2006, we dismissed the instant action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to Harrison's Section 1983 claim and we declined to exercise supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over Harrison's underlying state law tort claim. Additionally, since we dismissed Harrison's complaint, we dismissed as moot his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, his motion for appointment of counsel filed on August 31, 2006, and his motion for appointment of counsel filed on October 2, 2006. Harrison now requests that we allow him to file an amended complaint and that we reconsider our prior ruling.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) ("Rule 59(e)") permits parties to file, within ten days of the entry of a judgment, a motion to alter or amend the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 59(e) motions do not give a party the opportunity to rehash old arguments or to present new arguments or evidence "that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment." Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir.1996)(citing LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir.1995)). Rather, for a Rule 59(e) motion, the movant "must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence" in order to be successful. LB Credit Corp., 49 F.3d at 1267 (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir.1986)). The decision of whether to grant or deny a motion brought pursuant to Rule 59(e) "is entrusted to the sound judgment of the district court. . . ." In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir.1996).
If a party does not file the motion for reconsideration within ten business days "after entry of judgment[, it] automatically becomes a Rule 60(b) motion." Talano v. Northwestern Med. Faculty Found., Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2001)(quoting Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1143 (7th Cir. 1994)); U.S. v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992)(holding that "motions to alter or amend a judgment served more than ten days after the entry of judgment are to be evaluated under Rule 60(b)"); Fed R. Civ. P. 6(a). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) ("Rule 60(b)") provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).A court should grant a Rule 60(b) motion "only in exceptional circumstances" because "[r]elief under Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy. . . ." Talano, 273 F.3d at 762 (quoting Provident Sav. Bank v. Popovich, 71 F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir.1995)).
Harrison's motion to reconsider is unclear as to whether he is asking this court to reconsider this court's order on October 13, 2006 terminating the action, this court's order denying as moot his motion for appointment of counsel filed on August 31, 2006, or this court's order denying his motion for appointment of counsel filed on October 2, 2006. The pleadings of a pro se plaintiff are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)(citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Thus, we liberally construe Harrison's motion as a motion to reconsider this court's order on October 13, 2006 ...