The opinion of the court was delivered by: J. GILBERT, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on defendant John D.
Padgett's ("Padgett") motion to dismiss plaintiff Shelter Mutual
Insurance Company's ("Shelter") claims against him for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction (Doc. 11) pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Shelter has responded to the motion
Shelter brings this case under the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201 seeking a declaration that a homeowners insurance
policy and an automobile insurance policy written by Shelter, an
insurance company, do not cover injuries resulting from an
altercation between defendant Thomas Perkins ("Perkins"), its
insured, and the decedent, John D. Padgett II, and do not
obligate Shelter to defend Perkins in an underlying suit by
Padgett, the administrator of the decedent's estate, for those
injuries. In this case, Shelter is suing Perkins, as the insured,
and Padgett, as the claimant in the underlying suit. Shelter
relied on diversity jurisdiction to get into federal court; it is
completely diverse from Perkins and Padgett's decedent and more
than $75,000 is at issue.
Padgett asks the Court to dismiss Shelter's claims against him
on the grounds that there is no case or controversy between him and Shelter since he is not a
party to Perkins's insurance policies. He believes that this
deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
claims in this case against him. In response, Shelter argues that
a claimant in an underlying suit is a proper party to a
declaratory judgment action seeking to determine the coverage of
an insurance policy.
The Declaratory Judgment Act ("the Act"), 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
states, in pertinent part: "In a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction . . ., any court of the United States,
upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking
such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such." §
2201(a). However, a court may not use its discretion to issue a
declaration under the Act where there is no "actual controversy"
between the parties. Id. The Act's language "tracks the `cases'
or `controversies' requirement of Article III, [and] saves the
statute from unconstitutionally expanding the federal courts'
jurisdiction." Deveraux v. City of Chicago, 14 F.3d 328, 330-31
(7th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted).
It is often difficult to determine whether an actual
controversy exists; the distinction between a "controversy" and
an abstract question of law is one of degree. Id. (citing
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273
(1941)). Consequently, there is no precise test for determining
if a complaint presents a controversy in the constitutional
sense, and each case must be considered on its own facts. Id.
However, the Supreme Court has given guidance as to when such a
The controversy must be definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. . . . It must be a real and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227
, 240-41 (1937).
Padgett does not contest, and the Court therefore assumes for
the purposes of this motion, that there is an actual case or
controversy between Perkins and Shelter. Therefore, there is also
an actual case or controversy between Padgett and Shelter.
Padgett has a legally protectible interest in Perkins's insurance
policy that gives him standing to sue Shelter under Article III
and that creates a case or controversy with Shelter over which
this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Although a tort
victim's interest does not stem from a contractual relationship
with the tortfeasor's insurer, "a tort victim has a practical,
albeit only a potential, financial interest in the tortfeasor's
insurance policy, and the impairment of such an interest is an
injury that will support standing under Article III." Truck Ins.
Exch. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 951 F.2d 787, 789 (7th Cir. 1992);
see Maryland Cas., 312 U.S. at 273-74 (holding that there was
an actual controversy in a declaratory judgment action between an
alleged tortfeasor's insurer and the tort victim); Bankers Trust
Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 1992)
(sufficiently probable case or controversy between injured party
and liability insurer to satisfy subject matter jurisdiction
requirements even though underlying judgment not yet rendered);
Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Schulte, 302 F.2d 174, 177 (7th
Cir. 1962) (holding that injured party should not have been
dismissed in declaratory judgment action by tortfeasor's
insurer). It is for this reason that a claimant in an underlying
lawsuit is a proper party defendant in a declaratory judgment
action to determine the scope of an insured's policy. See, e.g.,
Essex Ins. Co. v. Kasten Railcar Servs., Inc., 129 F.3d 947, 948
(7th Cir. 1997).
In this case, the Court finds that there is a sufficiently
concrete case or controversy between Shelter and Padgett to establish federal subject matter
jurisdiction. Padgett's decedent has sued for injuries he
allegedly suffered at the hands of Perkins, Shelter's insured.
Although that underlying litigation has not yet been reduced to a
judgment against Perkins, the probability that it will be at some
point is not so remote or so slight so as to preclude there being
an actual case or controversy at this time between Shelter and
Padgett. See Bankers Trust, 959 F.2d at 680-81 ("Article III
requires only a probabilistic injury.").
For this reason, the Court finds that it has subject matter
jurisdiction over the case or controversy between Shelter and
Padgett over whether Perkins's insurance policy covers Padgett's
decedent's injuries in the underlying suit and DENIES Padgett's
motion to dismiss (Doc. 11).
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