The opinion of the court was delivered by: Marvin E. Aspen, District Judge
Centralized before the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs in this multi-district litigation ("MDL"), homeowners who obtained mortgages from Ameriquest Mortgage Company or its affiliates (collectively, "Ameriquest"), filed motions for class certification and for a preliminary injunction on January 11, 2006. Recognizing that we are unable at this early stage of the litigation to expeditiously rule on those motions, Plaintiffs seek interim injunctive relief ordering Ameriquest to issue notice to borrowers who may face foreclosure before class-wide relief can be determined. Over Ameriquest's objection, we grant the limited injunction for the reasons discussed below.
On December 14, 2005, the MDL Panel transferred this centralized lending practices litigation to us. Additional cases from across the country continue to join the MDL action, and we expect further transfers throughout the next several months. To assist with case management, we have asked the parties to provide case organization plans at our next status hearing on June 13, 2006. In light of this state of flux, it would be improvident for us to rule immediately on Plaintiffs' motions for class certification and preliminary injunction. In the meantime, therefore, we address Plaintiffs' concern that some Ameriquest borrowers may lose their homes despite the potential existence of a defense to foreclosure.
Plaintiffs allege that Ameriquest violated certain disclosure provisions of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") and its implementing regulations ("Regulation Z"). See 15 U.S.C. § 1635; 12 C.F.R. § 226.23. First, Ameriquest purportedly provided incomplete Notice of Right to Cancel forms ("NORTC") to borrowers. Specifically, Ameriquest delivered NORTCs that failed to identify the deadline upon which the borrower could rescind the transaction. Second, Plaintiffs claim that Ameriquest provided the wrong form to refinancing borrowers. Rather than using the H-9 form recommended in Regulation Z, Ameriquest gave borrowers an H-8 form, which allegedly is not approved for refinancing disclosures.
Plaintiffs argue that these failures to comply with TILA constitute material violations entitling affected borrowers to cancel their mortgages for up to three years from the date of the transaction.*fn1 See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(h); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3). If a borrower rescinds a mortgage, he or she is no longer responsible for finance or other charges, and the lender loses its security interest. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b). As such, proper and timely rescission of a mortgage derails a foreclosure action. Once a foreclosure sale is completed, however, a borrower can no longer cancel the mortgage. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). Thus, Plaintiffs contend, certain Ameriquest borrowers facing foreclosure may unknowingly be entitled to extended rescission rights but lose their defense if they fail to act prior to the impending property sale. Ameriquest apparently does not dispute Plaintiffs' description of TILA rights and remedies, or the fact that certain borrowers may lose their homes despite having extended rescission rights. Nonetheless, it opposes the notice sought by Plaintiffs on several other grounds, addressed in turn below.*fn2
A. Request for Notice to Borrowers Facing Foreclosure
As Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order requiring notice to a subset of putative class members, we evaluate their request under the familiar standards for preliminary injunction.*fn3
To obtain such relief, the moving party must show that its case has some likelihood of success on the merits, that no adequate remedy at law exists, and that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted. Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001); Nav-Aids Ltd. v. Nav-Aids USA, Inc., No. 01 C 0051, 2001 WL 1298719, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25. 2001). If these three conditions are met, we must then balance the hardships the moving party will suffer in the absence of relief against those the nonmoving party will suffer if the injunction is granted. Ty, Inc., 237 F.3d at 895. Finally, we consider the public interest -- that is, the interest of non-parties -- in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief. Id. We weigh all these factors, "'sitting as would a chancellor in equity.'" Id. (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992)). We use a "sliding scale approach" in conducting this analysis, whereby the likelihood of success on the merits and the balance of irreparable harms are inversely proportional. Id.; Duct-O-Wire Co. v. U.S. Crane, Inc., 31 F.3d ...