The opinion of the court was delivered by: Reagan, District Judge
Plaintiff, formerly an inmate in the Jackson County Jail, brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff previously was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and he has tendered his initial partial filing fee as ordered.
Plaintiff states that he was scheduled to receive free medical treatment at St. Joseph's Health Center in Murphysboro, Illinois, for an unspecified liver ailment, but he was taken into custody on September 9, 2005. He asked to be taken to the Health Center for his scheduled treatment, but that request was denied. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' refusal constitutes deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and that he suffered irreparable damage to his liver due to Defendants' failure to provide him with medical treatment.
[F]or a pretrial detainee to establish a deprivation of his due process right to adequate medical care, he must demonstrate that a government official acted with deliberate indifference to his objectively serious medical needs. See Qian, 168 F.3d at 955. This inquiry includes an objective and subjective component. The objective aspect of the inquiry concerns the pretrial detainee's medical condition; it must be an injury that is, "objectively, sufficiently serious." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (internal quotations omitted); see also Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1999). "A 'serious' medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1371 (7th Cir. 1997).
Even if the plaintiff satisfies this objective component, he also must tender sufficient evidence to meet the subjective prong of this inquiry. In particular, the plaintiff must establish that the relevant official had "a sufficiently culpable state of mind[,] ... deliberate indifference to [the detainee's] health or safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Evidence that the official acted negligently is insufficient to prove deliberate indifference. See Payne, 161 F.3d at 1040. Rather, as we have noted, " 'deliberate indifference' is simply a synonym for intentional or reckless conduct, and that 'reckless' describes conduct so dangerous that the deliberate nature of the defendant's actions can be inferred." Qian, 168 F.3d at 955. Consequently, to establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must proffer evidence "demonstrating that the defendants were aware of a substantial risk of serious injury to the detainee but nevertheless failed to take appropriate steps to protect him from a known danger." Payne, 161 F.3d at 1041. Simply put, an official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Higgins, 178 F.3d at 510. Even if he recognizes the substantial risk, an official is free from liability if he "responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
Jackson v. Illinois Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2002).
Although the complaint is brief, the Court is unable to dismiss any portion of this action at this point in the litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff requests that the Court appoint counsel to represent him in this matter (Doc. 3). Before the Court can consider a pro se plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel, the plaintiff must make a showing that he has made reasonable efforts to find a lawyer on his own. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff states that he made phone calls and sent out letters, but he presents no documentation to indicate who he contacted, what areas of law those attorneys practice, or the substance of any actual response. However, his motion would have to be denied in any event.
The determination whether to appoint counsel is to be made by considering whether Plaintiff is competent to represent himself given the complexity of the case, and if he is not, whether the presence of counsel would make a difference in the outcome of his lawsuit. Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 1995)(citing Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 322 (7th Cir. 1993)). It appears that Plaintiff is competent to read, express his thoughts in writing and follow directions generally. Although he may be unskilled in the law with minimal understanding of court proceedings, most pro se litigants are similarly disadvantaged. In this Court, persons representing themselves are not penalized for failing to know the rules applying to their cases. In most instances, if proper procedure is not followed, the pro se litigant is directed to the relevant rule and given a second opportunity to comply.
Plaintiff's case is not particularly complex. He contends that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, and the law governing Eighth Amendment claims relating to medical treatment of prisoners is well settled. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Plaintiff does not need to pore over law books to obtain additional precedent. His ability to succeed on his claim will rest entirely upon the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment or at trial.
Plaintiff's case is the kind of case that is likely to generate interest among members of the bar, so it is important for Plaintiff to try to find counsel on his own. Because the cost of medical experts is so great, most individuals suing for medical mistreatment of the serious nature required to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment seek out a lawyer who would be willing to take the case on a contingent fee basis. This means that if the plaintiff wins, the cost of the experts will be recovered and the lawyer will be paid for his or her time and expenses in pursuing the case. The contingent fee system serves as a reality check for litigants. If no lawyer with a background in medical malpractice cases is willing to take Plaintiff's case, chances are high that the case is one the lawyers have assessed either as not likely to succeed or as not likely to result in a damage award large enough to recoup the expense of prosecuting the case.
As noted earlier, Plaintiff has not provided support for his claim that he has made reasonable efforts to obtain representation. As he pursues this search, he will either find a lawyer willing to take the case or he will discover that no lawyer is willing to do so. It is difficult for lawyers to decline to take a case when the Court asks them to do so. Therefore, in an ordinary medical care case such as this one, it is inappropriate for a court to select a lawyer to take the case without regard for his or her assessment of the risks of incurring the expense of the lawsuit against the probability of succeeding on the merits of the ...