The opinion of the court was delivered by: Michael M. Mihm United States District Judge
This matter is now before the Court on Petitioner, Mario Lendos' ("Lendos"), Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the reasons set forth below, the Government's Motion to Dismiss [#7] is GRANTED, and Lendos' § 2255 Motion [#1] is DISMISSED.
In August 2004, Lendos was charged in a two-count Indictment of conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. On May 19, 2005, Lendos entered a guilty plea pursuant to a written plea agreement to the possession charges. On September 22, 2005, he was sentenced to 175 months' imprisonment, followed by a term of supervised release. The conspiracy charges in the Indictment were dismissed.
Although he waived his right to appeal and pursue collateral relief pursuant to § 2255 in ¶¶ 10 and 11 of the written plea agreement, Lendos attempted to pursue a direct appeal. On March 3, 2006, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as frivolous. Lendos has now filed the instant Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In his Motion, Lendos attempts to collaterally attack his conviction based on allegations that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. This Order follows.
A petitioner may avail himself of § 2255 relief only if he can show that there are "flaws in the conviction or sentence which are jurisdictional in nature, constitutional in magnitude or result in a complete miscarriage of justice." Boyer v. United States, 55 F.3d 296, 298 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 268 (1995). Section 2255 is limited to correcting errors that "vitiate the sentencing court's jurisdiction or are otherwise of constitutional magnitude." Guinan v. United States, 6 F.3d 468, 470 (7th Cir. 1993), citing Scott v. United States, 997 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1993). A § 2255 motion is not, however, a substitute for a direct appeal. Doe v. United States, 51 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 205 (1995).
Here, Lendos would appear to be barred from bringing this § 2255 motion by virtue of the fact that his plea agreement contains a waiver of his right to bring a collateral attack on his sentence. Lendos makes two arguments of ineffective assistance: (1) that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a direct appeal, and (2) that counsel was ineffective for withdrawing his objections at sentencing. While Lendos does assert that he should be resentenced, he makes no attempt to avoid the impact of this waiver by asking the Court to vacate his guilty plea and does not present any evidence indicating that but for his counsel's ineffective assistance, he would not have entered into the plea agreement. Perhaps this is because he believes that the plea bargain's substantial advantages outweigh its disadvantages. In any event, so long as the plea agreement stands, the waiver of the right to appeal or pursue collateral relief must generally be enforced. Id., citing United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 1996); Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Nelson, 124 F.3d 206, 1997 WL 374712, at *1 (7th Cir. July 1, 1997).
However, this circuit has recognized that the right to pursue a collateral attack pursuant to § 2255 survives "with respect to those discrete claims which relate directly to the negotiation of the waiver." Jones, 167 F.3d at 1144-45. Accordingly, while Lendos does not specifically contend that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver itself, the Court will address his claim to the extent necessary to determine whether the negotiation of the various waiver provisions is implicated.
The seminal case on ineffective assistance of counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the Court stated that in order for a prisoner to demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below the constitutional standard, the petitioner would have to show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. A prisoner must also prove that he has been prejudiced by his counsel's representation by showing "a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. The courts, however, must "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 690.
To satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong in this case, Petitioner must demonstrate through objective evidence a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's purportedly erroneous advice, he would not have entered the guilty plea and would have insisted upon going to trial. United States v. Woolley, 123 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 1997). "It is far from obvious how a petitioner is expected to make such a showing, but it is clear that 'merely making such an allegation is insufficient.'" United States v. Ryan, 986 F.Supp. 509, 513 (N.D.Ill. 1997), citing Key, 806 F.2d at 139; see also McCleese v. United States, 75 F.3d 1174, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring that the petitioner establish through objective evidence that he would not have accepted the plea).
Here, Lendos asserts that counsel was ineffective because he failed to pursue a direct appeal and withdrew his objections at sentencing. There are no specific factual assertions or claims to the effect that Lendos' attorney rendered ineffective assistance in negotiating the waiver provision of his plea agreement. He does not argue that but for the purportedly misleading advice of counsel concerning the waiver, he would have rejected the plea offer and insisted on going to trial and does not ask to set aside his plea agreement.
Furthermore, a review of the transcript of the plea hearing reveals that, along with a detailed discussion of the maximum sentence he could face depending on the nature of any past criminal conduct, Lendos received a lengthy explanation of the waiver provision and its consequences during the plea colloquy. As set forth below, this explanation was more than sufficient to remedy any misinformation (or lack of information) that may have been provided by his counsel with respect to the waiver provisions, and hence, he has failed to demonstrate actual prejudice under Strickland. This same dialogue also demonstrates the knowing and voluntary nature of Lendos' waiver and guilty plea, as well as his competency.
When the Court accepted Lendos' guilty plea, it held a lengthy change of plea hearing pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 11 "provides protection for those who voluntarily choose to waive their constitutional right to a trial by pleading guilty while ensuring an adequate record to insulate the plea from appellate and collateral attacks." Key v. United States, 806 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1986). Rule 11 also provides for a colloquy that "exposes the defendant's state of mind in the record through personal interrogation." Id., citing United States v. Fountain, 777 F.2d 351, 356 (7th Cir. 1985). This aspect of the Rule 11 hearing is especially important with respect to subsequent collateral proceedings, because the representations made by the defendant during a plea colloquy, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceeding. Id., citing Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1986); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629 (1977). Furthermore, "[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Blackledge, 97 S.Ct. at 1629.
After a careful review of the transcript of Petitioner's Rule 11 hearing, the Court finds that he has failed to overcome the strong presumption of verity which attached to the statements of voluntariness and understanding that he made during that hearing. The pertinent portion of the record reveals the following colloquy between Lendos and the Court after he was placed under oath:
Q: Now that you have been sworn, do you understand that your answers to my questions are subject to the penalties of perjury or of giving a false statement if you don't answer truthfully?
Q: Have you been treated recently for any mental illness or addiction to narcotic drugs of any kind?
Q: Are you currently under the influence of any drug, medication or alcoholic beverage?
Q: Are you fully satisfied with the counsel and advice that he has given you in this case?
Q: As I understand it, you have entered into a written plea agreement with the ...