The opinion of the court was delivered by: John F. Grady, United States District Judge
Before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims brought pursuant to Illinois law in Count IV of the Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint filed in Chatham v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 05 C 2623. For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted.
In this putative class action, plaintiffs, who are citizens of several different states, claim that defendant Sears, Roebuck & Company ("Sears") deceptively advertised its proprietary line of "Craftsman" tools as manufactured exclusively in the United States ("Made in USA") when in fact many of the tools are foreign-made or contain significant foreign parts.
Plaintiffs' current complaint is titled "Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint." In our Pretrial Order Number 6 of July 31, 2006, we dismissed Counts I and II of the complaint (which alleged violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and the Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices Act) with prejudice as to all plaintiffs except William Beanblossom and John S. Bertrand. We dismissed Beanblossom and Bertrand's claims without prejudice for failure to allege fraud with particularity. (Since then, Bertrand voluntarily dismissed his claims; thus, Beanblossom is the only remaining Illinois plaintiff.) We also dismissed Count VII, the Magnuson-Moss claim, with prejudice as to all plaintiffs. And as to certain plaintiffs, we dismissed Count III, which is alleged in the alternative to Counts I and II and in which plaintiffs seek damages and/or injunctive relief under the consumer fraud and deceptive trade practices of all fifty states and the District of Columbia.
Other claims asserted by plaintiffs are Count IV, an unjust enrichment claim, and Count VI, a claim for "equitable relief."*fn1 As to Count IV, we stated in our previous order: "It appears to the court that the claim most likely to involve an amount of money sufficient to support federal diversity jurisdiction in this case, either on an individual or a class basis, is plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment . . . . Defendant believes that there is no basis for the unjust enrichment claim, and a briefing of the issues regarding Count IV will be the next item of business in the litigation." (Pretrial Order Number 6 at 5.) We gave Sears leave to file a motion to dismiss Count IV and set a briefing schedule, instructing the parties to focus on the issues of what state's law applies to the unjust enrichment claims and whether a nexus must exist between the injury sustained by a plaintiff and the amount of recoverable disgorgement of defendant's profits. The motion to dismiss is now fully briefed.
Our first inquiry is the choice-of-law question--which state's (or states') law applies to plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims. The parties do not agree on this issue. Even though plaintiffs are citizens of several different states, they all contend that Illinois law applies to their claims (evidently because they are seeking certification of a nationwide class).*fn2 Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the claims are governed by the laws of the various states where each plaintiff saw the advertising and purchased his or her tools.*fn3
The parties do agree that because Illinois is the forum state of this diversity case, we must consult the choice-of-law rules of Illinois to determine which state's substantive law applies. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); GATX Leasing Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 64 F.3d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir. 1995). The Illinois Supreme Court uses the "most significant relationship" test for choosing the appropriate law in tort cases.*fn4 The Seventh Circuit has stated:
The Illinois Supreme Court uses the "most significant relationship" test for choosing the appropriate law in tort cases. In practice, this means that "the law of the place of injury controls unless Illinois has a more significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties." A court is to determine whether Illinois has the more significant relationship by examining the following factors: (1) the place of the injury, (2) the place where the injury-causing conduct occurred, (3) the domicile of the parties, and (4) the place where the relationship between the parties is centered. The Illinois courts also consider "the interests and public policies of potentially concerned states . . . as they relate to the transaction in issue."
Fredrick v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 144 F.3d 500, 503-04 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Esser v. McIntyre, 661 N.E. 2d 1138, 1141 (Ill. 1996) and Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 682 N.E.2d 238, 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)).
The place of the injury here (or, in unjust enrichment terms, the place where plaintiffs allegedly "conferred" the benefit on defendant) is the plaintiffs' home states where they purchased Sears's tools. The place where the parties' relationship is centered is the plaintiffs' home states as well. Plaintiffs saw the allegedly misleading advertising in those states, and they purchased the tools (which were located there) in those states as well. Plaintiffs contend that the relationship is centered in Illinois because plaintiffs purchased the tools "by virtue of" Sears's nationwide advertisements, which were conceived of and sent from Illinois. (Pls.' Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. at 10.) This characterization rings hollow. The relationship arose from plaintiffs' purchases of Craftsman tools, which occurred in plaintiffs' home states.*fn5 ...