The opinion of the court was delivered by: James F. Holderman, Chief Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On April 22, 2004, plaintiff Leroy Orange ("Orange") filed a twelve-count amended complaint against various defendants. (Dkt. No. 9). Orange's complaint alleges numerous civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 including claims of false arrest/false imprisonment (Count II) and excessive force (Count III). (Id. at ¶ 64-70). The defendants initially filed various motions to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to stay discovery. (Dkt. Nos. 35, 37, 41, 50, 53). On March 30, 2005, this court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss regarding Counts II and III of Orange's amended complaint. See Orange v. Burge, No. 04 C 168, 2005 WL 742641 (N.D. Ill. March 30, 2005). On May 25, 2006, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"), defendants Jon Burge ("Burge"), Leonard Bajenskil ("Bajenski"), David Dioguardi ("Dioguardi"), Robert Flood ("Flood"), Raymond Madigan ("Madigan"), Dennis McGuire ("McGuire"), Raymond McNally ("McNally"), Daniel McWeeny ("McWeeny"), Terry Hillard ("Hillard"), Thomas Needham ("Needham"), Richard Devine ("Devine"), Leroy Martin ("Martin"), Gayle Shines ("Shines"), Dennis Dernbach ("Dernbach"), and City of Chicago ("City of Chicago"), (jointly, "defendants"), filed a renewed motion to dismiss Counts II and III based on new Seventh Circuit authority. (Dkt. No. 189). For the reasons set forth below, this court grants the defendants' renewed motion to dismiss Counts II and III of Orange's complaint.
The following set of facts, unless otherwise noted, are taken from Orange's April 22, 2004 first amended complaint. In determining a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, all well pleaded facts and allegations in Orange's complaint are construed as true. Thompson v. Illinois Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002); WM Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, No. 06 CV 941, 2006 WL 1793571 at *1 (N.D.Ill. June 26, 2006).
Burge, Bajenski, Dioguardi, Flood, Madigan, McCabe, McGuire, and McNally, ("defendant officers"), were Chicago Police Officers assigned to the Area 2 police station ("Area 2"). In 1984, Burge was the commanding officer over the other defendant officers in the Detectives Violent Crimes Unit at Area 2. (Dkt. No. 9 at ¶ 4). Martin was Superintendent of Police for the City of Chicago from 1987-1992 and was Burge's direct supervisor. (Id. at ¶ 6). Hillard was Superintendent of Police for the City of Chicago from 1998-2004, and Needham was Hillard's counsel and administrative assistant from 1998-2004. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8). Shines was Director of the Office of Professional Standards of the Chicago Police Department ("OPS") from 1990-1998. (Id. at ¶ 9).
Dernbach was an Assistant Cook County State's Attorney ("ASA"), a supervisor in the Felony Review Unit, and was assigned to Area 2 in January of 1984. (Id. at ¶ 11). Devine has been the State's Attorney of Cook County from 1997 through the present. (Id. at ¶ 12).
On January 12, 1984, Orange was arrested and brought to Area 2 in connection with the murders of Renee Coleman, Tony Coleman, Michelle Jointer, and Ricardo Pedro. (Id. at ¶ 18). At Area 2, Orange was placed in an interrogation room where his hands were cuffed behind his back and attached to a metal ring on the wall. (Id. at ¶ 20). Orange initially maintained his innocence during the interrogation. (Id.). Defendant officers then administered electric shock to Orange by placing electrodes on his arms and in his rectum. (Id. at ¶ 21). Throughout the interrogation, defendant officers also repeatedly placed an airtight bag over Orange's head, and squeezed his testicles. (Id. at ¶ 22). Orange's interrogation lasted for twelve hours. (Id. at ¶ 28). Fearing the torture would continue, Orange gave a false statement implicating himself to the four murders. (Id.)
Defendant Officers and Dernbach also allegedly manufactured false admissions by Orange in official reports and presented these admissions to prosecuting attorneys who relied upon and presented this evidence throughout Orange's case. (Id. at ¶ 34). Defendant Officers and Dernbach suppressed from the prosecutors, the judge and jury in Orange's criminal trial that Orange's confession was obtained through torture. (Id. at ¶ 36). Based on the false confession, Orange was found guilty by a jury on four counts of murder, four counts of concealment of homicidal death, and one count of aggravated arson, and was sentenced to death. (Id. at ¶ 39).
While awaiting trial, OPS purported to open an investigation into Orange's allegations of torture at Area 2. (Id. at ¶ 37). After Orange was convicted, OPS completed the investigation and in a secret report found that from 1973 to 1985 there was systematic abuse of suspects held in custody at Area 2. (Id. at ¶ 40). The OPS report remained secret until a federal court ordered the report produced in February of 1992. (Id. at ¶ 44).
Orange served nineteen years in prison, most of which was on death row, until he was pardoned on January 10, 2003 by then Governor George Ryan on the basis of innocence. (Id. at ¶ 54 & 52). Governor Ryan also pardoned Madison Hobley, Aaron Patterson, and Stanley Howard, who had been allegedly tortured by Burge. (Id.)
A motion to reconsider is an interlocutory order permissible within the inherent authority of the district court, the common law and/or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Ramada Franchise Systems, Inc. v. Royal Vale Hospitality of Cincinnati, Inc., No. 02 C 1941, 2004 WL 2966948 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2004). The Seventh Circuit has said that a motion to reconsider is appropriate where: (1) the court has patently misunderstood a party; (2) the court has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties; (3) the court has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension; (4) there has been a controlling or significant change in law since the submission of the issue to the court; or (5) there has been a controlling or significant change in the facts since the submission of the issue to the court. Id. (citing Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990)).
The Seventh Circuit's March 8, 2006 decision in Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 2891 (2006), has led to a controlling change in law since this court's decision from almost a year earlier of March 30, 2005. The decisions of the Seventh Circuit are binding upon ...