The opinion of the court was delivered by: Reagan, District Judge
This Order addresses the bills of costs filed by Plaintiff (Doc. 95) pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 54(d), which authorizes federal district courts to award costs (as well as attorneys' fees in appropriate cases) to prevailing parties in lawsuits. Plaintiff's "Interim Petition for Fees and Costs through December 27, 2006" (Doc. 86) and "Motion for Attorneys Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988" (Doc. 88) will be addressed in a subsequent order.
I. Background and Introduction
The full procedural history and background of this case is detailed in this Court's "Order Following Bench Trial" (Doc. 83) and will not be repeated in the present Order. For purposes of this Order, it is sufficient to say that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in his First Amendment cause of action against the Defendant, in that Plaintiff succeeded in convincing this Court to declare Granite City Ordinance 7861 unconstitutional (see Doc. 78). Following a bench trial on the issue of damages, the Court awarded Plaintiff compensatory money damages in the sum of $2772.00 (see Doc. 83).
In the motion now before the Court, Plaintiff seeks costs in the total sum of $1622.79. Defendant has filed an objection (see Doc. 96), but has abandoned its untimeliness complaint (see Doc. 105, p. 2), leaving only two issues in dispute: 1) whether the bill of costs is defective because it lacked the verification required by 28 U.S.C. § 1924*fn1 ; and 2) whether mileage expenses in the sum of $223.20 incurred by Plaintiff's counsel as a result of three trips to Granite City Municipal Court, where he defended Plaintiff against a municipal ordinance violation charge, are recoverable.
The first issue is easily dispatched because Plaintiff, although belatedly, has filed the requisite § 1924 affidavit (see Doc.104-2).
A prevailing party is a litigant who "wins the battle" on a "substantial part of the litigation." Slane v. Mariah Boats, Inc., 164 F.3d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1005 (1999); First Commodities Traders, Inc. v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir. 1985). Defendants prevail by defeating a claim against them. See Perlman v. Zell, 185 F.3d 850, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999).
In relevant part, FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 54 provides:
(d)(1) Costs Other than Attorneys' Fees. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs. . . . FED.R.CIV.P. 54(d)(1).
This rule has been interpreted to create a strong presumption that a prevailing party shall recover costs, with broad discretion given to district courts in deciding the extent of such costs. Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Industries Company, Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 944 (7th Cir. 1997). "The presumption in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party is difficult to overcome, and the district court's discretion is narrowly defined -- the court must award costs unless it states good reasons for denying them." Weeks, 126 F.3d at 945, citing Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche, Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 219, 222 (7th Cir. 1988). "Generally, only misconduct by the prevailing party worthy of penalty or the losing party's inability to pay will suffice to justify denying costs. Weeks, 126 F.3d at 945, citing id.The district court may exercise its discretion to deny costs, although it should state its reason for such disallowance. Cengr v. Fusibond Piping Systems, Inc., 135 F.3d 445, 453 (7th Cir. 1998); Gardner v. Southern Railway Systems, 675 F.2d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 1982).
In the instant case, Horina is clearly a "prevailing party" within the meaning of FED. R.CIV.P.54(d). He succeeded in obtaining a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the enforcement of Granite City Ordinance No. 5.78.010 and further succeeded in declaring its successor ordinance, No. 7861 unconstitutional.
Costs do not include all litigation expenses. Rather, costs are particular statutorily-defined categories of incurred charges worthy of reimbursement. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987); Hairline ...