United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
November 3, 2005.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CHRISTOPHER MILLET, Defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: JAMES MORAN, Senior District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Christopher Millet has filed several motions to
suppress evidence or to dismiss. Since there are common themes
running through them, we will consider them together, and they
are all denied.
That common theme is the course pursued by the government in
its investigation. According to defendant, the government
initiated its investigation by relying upon a totally unreliable
informer, violated pen register and trap-and-trace orders by
recording the content of conversations, and coerced him into
making damaging admissions. It may well be that the informer is
far from being a solid citizen, but the relationship between
defendant and the informer on the one hand, and between the
government and the informer on the other hand, resulted in the
informer recording various conversations he had with the
defendant either over the telephone or in person. These were not
wire-taps. Rather, they were recordings by recording devices with
the consent of the informer. And recordings made of conversations
with the consent of one of the parties are permissible under
federal law. The pen registers and trap-and-trace devices may
well assist the government in determining the exact time and date of telephone calls and the telephones accessed, but they do not
disclose the contents of the conversations, nor do they make
illegal the consensual recordings.
Finally, the mere assertion of coercion is insufficient and, in
any event, it is fanciful. Defendant is an experienced criminal
defense attorney, although that has not been his entire practice.
As far as we can ascertain, he made the statements he seeks to
suppress in the presence of his attorney. He was not some
frightened adolescent denied the presence of a parent or lawyer,
and deprived of food and sleep, nor does he claim to be. While at
the time defendant may have been motivated by some hope that some
beneficial cooperation agreement would be reached, and that did
not happen, such a hope is not coercion.
He advances other grounds as well. He claims the indictment was
not signed by an attorney for the government or the foreperson of
the grand jury but, indeed, it was signed by both. He claims
that Count I is duplicitous because it includes an aiding and
abetting allegation but aiding and abetting is just another
means of committing the substantive offense. United States v.
Garcia, 400 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2005). He claims that the
indictment must charge drug amount and type but it does: 500
grams or more of mixtures containing cocaine. He claims that a
conspiracy may not be formed between a criminally-motivated
person and a government agent, and he is right about that. But
the government does not claim the informer to be a
co-conspirator. One conspirator is named in the superceding
indictment, and there are others referred to as well, but the
informer is not one of them.
On August 11, 2005, defendant filed a number of motions
relating to discovery. Since then the government has furnished
Millet with a considerable volume of material. A discussion in
court indicated that the government has complied with defendant's
discovery demands except in minor respects, and it will comply
with the latter as well. Those motions are, therefore, denied as moot. If there is something further to
which defendant believes he is entitled and which has not been
furnished, he can move for its production.
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