The opinion of the court was delivered by: MATTHEW KENNELLY, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Phoenix Closures, Inc. has sued Silgan Plastics Corp. for
infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,257,432, which relates to a
sealing mechanism found in powdered drink containers. This case
is before the Court for construction of the disputed claim
language in the patent-in-suit.
Because powdered drink mix is notorious for forming undesirable
clumps when exposed to humid air, manufacturers of the product
are always in need of an inexpensive cap and container assembly
that forms an airtight seal after repeated opening. Len Ekkert,
Phoenix's vice-president, invented one of these sought-after
assemblies, patented his invention in July 2001, and assigned the
patent to Phoenix. We include as an appendix an illustrative
diagram from the patent. Silgan sells a competing cap and
container assembly that Phoenix believes infringes on independent
claims 3 and 14 of its patent as well as a number of dependent
claims. The construction of the independent claims is in dispute.
After briefing the issue of claim construction, the parties
presented oral argument and submitted additional material during
a October 26, 2005 hearing. Discussion
Claim construction entails questions of law to be determined by
the Court. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
52 F.3d 967, 977-78 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Mars, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co.,
377 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Federal Circuit clarified the
approach courts should use when analyzing claim language. It
directed courts to focus at the outset on how the patentee used
the claim term in the claims, specifications, and prosecution
history, rather than beginning the analysis by consulting
dictionaries or similar sources. Id. at 1321. The court noted
that "heavy reliance on the dictionary divorced from the
intrinsic evidence risks transforming the meaning of the claim
term to the artisan into the meaning of the term in the
abstract." Id. at 1315.
The claim term's ordinary and customary meaning, as understood
by persons who were skilled in the relevant technology at the
time the patent application was filed, continues to serve as the
baseline interpretation of the proper scope of the claim. Courts
are instructed to analyze the disputed terms in the context of
the disputed claim itself, as well as in the context of the
patent as a whole. Phillips emphasized that in addition to
evaluating the claims of a patent in dispute, the specification
is the "single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term."
Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). If the specification indicates that
the patentee defined the term in a manner that differs from its
generally conceived meaning or disavowed claim scope, the
inventor's intention is dispositive. Id. at 1316.
Though the Federal Circuit emphasized the primary role
intrinsic evidence should play in discerning the proper scope of claims, it did not preclude the
use of extrinsic evidence altogether. Judges remain free to
consult dictionaries or comparable sources to assist in
understanding the meaning of words and to gain a better
understanding of the underlying technology. Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1322. In particular, the court noted that dictionaries may be
helpful in determining the ordinary meaning of certain
non-technical, commonly understood words. See id. at 1314.
Thus, dictionaries, and particularly technical treatises, may
continue to inform claim construction, so long as a court does
not adopt a definition that contradicts the intrinsic evidence.
Id. at 1322-23.
In sum, though there exists no "magic formula . . . for
conducting claim construction," and the sequence of steps used by
the judge is unimportant, id. at 1324, the focus should remain
on construing the claims within the context of the patent itself.
At the outset, Phoenix maintains that two of the claim terms at
issue have clear meanings and do not require definition. Thus,
the constructions proposed by Phoenix are alternatives should the
Court conclude that a definition is necessary. Phoenix has cited
no authority, however, for the proposition that it is unnecessary
to construe a disputed limitation when its meaning is obvious to
one of the parties. The Federal Circuit has held that claim
construction is necessary "when the meaning or scope of technical
terms and words of art is unclear and in dispute and requires
resolution to determine the issue before the court." Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(quoting U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554,
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The fact that the meaning of a particular
limitation is disputed suggests that the meaning is not entirely
clear from the language used in the patent and that the Court
must construe the term. The Court agrees with Phoenix that certain terms may not require elaborate interpretation, see
Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001), but Phoenix's
suggestion that entire limitations in dispute do not require
construction is at odds with the purpose of claim construction.
The parties dispute several terms found in claim 3, which
discloses:
A cap and container assembly comprising: a container
and a cap; the container including a base, and a neck
for sealing engagement with the cap; a land area at
an end of the neck defining a container mouth, and an
exterior surface of the neck below the land area and
an exterior surface of the base defining an exterior
side surface of the container; the cap including a
top and a skirt depending peripherally from the top;
the skirt including a horizontal stopping surface;
wherein the stopping surface of the skirt and a
horizontal stopping surface on the container engage
to form a positive stop to lower engagement of the
cap with respect to the container.
a. Top/Skirt
The parties contest the scope of the word "top" and "skirt,"
which appear in claims 3 and 14. Phoenix argues that the top is
the "upper portion that covers the container"; Silgan argues that
it is "the upper central portion (convex as seen from the
interior) of the cap which is bounded by the depending peripheral
skirt and from which the sealing protrusions depend." In essence,
Phoenix maintains that the top includes the curved outer edge of
the upper portion of the cap, and ends somewhere near the point
where the outer edge becomes vertical. Silgan maintains that the
top ends where it transitions from convex to concave. As for the
term "skirt," Phoenix defines it as "the outer portion," and
Silgan defines it as "that portion of a cap which bounds the top
of the cap and depends peripherally therefrom and which includes
a generally cylindrical portion for engagement with the
cylinder."
Both parties cite the specification to support their proposed
definitions. At column 2, lines 17-18, the specification states,
"The top . . . is generally convex as viewed from inside of the cap." Silgan says this passage suggests that the top ends
near where it transitions from a convex to concave
shape,*fn1 though we note that saying the top is generally
convex does not mean that it is entirely convex. On the other
hand, at column 3, lines 20-21, the patent describes the skirt as
"generally the same diameter as the upper part of the base." This
description suggests that the skirt ends near where the cap
transitions from concave to being a more or less straight
vertical line.
If one examines these definitions of top and skirt
collectively, one quickly realizes that the concave portion of
the cap the curved portion or the outer edge remains unnamed.
Silgan argues that the concave area is part of the skirt, because
one of the preferred embodiments illustrates a number of "stops
or projections on the interior surface of the skirt," some of
which extend into the concave area. The Court rejects this
argument. Though the specification requires stops or ...