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Thompson v. Memorial Hospital of Carbondale

January 26, 2007

ARCHIE D. THOMPSON, PLAINTIFF,
v.
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF CARBONDALE, DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Murphy, Chief District Judge

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

The Court heard arguments on Defendant's pending motion on January 19, 2007. For the reasons set forth on the record at the hearing and below, Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an African-American, worked in an Emergency Medical System as a Emergency Medical Technician Paramedic (EMT). Plaintiff claims that he suffered racial discrimination in employment which led to his constructive discharge.

Plaintiff was an EMT for Jackson County Ambulance Service, which is part of an Emergency Medical Services (EMS) System. In Illinois, EMS Systems are comprised of: 1) hospitals, 2) vehicle service providers, and 3) personnel. In this case, the participating hospital is Memorial Hospital of Carbondale, and the vehicle service provider is Jackson County Ambulance Service. The relationship between these entities is governed by the Illinois Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act at 210 ILCS 50/1, et seq.

When responding to an ambulance call, EMTs must often provide emergency medical treatment such as a needle injection or an intravenous treatment (IV). Thus, EMTs must operate under a medical license and can function only under the direction of a licensed Medical Director. Here, the EMS Medical Director was Dr. Doolittle. Dr. Doolittle was responsible for overseeing the medical services administered by Defendant's EMTs, including the medical services that were provided by Plaintiff. Under Dr. Doolittle was Paula Bierman, an EMS Coordinator. As EMS Coordinator, Ms. Bierman was responsible for overseeing compliance issues, skill deficiencies, and training of EMTs. Memorial Hospital compensated both Dr. Doolittle and Ms. Bierman for their services in the EMS system.

Plaintiff began working for Jackson County Ambulance Service (JCAS) in October 1996. Plaintiff alleges that during 1998 and 1999 Ms. Bierman told him, "You can't do what other paramedics do," and "I'll be watching you." Plaintiff claims that he asked her if the reason she said this was that he was black, and she responded, "Yes." Plaintiff also claims that Ms. Bierman told him that she could not invite him into her home because she did not know how her neighbors would react to a "black man" in her neighborhood.

During 2000, Plaintiff expressed an interest to Ms. Bierman in becoming a Supervisor. Ms. Bierman, however, told him that to become a Supervisor, he must first become a "Preceptor." (A "Preceptor" is a person who mentors and monitors other EMTs.) Plaintiff then told Bierman that he wanted to become a Preceptor, and she responded that he must first obtain some teaching experience. Plaintiff then asked Bierman for some teaching experience, but she did not give him a teaching assignment. Plaintiff did, however, receive a teaching opportunity from an instructor at John A. Logan College which Plaintiff rejected.

On September 29, 2003, Plaintiff responded to an ambulance call where a woman had lapsed into a diabetic coma. After arrival, Plaintiff injected her with glucose and started her on an IV but failed to contact Medical Control personnel. Applicable protocol required that anytime an EMT administers medicine or an IV, the EMT must contact Medical Control.

Plaintiff's failure to contact Medical Control was reported to Paula Bierman. Ms. Bierman reported the incident to Dr. Doolittle and recommended that Plaintiff be suspended. Dr. Doolittle rejected Ms. Bierman's recommended suspension. Instead, Dr. Doolittle placed Plaintiff on ninety (90) days of probation beginning October 6, 2003.

In mid to late October, Plaintiff applied for an open Supervisor position. On October 28, 2003, JCAS Director Dottie Miles sat down with Plaintiff and discussed his application. Plaintiff was not promoted to Supervisor. On November 11, 2003, Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge of discrimination against Defendants. In December 2003, Plaintiff took a leave of absence under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) due to job stress. When Plaintiff returned, he was informed that because he took FMLA leave in December 2003, he had interrupted the completion of his 90-day probationary period, and he still had six-weeks left on probation. Shortly thereafter, in February 2004, Plaintiff began taking general leaves of absence on a monthly basis. On July 7, 2004, Plaintiff resigned by sending a letter to Dottie Miles indicating that he would not return to employment.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In considering a summary judgment motion, a court must review the entire record and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 2000); Baron v. City of Highland Park, 195 F.3d 333, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1999). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he court has one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial." Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994).

To avoid summary judgment on his discrimination claims, Plaintiff must present facts from which a reasonable juror could find that Defendant discriminated against him because of his race. Plaintiff has sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983. Title VII forbids certain employers "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). The anti-retaliation provision also forbids employers from taking an adverse employment action against an employee for opposing discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The same standards apply under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983. Steinhauer v. DeGolier, 359 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing ...


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