The opinion of the court was delivered by: David H. Coar
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Shirley Jones ("Plaintiff") has filed this action against Defendants Ameriquest Mortgage Company, Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., and AMC Mortgage Services, Inc. (collectively, "Defendants") to rescind her mortgage and recover statutory damages for violations of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq. Before this Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Also before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Strike Portions of Materials Submitted by Plaintiff in Support of Her Motion for Summary Judgment and to Deem Certain Facts Admitted. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to strike is granted in part and denied as moot in part. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is denied.
I. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE
Defendants move to strike portions of (1) Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Reply") and the appendices thereto and (2) Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Statement of Additional Uncontested Material Facts that Require Denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Response").
A. Plaintiff's Reply and its Appendices
Defendants move to strike pages 1-6 of Plaintiff's Reply and Appendices 8 and 9, attached to the Reply, because those pages contain new factual allegations, inadmissible hearsay, immaterial arguments, and facts that, if material, should have been included in Plaintiff's L.R. 56.1 Statement rather than in her reply brief.
In the first six pages of her Reply, Plaintiff presents several enumerated "facts," one of which is that Defendant Ameriquest Mortgage Company ("Ameriquest") is under investigation in 30 states for unlawful and unethical business practices. The Reply admits that this "fact" is "not offered as evidence of any point in this case," but nonetheless attaches as support Appendices 8 and 9 which contain multiple newspaper articles about Ameriquest's questionable business practices. Pl.'s Reply in Support of Summ. J. at 1. The remainder of the "facts" in the first six pages painstakingly detail the history of Plaintiff's dealings with Ameriquest, and comment extensively on the quality of customer service Plaintiff received.
To the extent that, in these six pages and in Appendices 8 and 9, Plaintiff is raising new claims about Ameriquest's business practices and her dealings with Ameriquest, Plaintiff cannot do so. In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party generally may not raise new issues in its reply brief. See Aircraft Gear Corporation v. Marsh, No. 02 C 50338, 2004 WL 2222262, *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2004). Similarly, under the Local Rules, a party may not present facts for the Court's consideration in a reply brief as opposed to a Statement of Material Facts or a Statement of Additional Facts. See Bethine W. Alberding Estate Administration Trust ex rel. Moore v. Vinoy Park Hotel Co., No. 03 C 1250, 2005 WL 730960, *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2005). Finally, Plaintiff herself has admitted that first "fact" she presents is irrelevant to the motions presently before the Court. So too are the remainder of the facts to the extent that they discuss Plaintiff's dealings with Ameriquest but not the two issues presented for summary judgment. Defendants' motion to strike pages 1-6 of Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment and Appendices 8 and 9 attached thereto is granted.
B. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' L.R. 56.1 Statement
Defendants also move to strike the portions of Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' L.R. 56.1 Statement that contain argument or conclusions of law, or contain denials without citing evidentiary support. Defendants filed their motion to strike on November 4, 2005. Five days later, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Response to Defendants' Statement of Additional Uncontested Material Facts. The Court granted Plaintiff leave, and Plaintiff's Amended Response cures the ills about which Defendants complain. The Court, therefore, considers this portion of Defendants' motion to strike moot.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
To that end, TILA requires creditors to clearly and conspicuously disclose certain terms and costs of credit to consumers before a credit transaction takes place. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.17. The Seventh Circuit has repeated that the "sufficiency of TILA-mandated disclosures is to be viewed from the standpoint of an ordinary consumer, not the perspective of a Federal Reserve Board member, federal judge, or English professor.'" Smith v. Cash Store Management, 195 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
It is "well settled" in the Seventh Circuit that a borrower need not have been mislead or have suffered any actual damages from a TILA violation to recover under the act. Brown v. Marquette Savings & Loan Association, 686 F.2d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 1982). Instead, the statute imposes a kind of strict liability on the lender:
It is not sufficient to attempt to comply with the spirit of TILA in order to avoid liability. Rather, strict compliance with the required disclosures and terminology is required. Many violations of TILA involve technical violations without egregious conduct of any kind on the part of the creditor. However, Congress did not intend that creditors should escape liability for merely technical violations.
Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown Finance Corporation, 615 F.2d 407, 416 (7th Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds, Pridegon v. Gates Credit Union, 683 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1982) (internal citations omitted). Thus, "[s]ubject to narrow exceptions, hypertechnicality reigns in the application of TILA." Cash Store ...