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Bilal v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp.

June 13, 2006


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Samuel Der-yeghiayan, District Judge


This matter is before the court on Defendants' motions to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, we grant the motions to dismiss.


Plaintiff Yvonne Bilal ("Bilal") alleges that she is an African American woman who lives in Chicago, Illinois. According to Bilal, Bilal signed a mortgage and note granting her possession of a single family home in Bellwood, Illinois, ("Property") in September 1996. Bilal claims that she suffered a financial hardship, which caused the Property to be foreclosed by Defendant Bankers Trust Company of California ("Bankers Trust") and Defendant Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation ("Chase"). According to Bilal, after the foreclosure of the Property, the Property was sold at a judicial sale and the sale was confirmed in December 2003.

Bilal claims that on two occasions, the Defendants entered the Property without her permission, where they "intentionally, willfully, and in concert with each other" removed her personal belongings and changed the locks, which, according to Bilal "caus[ed] her to be ousted from her . . . property." (Compl. Par. 21). Bilal alleges that Defendants did this, despite the fact that she was negotiating an agreement with Chase under which she could sell her home to a third party. Bilal claims that she relied on fraudulent statements made by Chase in regard to the sale to a third party, and that Chase failed to give her notice that the Property was to be sold in a judicial sale.

On December 19, 2005, Bilal filed the instant action against Defendants Chase, Bankers Trust, Prudential Asset Management ("Prudential"), Coldwell Banker ("Coldwell"), A-City Suburban Service Inc. ("A-City"), and Frank Denvoi ("Denvoi"). Bilal includes in the complaint a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 ("Section 1985") (Count I), a claim brought pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (Count II), a civil conspiracy claim (Count III), a negligence claim (Count IV), an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (Count V), a trespass claim (Count VI), a trespass to chattels claim (Count VII), a conversion claim (Count VIII), a fraud claim (Count IX), a claim brought pursuant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 (Count X), a breach of contract claim (XI), and a request for punitive damages (Count XII). All Defendants now move to dismiss this action.


In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must draw all reasonable inferences that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint. Thompson v. Illinois Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002); Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1991). The allegations of a complaint should not be dismissed for a failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Nonetheless, in order to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege the "operative facts" upon which each claim is based. Kyle v. Morton High School, 144 F.3d 448, 454-55 (7th Cir. 1998). Under the current notice pleading standard in federal courts, a plaintiff need not "plead facts that, if true, establish each element of a 'cause of action . . . .'" Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994)(stating also that "[a]t this stage the plaintiff receives the benefit of imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint" and that "[m]atching facts against legal elements comes later"). The plaintiff need not allege all of the facts involved in the claim and can plead conclusions. Higgs v. Carter, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002). However, any conclusions pled must "provide the defendant with at least minimal notice of the claim," Id., and the plaintiff cannot satisfy federal pleading requirements merely "by attaching bare legal conclusions to narrated facts which fail to outline the bases of [his] claims." Perkins, 939 F.2d at 466-67. The Seventh Circuit has explained that "[o]ne pleads a 'claim for relief' by briefly describing the events." Sanjuan, 40 F.3d at 251.


I. Section 1983 and Section 1985 Claims (Count I)

In Count I, Bilal claims that "each named Defendant communicated and conspired with one or more of the named Defendants' [sic] in this action to oppress, threaten, intimidate or deprive Plaintiff of property," which Bilal claims violates both Section 1983 and Section 1985.

A. Section 1983

In order to state a claim pursuant to Section 1983, "a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the activity deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Case v. Milewski, 327 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2003). Defendants may be found to have acted under the color of state law "when the state has cloaked the defendants in some degree of authority-normally through employment or some other agency relationship [and] when the defendants have conspired or acted in concert with state officials to deprive a person of his civil rights." Id. at 567.

Bilal claims that Defendants "took on the duties of the Cook County Sheriff, when they performed their illegal eviction, so it is too late for them to claim that they were not acting under the color of law." (Resp. 3). However, in the instant action, Defendants are private companies and a private individual, who are neither employees nor agents of the state. Bilal does not allege that the state has "cloaked" Defendants with any authority or that Defendants acted in concert with any state officials. Actually, Bilal alleges in her complaint that the Bellwood, Illinois police officers who Bilal called to the Property during the eviction sided with Bilal and "informed Chase's agents that what they were doing was illegal." (Compl. Par. 43-45). Such allegations show that Defendants were not acting in concert with state officials and that they were not ...

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