The opinion of the court was delivered by: Herndon, District Judge
Defendant moves (Doc. 24), pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b), for the Court to reconsider its prior June 1, 2005 Order (Doc. 18), which granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Payment of Cure, Punitive Damages and/or Attorneys Fees (Doc. 14). The June 1, 2005 Order granted Plaintiff's request for Defendant to comply with its cure obligations for treatment as outlined by Dr. Schnapp in his January 19, 2005 letter to Plaintiff's counsel (see Doc. 15, Ex. K). The Court further denied Plaintiff's request for punitive damages and/or attorney's fees. Defendant seeks to stop its cure obligations, asserting that new evidence provides Plaintiff has reached maximum medical improvement as of September 21, 2004. Additionally, Defendant seeks to be reimbursed for amounts paid to Plaintiff since September 21, 2004 (Doc. 24, p. 1). As subsequently discussed, Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion (Doc. 24) must be denied.
The Court, in its June 1, 2005 Order, found Plaintiff was entitled to cure because "the medical treatment [for Plaintiff] is clearly related to the work injury and aimed at resolving pain at the injury site so that the soft tissue has an opportunity to relax and heal" (Doc. 18, p. 4). Yet, the Court also cited law which holds that "where it appears that the seaman's condition is incurable, or that future treatment will merely relieve pain and suffering but not otherwise improve the seaman's physical condition, it is proper to declare that the point of maximum cure has been achieved." (Doc. 18, p. 2, quoting Pelotto v. L & N Towing Co., 604 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1979)(citations omitted)). This "incurable disease" approach also appears to be followed by the Supreme Court. See Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1 (1975); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). The Seventh Circuit has also cited to Pelotto. See Cella v. United States, 998 F.2d 418, 430 (7th Cir. 1993)(affirming, among other things, the district court's determination that physician's diagnosis that the plaintiff was permanently medically disabled and therefore reached maximum medical cure, which terminated the obligation to pay cure, even though continued medication would be necessary to maintain the plaintiff's condition).
The evidence Defendant asserts is "new" for the purposes of its Motion is testimony from Dr. Schnapp's April 6, 2006 deposition (Doc. 24, Ex. B). First, Defendant points to Dr. Schnapp's testimony stating that Plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement as of September 21, 2004 (Doc. 24, p. 2, Ex. B, 43:17-23). Defendant also bases its request for relief upon Dr. Schnapp's testimony that the nerve block treatments given to Plaintiff do not serve to relax the soft tissue, but instead merely serve to "help the pain and facilitat[e] the rehabilitation" (Doc. 24, Ex. B, 56:16-22). This is contrary to the Court's finding in its June 1, 2005 Order that "the medical treatment is clearly related to the work injury and aimed at resolving pain at the injury site so that the soft tissue has an opportunity to relax and heal" (Doc. 18, p. 5). Thus, Defendant asserts that the Court's basis for granting the motion was erroneously founded upon a medical treatment that was never intended to relax the soft tissue, cause the tissue to heal or result in a cure. Further, Defendant argues that Dr. Schnapp's testimony provides that there is no cure for Plaintiff's underlying conditions; Dr. Schanpp admitted that the treatment has not changed any of Plaintiff's underlying conditions, nor will her degenerative conditions ever get better (Doc. 24, pp. 2-5). Therefore, based upon maintenance and cure legal precedent, Defendant seeks to terminate its cure payment obligation and seeks reimbursement.
B. Plaintiff's Opposition
Plaintiff, in her opposing Response (Doc. 25), first takes issue with the procedural vehicle Defendant has chosen for its Motion, asserting that Rule 60(b) only applies to final judgment and orders, and not the Court's June 1, 2005 Order at issue. Plaintiff also objects to the notion of reimbursement, arguing that Defendant cites no legal authority supporting its request. Third, Plaintiff advocates for a broader interpretation of the term "condition," (as in "improvement of physical condition") which should encompass the medical term of "rehabilitation." This is what Plaintiff will continue to receive from the medical treatment: rehabilitation of her condition. Plaintiff cites to Costa Crociere, S.p.A. v. Rose, 939 F. Supp. 1538, 1550 (S.D. Fl. 1996), a case from the Southern District of Florida, for legal support (see Doc. 25, pp. 2-5).
Lastly, Plaintiff objects to Defendant's assertion of "new evidence," because Dr. Schnapp's statement that Plaintiff was at her "maximum medical improvement" was part of Plaintiff's medical record before the Court at the time of its initial June 1, 2005 Order for cure. Therefore, any testimony referring to this fact is not "new" evidence for purposes of the Court's reconsideration. As Dr. Schnapp has indicated his prescribed treatment was designed to facilitate Plaintiff's rehabilitation, Plaintiff argues it is a proper element of cure and therefore, Defendant's Motion should be denied.
Motions to reconsider interlocutory orders "are left subject to the complete power of the court rendering them" and should be granted "as justice requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 advisory committee's notes. In other words, granting such relief should only be done if "consonant with equity." John Simmons Co. v. Grier Brothers, 258 U.S. 82, 90-91 (1922); see also 12JAMES WM.MOORE ET AL.,MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 60App.108 (3d ed. 2004). Such motions "serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Ill. 1982),aff'd, 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984)). Reconsideration of prior decisions are allowed under Rule 60(b)(3) for "fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party." Fed. R. Civ. P. ...