The opinion of the court was delivered by: Marvin E. Aspen, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before us are the motions of Plaintiffs Kurt Bostrom and Eleanor Bostrom for leave to file an amended complaint, and to remand the action to state court. For the reasons set forth below, we deny both motions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiffs' allegations relevant to the motions are as follows. Kurt Bostrom and Eleanor Bostrom ("Plaintiffs") have at all relevant times been a lawfully wedded couple. (Compl. ¶ 9.) On or about January 9, 2006, Kurt Bostrom was shopping at a "Target store" located within Cook County, Illinois. The store is owned and operated by the Defendant Target Corporation ("Target"), a company incorporated outside of Illinois and with its principal place of business outside of Illinois. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-3.)*fn1 While navigating a walkway located on store premises, Bostrom fell on torn, worn, and jumbled carpeting, suffering severe and disabling injuries. (Compl. ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiffs filed this action in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, alleging that in its maintenance of the walkway carpeting, Defendant Target breached its duty to exercise ordinary care in seeing that the store was reasonably safe for the use of those lawfully on store premises. (Compl. ¶ 4.)
On March 24, 2006, Target timely removed the litigation to this Court, invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and § 1441. (Def. Notice of Removal ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs do not challenge this Court's jurisdiction over the action. Rather, they now seek to amend the complaint to add a non-diverse defendant, Dennis Thigles ("Thigles"), the Manager of the Target store where Bostrom was injured. (Pl. Proposed. Am. Compl. ¶ 4.) Because the addition of Thigles as a defendant would destroy complete diversity and, in turn, deprive this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the action, Plaintiffs seek to remand the action to state court.
Ordinarily, requests to amend pleadings are evaluated under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which establishes a permissive standard for amendments. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a) ("leave shall be freely given when justice so requires")"; see also Kortum v. Raffles Holdings LTD, 2002 WL 31455994, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2002) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d).
However, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that when a party has been joined after the case has been removed to federal court, the court should apply 28 U.S.C. § 1447 -- which addresses post-removal procedures -- in lieu of Rule 15. Perez v. Arcobaleno Pasta Machines, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plain, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1492 (7th Cir. 1996)). Section 1447(e) provides that "[i]f after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court."*fn2
We base our decision whether to permit joinder under § 1447(e) on equitable considerations. Perez,261 F. Supp. 2d at 1001. Although the Seventh Circuit has not articulated the factors to consider in making this determination,*fn3 other courts in this district have relied upon the following four factors: (1) plaintiff's motivation in seeking to join the parties, particularly whether joinder is sought solely to defeat federal jurisdiction; (2) timeliness of the request; (3) any prejudice to the parties flowing from the motion; and (4) other equitable considerations, including defendant's interest in maintaining a federal forum. Id. at 1001 (citing Kortum,2002 WL 31455994 at *3; see also Vasilakos v. Corometrics Medical Systems, Inc., 1993 WL 390283 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1993). Additionally, courts in other districts within the Seventh Circuit have used substantially the same factors. See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204 (S.D. Ind. 2001); Land v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 2000 WL 33226317 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2000).*fn4
In balancing the equities, we place greatest emphasis on the Plaintiffs' motive for seeking the amendment. See Bridgestone/Firestone, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 1207 (citing Connelly v. General Motors Corp., 1986 WL 14140, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 1986)). Of particular concern is whether joinder is sought solely to defeat federal jurisdiction. Perez, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1001. Here, it appears that Plaintiffs only seek to add Thigles in order to defeat federal jurisdiction. See Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2003 WL 69558 (S.D. Ind. 2003). Further, we are unpersuaded that Plaintiffs' inability to add Thigles as a defendant would unduly prejudice them. On balance, we therefore find grant of leave to amend and remand to state court under § 1447(e) inappropriate, and accordingly deny both motions.
I. Plaintiffs' Alleged Motive for Seeking to Join Thigles
Plaintiffs advance three arguments in support of their claim that their motive in seeking to join Thigles is legitimate. First, because "premise[s] liability cases often rest on the question of whether or not the defendant had notice of the defective condition," and Thigles is "the person who can answer this question," Plaintiffs assert that they have legitimate grounds for seeking to add him as a defendant. Second, Plaintiffs argue that, because "Thigles is the person with the most knowledge concerning this case, equity demands that Plaintiffs have control over [him]." (Pl. Reply p.3.) Third, Plaintiffs argue that a "jury may be more inclined to enter a verdict against Thigles than it would be against Target, as Thigles was directly involved in the tortuous [sic] action which gave rise to the accident, as opposed to Target, a corporation." (Pl. Reply p.4). Denying Plaintiffs the opportunity to add Thigles would, they claim, "severely impair" their "strategy and theory of liability before the jury." (Id. p.6.)
As to the first two arguments -- the need to gain information from and "control" of Thigles -- Plaintiffs fail to address why conducting discovery on Thigles and calling him as a non-party witness would not suffice. Indeed, Plaintiffs cite no specific procedural benefit to naming Thigles as a defendant. As to Plaintiffs' admittedly interesting argument that a jury would be more likely to enter a verdict against a store manager than a large corporation, we note that "[t]hey may obtain full recovery through ...