The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Robert W. Gettleman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff H. Günther Oberth initially filed a five-count pro se complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, against defendants Mary L. Kirth, Jay V. Krafsur, Darren B. Watts, the Krafsur Law Group, L.L.C., Dana Rosenthal, Lisa Danna and Barbara Knox alleging libel (Count I), slander (Count II), defamation of character (Count III), the improper use of a civil proceeding (Count IV) and disregarding the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (Count V). Plaintiff's claims stem from an initial sexual harassment lawsuit filed against him by defendant Mary L. Kirth. The United States removed the action to this court and then moved, pursuant to § 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(2), to substitute itself on behalf Dana Rosenthal, Lisa Danna and Barbara Knox, all attorneys at the United States Department of Housing & Urban Development ("HUD"). Plaintiff moved to vacate the removal. On August 3, 2006, this court denied plaintiff's motion to vacate and ordered the substitution of the United States. Both the United States and defendants Krafsur, Watts and the Krafsur Law Group, L.L.C. ("Krafsur defendants"), have moved to dismiss all counts of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).*fn1 For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motions to dismiss are granted. FACTS*fn2
Plaintiff was employed by Hildegard Schniedermeier in various capacities at her apartment building at 2632-36 W. Winona St. in Chicago, Illinois. On February 7, 2003, Mary Kirth, a tenant in the building, wrote a letter to Ms. Schniedermeier complaining of plaintiff's overtly sexual behavior and sexual comments directed towards her. Plaintiff alleges that the statements made in this letter were fabricated stories made by Ms. Kirth after a failed relationship between her and plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleges that Ms. Kirth told other tenants in the building about plaintiff's harassing behavior and that as a result of Ms. Kirth's behavior, he suffered emotional distress, humiliation and loss of community ties.
Ms. Kirth filed a lawsuit against plaintiff and Ms. Schniedermeier in federal court in July 2003. She was represented by the Krafsur defendants. While that suit was pending, HUD initiated an investigation and began a conciliation process. As a result of that process Ms. Kirth eventually settled with Ms. Schniedermeier. The terms of that settlement are reflected in a confidential HUD Conciliation Agreement, pursuant to which Kirth dismissed the suit with prejudice including all claims against plaintiff, who had refused to participate in the settlement in any way. According to plaintiff, none of the accusations in Ms. Kirth's lawsuit, particularly the allegations of sexual harassment, were valid. Additionally, plaintiff alleges that he and Ms. Kirth had an ongoing relationship for most of the time period in which Ms. Kirth resided at 2632 W. Winona Street and that she complained about his behavior only after their break up. According to plaintiff's complaint, the Krafsur defendants and Dana Rosenthal, Lisa Danna and Barbara Knox violated Rule 1.16(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct because they "had all the evidence in front of them to know Ms. Kirth's case was bogus, but they decided to push forward." Additionally, plaintiff alleges that the attorneys collectively coerced and intimidated Ms. Schniedermeier into settlement and knew they could "wear her down" because of her old age. Both Ms. Schniedermeier and plaintiff were represented in the underlying lawsuit brought by Ms. Kirth. Plaintiff seeks both compensatory and punitive damages.
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court should accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Kim v. Kim, 360 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2005). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts entitling him to relief. Pressalite Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America, 2003 WL 1811530, at *2 (N.D. Ill. April 4, 2003). There is no requirement to plead specific facts but merely a need to plead a claim for relief and plaintiffs "need do no more than narrate a grievance simply and directly, so that the defendant knows what he has been accused of." Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005).
The United States has moved to dismiss all of plaintiff's counts on the ground that they are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Krafsur defendants have moved to dismiss Count I ("liable"), Count II (slander) and Count III (defamation of character) on the ground that they are time-barred and Counts IV (abuse of process) and V (violation of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct) for failure to state a claim.
The United States moved to dismiss all of plaintiff's claims as barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") allows an individual to sue the federal government when an employee of the federal government, while acting within the scope of his or her employment, causes the individual injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The FTCA, however, has an intentional tort exception that does not waive sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Section 2680(h) provides that the FTCA shall not apply to:
Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, that, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations arising out of federal law.
Counts I, II and III are all for various forms of defamation. Under the FTCA, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity allowing the United States to be sued for libel, slander or defamation. See Jimenez v. United States, 682 F.2d 1(1st Cir. 1982) (the exception covers all claims of defamation). Thus, Counts I, II and III are all barred by sovereign immunity.
In Count IV, plaintiff alleges the improper use of a civil proceeding. This appears to be a claim for malicious prosecution. See Hammond Lead Products, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 570 F.2d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating that actions for the misuse of a civil proceeding are generally viewed as actions for malicious prosecution). Under the FTCA, a claim for malicious prosecution is barred by sovereign immunity unless the individual defendant is an investigative or law enforcement officer. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Investigative or law enforcement officers are defined as "any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations arising out of federal law." Id. In the instant case, plaintiff's allegations involve the conduct of three HUD attorneys, none of whom are investigative or law enforcement officers. Thus, Count IV is also barred by sovereign immunity. In Count V, plaintiff alleges that the HUD lawyers violated the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to drop the "bogus" fair housing action brought by Ms. Kirth and for coercing Ms. Schniedermeier into settlement. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that all the defendant attorneys violated Rule 1.16 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. Illinois courts have held that a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not, in and of itself, expose an attorney to civil liability for damages. See e.g. Nagy v. ...