The opinion of the court was delivered by: Matthew F. Kennelly, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In October 2004, Installation Services, Inc. (ISI) sued Electronics Research, Inc. (ERI), Crown Castle Broadcast USA Corp., and Shorenstein Realty Services, L.P., asserting a variety of state law claims relating to a construction project on the Hancock building in downtown Chicago. See Installation Svcs., Inc. v. Electronics Research, Inc., No. 04 C 6906 (N.D. Ill.). After the defendants moved for summary judgment, ISI argued that the defendants' motions did not address a number of the claims in its complaint. The defendants responded that ISI's complaint did not give fair notice of these purported claims, and the Court agreed. See Installation Svcs., Inc. v. Electronics Research, Inc., No. 04 C 6906, 2005 WL 3180129, *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2005). Consequently, the Court dismissed the claims that the complaint inadequately alleged.
On December 6, 2005, ISI moved to amend its complaint to include the dismissed claims. On December 21, 2005, the Court denied ISI leave to amend, concluding that allowing an amended complaint would cause undue delay as well as unfair prejudice to the defendants. On January 3, 2006, ISI filed this lawsuit, determined to have its additional claims heard one way or another. The complaint seeks relief against Shorenstein and Crown Castle for promissory estoppel (Count 1), breach of contract (Count 2), and defamation and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage (Count 3). Shorenstein responded by filing a cross claim and third-party complaint against Crown-Castle and ERI, respectively, seeking indemnity. Shorenstein has also filed a counterclaim against ISI for negligence (Count 1), conversion (Count 2), promissory estoppel (Count 3), and breach of contract (Count 4). The Court has consolidated the two cases for trial.
The parties have now filed five motions for summary judgment. Shorenstein and Crown Castle have each filed motions for summary judgment on ISI's claims. ISI has moved for summary judgment on Shorenstein's counterclaim.*fn1 ERI has moved for summary judgment on Shorenstein's third-party claim, and Crown Castle has moved for summary judgment on Shorenstein's cross-claim. For the following reasons, the Court grants Shorenstein's motion against ISI in part and denies it in part, grants Crown Castle's motion against ISI in part and denies it in part, denies ISI's motion against Shorenstein, grants ERI's motion against Shorenstein, and grants Crown Castle's motion against Shorenstein.
Familiarity with the facts of the case is presumed. See Installation Svcs., Inc. v. Electronics Research, Inc., No. 04 C 6906, 2005 WL 3180129, *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2005). Any additional facts that are relevant to the case are discussed in the legal analysis that follows.
Summary judgment is proper when the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, presents "no genuine issue as to any material fact" such that 'the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In applying this standard, all disputed issues of fact are to be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)
1. Shorenstein's Motion for Summary Judgment against ISI
Shorenstein has moved for summary judgment on all three counts of ISI's new complaint. The first count proceeds on a promissory estoppel theory and alleges that Crown Castle's employee, Ray Tattershall -- acting as an agent for Shorenstein -- told ISI to buy a winch and that he "would get the money" for ISI. The complaint further alleges that after ISI purchased the winch, which cost more than $270,000, ISI was never repaid by Crown Castle or anyone else.
Under Illinois law, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a promissory estoppel claim must prove that the defendant made an unambiguous promise to the plaintiff upon which the plaintiff reasonably and forseeably relied to his detriment. Vajda v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 253 Ill. App. 3d 345, 356, 624 N.E.2d 1343, 1350 (1993). Shorenstein has moved for summary judgment, arguing that no jury reasonably could find that Crown Castle's alleged promise was unambiguous. Shorenstein also argues that "there is no evidence that Crown Castle ever unambiguously promised that Shorenstein would reimburse ISI for the cost of this equipment." Shorenstein Mem. at 2 (emphasis in original).
Tattershall's alleged promise, which specified the type of winch ISI should buy and assured ISI that it would be reimbursed, was not too indefinite or ambiguous to satisfy the first element of a promissory estoppel claim. Unlike a promise to loan money that does not specify an interest rate or duration for the loan, Demos v. Nat'l Bank of Greece, 209 Ill. App. 3d 655, 661-62, 567 N.E.2d 1083, 1088 (1991), or a promise to provide employment that does not specify a salary or position, Sembos v. Phillips, 376 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2004), a promise to reimburse a promisee's particular expenditure -- even if it does not specify a price -- is not too indefinite to be relied on. See Chatham Surgicore, Ltd. v. Health Care Svc. Corp., 356 Ill. App. 3d 795, 801, 826 N.E.2d 970, 975 (2005) (holding promise to reimburse plaintiff for health care costs unambiguous); Truck City of Gary, Inc. v. Schneider Nat. Leasing, 814 N.E.2d 273, 279 (Ind. App. Ct. 2004) (Indiana law; holding that promise to reimburse plaintiff for truck repairs could support judgment in favor of plaintiff on promissory estoppel theory). Accordingly, a jury reasonably could find that the promise was unambiguous.
Shorenstein also argues -- in cursory fashion -- that ISI cannot recover on its promissory estoppel claim because "there is no evidence that Crown Castle ever unambiguously promised that Shorenstein would reimburse ISI for the cost of this equipment." Shorenstein Mem. at 2 (emphasis in original). Shorenstein concedes, however, that Crown Castle was acting as Shorenstein's agent on the Hancock project, see Shorenstein Resp. to ISI Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 7. As such, Shorenstein was liable for Crown Castle's broken promises, so long as those promises were made with actual or apparent authority. See Phipps v. Cohn, 139 Ill. App. 3d 210, 213, 487 N.E.2d 428, 431 (1985). Shorenstein does not argue that Crown Castle exceeded its authority in making the promise.
For this reason, a jury reasonably could find that Crown Castle's promise was legally binding on Shorenstein. The Court denies Shorenstein's motion for summary judgment on Count 1 of ISI's complaint.
ISI's breach of contract claim is based on a July 30, 2001 letter from Crown Castle's agent Mead Elliot to ISI's president Ron Romano. The letter states in relevant part as follows:
This letter is intended to confirm our understanding of certain principal terms regarding the performance by [ISI] of work in connection with the East Tower improvement project at the John Hancock Center in Chicago, Illinois.
We have discussed and generally agreed upon a scope of work to be performed in connection with the antenna improvement project. A portion of the project involving the removal of the existing CBS antenna and the removal of the existing pole structure is described in the AIA, A107 Limited Scope Project Agreement among ISI, [CBS], and SRI Michigan Avenue Venture, LLC[,] which is being signed today. As we discussed, the parties anticipate entering into one or more additional agreements with ISI with respect to additional portions of the overall antenna improvement project.
By signing this letter, ISI agrees that it will perform the scope of the work discussed to date for an amount not to exceed $1.3 million (including the amount payable to ISI under the Limited Scope Project Agreement referred to above). Such acknowledgment, of course, will be subject to the execution and delivery of one or more additional contracts in substantially the form as that which is being signed today for the antenna and pole removal work, ...