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Howell v. Motorola

August 11, 2006


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer


This matter comes before the court on a Motion to Intervene by John Endsley ("Endsley" or "Intervenor"). After this court concluded that Bruce Howell ("Howell") lacked standing to represent a class of ERISA plan beneficiaries in this action for breach of fiduciary duty, Plaintiffs proposed another class representative: Endsley. For the reasons explained below, however, the court concludes that Endsley, too, lacks standing. Accordingly, his motion for leave to intervene is denied.


On July 21, 2003, a single named Plaintiff, Bruce Howell, filed the initial complaint on behalf of the Motorola, Inc. 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan (the "Plan") and all Participants in the Plan for whose individual accounts the Plan purchased and/or held shares of Motorola common stock during the proposed class period, May 14, 2000 to the present (the "Participants"). The action was filed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132, et. seq. Plaintiffs seek to recover from Defendants*fn1 for breach of fiduciary duty in violation of Sections 502(a)(2) and (3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2)-(3). Specifically, in their amended complaint, filed on October 3, 2003, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by: (1) purchasing and holding shares of Motorola common stock when it was imprudent to do so; (2) negligently misrepresenting and failing to disclose materials concerning Plan management and assets; and (3) failing to appoint and monitor appropriate fiduciaries, and failing to provide sufficient information to enable the fiduciaries to fulfill their obligations under ERISA. In September 2004, this court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs' claim that members of the Board of Directors breached their fiduciary duty to monitor the Profit Sharing Committee of Motorola, Inc., and its members, was sufficient, and that Plaintiffs' allegation that the Board had an affirmative duty to monitor the committee was sufficient, under liberal pleading standards, to state a claim for relief. Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1097, 1099 (N.D. Ill. 2004).

After a period of discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the waiver and release signed by Howell at the end of his employment barred him from pursuing this action. On September 30, 2005, this court granted that motion for summary judgment, and struck the motion for class certification without prejudice. Howell v. Motorola, Inc., No. 03-C-5044, 2005 WL 2420410 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2005). Howell filed a Notice of Appeal with the Seventh Circuit on October 27, 2005. This court assumes the reader's familiarity with its two earlier opinions and will repeat facts here only as necessary for understanding the motion now under consideration.

Endsley filed this motion to intervene as Plaintiff and additional class representative on October 19, 2005.


Endsley is a former Motorola employee; he voluntarily resigned from his position on February 24, 2001. (Ex. A to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Endsley's Motion to Intervene ("Def.'s Opp.").) The Plan is a "defined contribution" plan within in the meaning of ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34). The Plan provides for individual accounts for each participant, and benefits are payable based on the amount contributed to each Participant's account, adjusted for any gains or losses. (Complaint in Intervention, 16.) Participants direct the Plan to purchase investments from among the investment options available in the Plan and allocate them to Participants' individual accounts. (Id.) One of the investment options available to Motorola employees was the Motorola Stock Fund, which consisted solely of Motorola Common Stock. (Id. at 17.)

During Plaintiff Endsley's employment with Motorola, he participated in the Motorola, Inc. 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan, and held shares of Motorola common stock in his individual account under the Plan. (Endsley's Motion to Intervene, 2.) After resigning, he received a full distribution under the Plan on or about March 20, 2001. (Ex. B to Def.'s Opp.)


As in the earlier motion for summary judgment involving Howell, the central issue here is Endsley's standing. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), a "participant," "beneficiary," or "fiduciary" may bring a civil action for a breach of fiduciary duty proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1109. A "participant" is defined as "any employee or former employee . . . who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employer benefit plan . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). The Supreme Court has explained that a former employee "may become eligible" to receive benefits under a plan if he has either (1) "a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment," or (2) a "colorable claim to vested benefits." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 117-118 (1989) (internal citations omitted).

Because Endsley has not alleged he plans to return to covered employment, this court must determine whether he had a "colorable claim to vested benefits" when the suit was brought on July 21, 2003. Id.; Clair v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 1999). The requirement of a colorable claim in the Seventh Circuit "is not a stringent one." Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus. Corp., 74 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 1996). A claim can meet this "low threshold" if it is not "bizarre" or "out of line with existing precedent." Id. at 790 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Endsley's claim is founded on the assertion that Defendants breached their ERISA fiduciary duties, and thus meets the low threshold of "colorable." As noted earlier, this court has previously denied Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim. Howell, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1079.

The more challenging question here is whether Endsley's colorable claim is one for vested benefits. Endsley argues he meets the test in Firestone because he is seeking the "benefit" of what his individual account would have earned and what it would have yielded if the account balance in Motorola stock had been invested in the best alternative available under the Plan. Defendants argue that, although styled as a claim for benefits, as discussed below, Endsley is really seeking damages.

Plaintiffs challenge this assertion. They argue, first, that standing is determined at the time of the alleged violation, not at the time this lawsuit was filed. Second, Plaintiffs contend that Endsley's claim is properly understood as one for vested benefits, not damages. Alternatively, Plaintiffs urge that an exception to the "vested benefits" ...

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