The opinion of the court was delivered by: Harold A. Baker United States District Judge
Before the court are the defendant's summary judgment motion  and the plaintiff's response  and the defendant's reply .
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.56(c); Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2001), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Herman v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 744 F.2d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985). In determining whether factual issues exist, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Beraha v. Baxter Health Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1440 (7th Cir. 1992). Further, this burden can be satisfied by "'showing'--that is, pointing out to the district court--that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the non-movant to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Outlaw, 259 F.3d at 837. A nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must demonstrate that there is admissible evidence that will support its position. Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 23 F.3d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1994). Credibility questions "defeat summary judgment only '[w]here an issue as to a material fact cannot be resolved without observation of the demeanor of witnesses in order to evaluate their credibility.'" Outlaw, 259 F.3d at 838, citing Advisory Committee Notes, 1963 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(other citations omitted).
Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. Rule 56(c) "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party there is no 'genuine' issue for trial." Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir. 1988). A "metaphysical doubt" will not suffice. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Disputed facts are material only if they might affect the outcome of the suit. First Ind. Bank v. Baker, 957 F.2d 506, 507-08 (7th Cir. 1992). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, *247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986).
The plaintiff's allegations against defendant Lisa Jump are brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (R.15,p.1). The plaintiff, an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution "FCI") in Pekin, alleges that Jump, a nurse at the medical unit at FCI Pekin, violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, he alleges that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in that she failed to provide him with immediate medical care while he was having a stroke.
1. The plaintiff is a federal inmate currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution in Pekin, Illinois. See App.6.
2. The plaintiff arrived at FCI Pekin on October 13, 2001. See App.6,47.
3. On October 6, 2003, at approximately 8:40 a.m., the plaintiff was returning to his unit from his job in Recreation. See App.18,49,53,54. While he was walking, the plaintiff claimed he lost feeling in the right side of his body, and fell. See App.54. According to the plaintiff, another inmate helped him back to the unit. See App.54,55.
4. After the plaintiff returned to his unit, he went to his unit officer, Joe Gray, and asked him to call the Medical Unit (hereinafter "Medical") regarding his symptoms. See App.56.
5. The plaintiff testified that he told Officer Gray that he "had a stroke." What he testified he meant was that he was currently having a stroke. See App.63.
6. What Officer Gray heard was that the plaintiff said he felt like he had the symptoms of having a stroke. See App.10. In fact, Officer Gray testified that he asked the plaintiff if he was having symptoms at that ...