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October 24, 2005.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: MICHAEL REAGAN, District Judge



Following a six-day trial in May 2004, a jury convicted Clennard Edward McCorkle of wire fraud (a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343), which was Count 2 of the superseding indictment. The jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on Count 1 of the superseding indictment, which charged McCorkle with deprivation of civil rights (a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 342), so the Court declared a mistrial on that charge. Count 1 then was set for retrial.

  Before retrial commenced, McCorkle and the United States of America ("the Government") reached an agreement. As part of the resolution regarding McCorkle's sentence on Count 2, the Government agreed to dismiss Count 1 and not retry him on that charge.

  On August 6, 2004, pursuant to the parties' agreement, the Court dismissed Count 1 and sentenced McCorkle on Count 2. See Docs. 81, 82, 83 in Case No. 03-cr-30058. McCorkle's sentence included a term of imprisonment of one year and one day, three years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and a $3,000 fine. He agreed to each component of this sentence in the written sentencing agreement (Exhibit 1 to Doc. 14 in Case No. 04-cv-0921 at ¶¶ 1, 8, 9, 10).*fn1 Judgment was entered accordingly on August 9, 2004.

  McCorkle timely moved this Court to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On preliminary review, the Court found some of McCorkle's § 2255 claims utterly baseless and directed the Government to respond to the remaining claims for § 2255 relief. See Doc. 7.

  Before the Government filed its response, McCorkle moved to amend his § 2255 petition. That filing was stricken, however, because (inter alia) it lacked a certificate of service. The Clerk's Office notified McCorkle of the proper steps to file an amended § 2255 petition (see Doc. 9). He elected not to do so. Thus, the Government responded to McCorkle's original § 2255 petition (Doc. 1) on October 6, 2005 (Doc. 14). The issues being fully briefed, the Court now rules thereon, beginning with an overview of the legal standard governing § 2255 petitions.


  28 U.S.C. § 2255 authorizes a federal prisoner to ask the court which sentenced him to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, if "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or . . . the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or . . . the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law. . . ."

  Relief under § 2255 is limited. Unlike a direct appeal, in which a defendant may complain of nearly any error, § 2255 proceedings may be used only to correct errors that vitiate the sentencing court's jurisdiction or are otherwise "of constitutional magnitude." Broadway v. United States, 104 F.3d 901, 903 (7th Cir. 1997). Accord Corcoran v. Sullivan, 112 F.3d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1997) (§ 2255 relief is available only to correct "fundamental errors in the criminal process"). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained that § 2255 relief "is appropriate only for an error of law that is jurisdictional, constitutional, or constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Harris v. United States, 366 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir. 2004). Accord Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1999).

  Before the Court determines whether those circumstances are present in a given case, it must ascertain that the claims asserted are made in a procedurally appropriate fashion. Theodorou v. United States, 887 F.2d 1336, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989). McCorkle's § 2255 motion fails to clear this bar. As is described further below, he effectively waived the right to seek any relief under § 2255.

  On August 6, 2004, McCorkle filed a document entitled "Defendant's Agreement to Accept an Agreed Sentence on Count 2 of the Superseding Indictment" (Exh. 1 to Doc. 14). In exchange for the Government (a) not retrying McCorkle on Count 1, (b) dismissing Count 1, (c) not prosecuting McCorkle "for other crimes the Defendant has committed that are now known by the Government . . ., including . . . Federal tax evasion," and (d) not seeking an upward departure at sentencing, McCorkle waived all rights "to contest any aspect of his conviction and sentence" under Title 18, Title 28, or any other provision of federal law (id., ¶ 11).*fn2 Clearly, this would encompass a motion to vacate or set aside sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.*fn3

  The Seventh Circuit consistently has upheld similar waivers, viewing them "through the lens of contract law." For instance, in United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 636-37 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 2005 WL 2216993 (Oct. 3, 2005), the Court enforced an appeal waiver and dismissed an appeal, noting:
A plea agreement is a type of contract. . . . In a contract (and equally in a plea agreement) one binds oneself to do something that someone else wants, in exchange for some benefit to oneself. By binding oneself one assumes the risk of future changes in circumstances in light of which one's bargain may prove to have been a bad one. That is the risk inherent in all contracts; they limit the parties' ability to take advantage of what may happen over the period in which the contract is in effect.
The government didn't want Bownes to appeal and was willing to offer concessions that he and his lawyer considered adequate to induce him to forgo his right to appeal. Had Bownes insisted on an escape hatch that would have enabled him to appeal if the law changed in his favor after he was sentenced, the government would have been charier in its concessions. . . . [T]here is abundant case law that appeal waivers worded as broadly as this one are effective even if the law changes in favor of the defendant after sentencing. . . .
  Likewise in U.S. v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 364 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit upheld a waiver of both direct (appeal) rights and collateral attack (§ 2255) rights:
Cieslowski would also like to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to various aspects of his sentence, but once again, since we have concluded that he cannot escape the plea agreement, he cannot do so. The plea agreement contained a waiver of Cieslowski's right to appeal "any sentence within the maximum provided in the statute of conviction." We strictly enforce such waivers. See Barnes, 83 F.3d at 941; United States v. Feichtinger, 105 F.3d 1188, 1190 (7th Cir. 1997). Cieslowski voluntarily entered into the plea agreement, and he is therefore bound by all its terms, including the waiver of his right to appeal the sentence.
  Such waivers are fully enforceable, as long as they are made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Lockwood, 416 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2005), citing United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668 (7th ...

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