The opinion of the court was delivered by: Michael M. Mihm United States District Judge
Before the Court is the Rock Island Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [#16], the Trinity Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [#22], and the Trinity Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [#26]. For the reasons set forth below, the Rock Island Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, the Trinity Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and the Trinity Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's § 1983 and § 1985 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Although Plaintiff's complaint is somewhat difficult to understand, it appears that Plaintiff's claims arise from an incident at the Trinity West Medical Center in Rock Island, Illinois. The complaint alleges that on May 22, 2004, Plaintiff Elizabeth Gaskins ("Gaskins") transported her fiancé, Frank Alvarado, to Trinity West Medical Center for psychiatric treatment. Sometime after entering the facility, Gaskins became uncomfortable with her surroundings. While attempting to exit the building, Gaskins was confronted by Raymond Goossens ("Goossens"), a security guard employed by Trinity. Gaskins claims that Goossens informed her that he was a Henry County Sheriff's Deputy. An altercation ensued, during which Gaskins claims she was knocked to the floor and then forcibly restrained by Goosens and Dr. Keith Butvilas ("Butvilas"), a doctor at Trinity. Gaskins was detained until the arrival of the Rock Island Police Department. She was then placed under arrest and taken to jail. Gaskins claims she was "held without bond" for three days and not permitted to speak to a lawyer. She alleges that she was arrested because Goossens and Butvilas falsely stated to the Rock Island Police that Gaskins had attacked them.
Gaskins brings this lawsuit against two sets of defendants. The first group (the "Trinity Defendants") consists of employees of Trinity Medical Center including Goossens, Todd Whiting (security guard), Dr. Butvilas, and Stephanie Sutton (nurse). The second group (the "Rock Island Defendants") consists of individual officers of the Rock Island Police Department (Sisler, Hicks, Perry, and Hoogerwerf), the Rock Island Police Department, the City of Rock Island, and "unknown employees acting in their official capacity for the City of Rock Island."
Gaskins brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging due process violations, false arrest, equal protection violations, and state law claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against both sets of Defendants. Gaskins also brings a claim against the Rock Island Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for conspiracy to deprive her of equal protection of the laws. In addition Gaskins brings a state law claim of medical negligence against the Trinity Defendants.
In response to Gaskins's complaint, both the Trinity Defendants and Rock Island Defendants have filed separate motions pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss Gaskins's complaint for failure to state claim for which relief can be granted. Both sets of Defendants argue that Gaskins has failed to sufficiently plead her claims. Additionally, the Trinity Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on Gaskins's § 1983 claim, arguing that they are not liable under § 1983 because they are not state actors.
A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears from the pleadings that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Gould v. Artisoft, Inc., 1 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1993). Rather, a complaint should be construed broadly and liberally in conformity with the mandate in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(f).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; its well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true, and all reasonably-drawn inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1997); M.C.M. Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assoc., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 1995); Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1992).
This rule has particular force when considering the allegations of a pro se complaint, which are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Accordingly, pro se complaints are to be liberally construed. Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, Ind., 839 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir.1988). However, while it is often said that a claim may be dismissed only if, as a matter of law, "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations," Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (quotingHishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)), the Seventh Circuit has observed that this maxim "has never been taken literally." Kyle v. Morten High School, 144 F.3d 448, 455 (7th Cir.1998) (quotingSutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Companies, Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir.1984)). All plaintiffs, whether pro se or not, must include in the complaint allegations concerning all material elements necessary for recovery under the relevant legal theory. Chowla v. Klapper, 743 F.Supp. 1284, 1285 (N.D.Ill.1990).
The Rock Island Defendants argue that Gaskins has failed to sufficiently plead any of her claims. Specifically, they assert that Gaskins does not provide the necessary factual allegations that would support relief under § 1983 and § 1985, or under the legal ...