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October 12, 2005.

JERRY R. SUMMERS and GEORGE T. LENORMAND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

The opinion of the court was delivered by: SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge


This matter is before the court on the parties' motions for summary judgment and on Defendant State Street Bank and Trust Company's ("State Street") motion to exclude Plaintiffs' expert opinions and testimony. For the reasons stated below, we deny Plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment, grant State Street's motion for summary judgment, and grant State Street's motion to exclude Plaintiffs' expert testimony.


  Plaintiffs were all participants in the United Airlines Corporation Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("Plan"). According to Plaintiffs, United Airlines ("UAL") was in financial trouble in July 2001, and after September 2001, UAL's financial position worsened. Plaintiffs claim that from August 2001 to August 2002, UAL stock prices fell over 80 percent in value. Plaintiffs contend that until August 2002, neither Defendant UAL Corporation ESOP Committee ("Committee"), the named fiduciary of the Plan, nor Defendant State Street, the trustee of the plan, took appropriate actions to protect the Plan assets by diversifying the stock held by the Plan. It is further alleged by Plaintiffs that the Committee members were not aware of the fiduciary duties they owed to the Plan. In August 2002, UAL announced that it might seek bankruptcy protection.

  According to Plaintiffs, in September 2002, State Street notified the Committee of its fiduciary duties and nine days later, on September 27, 2002, the Committee began selling the Plan's UAL stock. Plaintiffs claim that by September 27, 2002, the UAL stock had already dropped to $2.36 per share and the Plan had already lost approximately two billion dollars as a result of the decrease in the value of the stock. UAL subsequently filed for bankruptcy. UAL and the individual committee member Defendants have entered into a settlement agreement in this action and State Street remains as an active Defendant. Plaintiffs have filed a partial motion for summary judgment and State Street has filed a motion for summary judgment.


  Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In seeking a grant of summary judgment, the moving party must identify "those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). This initial burden may be satisfied by presenting specific evidence on a particular issue or by pointing out "an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. Once the movant has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest on the allegations in the pleadings, but, "by affidavits or as otherwise provided for in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A "genuine issue" in the context of a motion for summary judgment is not simply a "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000). The court must consider the record as a whole, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences that favor the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Bay v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000).


  I. Opinions and Testimony of Lucian Morrison

  State Street moves to strike or exclude the opinions and testimony of Plaintiffs' expert witness Lucian Morrison ("Morrison"). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides the following:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Fed.R.Evid. 702. A court in evaluating expert testimony must apply the Daubert analysis. Durkin v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 420 (7th Cir. 2005). Under such an analysis, the court must first assess the reliability of the expert's testimony, considering whether "the proposed witness would testify to valid scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." Id. Secondly, the court must assess the relevance of the expert's testimony, considering whether the "testimony will assist the trier of fact." Id.; see also Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 421 F.3d 528, 535 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that an examination of an expert's credentials to determine if he possesses sufficient knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education is not in and of itself a sufficient analysis and that the "district court must also, in keeping with its gatekeeper's duty, assess the reliability of the methodology the expert has employed in arriving at his opinion"). Thus, the district court acts as a "gatekeeper with respect to testimony proffered under Rule 702 to ensure that the testimony is sufficiently reliable to qualify for admission." Mihailovich v. Laatsch, 359 F.3d 892, 918 (7th Cir. 2004). In determining whether expert testimony is admissible, the court should also consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors: "(1) whether the theoretical framework or technique underlying the witness's testimony . . . is subject to verification through testing, (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) what its known or potential rate of error is, (4) whether there are standards controlling its application, and (5) whether it is generally accepted within the relevant expert community." Id.

  In the instant action, Plaintiffs seek to offer Morrison's opinion that UAL's bankruptcy was imminent in October 2001, and that Defendants failed to act prudently by neglecting to sell the UAL stock to protect the interests of the Plan participants. Morrison has prior experience acting as a professional fiduciary and has managed bank and trust activities when working for several banking and trust companies. He has also served as a trustee for employee benefit plans. However, State Street correctly points out that Morrison's opinions range far beyond the proper actions of a fiduciary and delve into areas of bankruptcy, insolvency, economics, and the securities industry. Plaintiffs have not shown that Morrison possesses the requisite "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" in such specialized areas. Fed.R.Evid. 702. The bankruptcy of UAL and its surrounding circumstances are key factors in assessing State Street's actions. Morrison is wholly deficient to offer expert testimony regarding such matters. Although he has some experience that has touched on the areas of economics, the securities industry, and corporate bankruptcies, such experience is not sufficient to qualify him as an expert in such areas. The bankruptcy of UAL is such an integral part of the claims in the instant action that a complete and thorough understanding of such matters is crucial to making any sort of informed testimony concerning the propriety of Defendants' actions. Morrison's lack of expertise in bankruptcy matters and related matters is illustrated by the deficiency in his methodologies utilized in forming his opinions in the instant action. Morrison attempts to sidestep the necessary detailed expert analysis of UAL's financial condition by relying on external factors and extraneous evidence, such as statements made in a letter by UAL's CEO. The trier of fact can read and analyze such letters without the assistance of an expert, and Morrison's speculation based on such evidence is nothing more than a guess. Morrison has not shown to the court that he utilized any reliable tests or methodologies to support his opinions. Morrison has not shown, for example, that he has utilized a methodology commonly employed by experts in analyzing bankruptcy situations. Morrison did not conduct a financial analysis of UAL's books or apply any reliable methodology in arriving at his opinions. Instead, Morrison offers his own unsupported theories and conclusions, and offers nothing of benefit to the trier of fact. The trier of fact is presumed to be able to think and reason on its own. An expert is not employed in litigation to "think" for the trier of fact. Rather, an expert may only assist the trier of fact in its understanding of the facts and issues at hand. So called "experts" such as Morrison are not entitled to weigh in with their half-baked opinions in order to attempt to sway the trier of fact in its analysis.

  Plaintiffs apparently recognize the impropriety of offering Morrison as an expert and, in an effort to salvage at least some of Morrison's testimony, Plaintiffs ask the court to not engage in a "wholesale exclusion" of Morrison's testimony. (Ans. Excl. 13). However, we agree with State Street that Morrison's opinions offer virtually nothing to the trier of fact and his uneducated speculation presented under the cloak of an "expert" would only be prejudicial to State Street. Although Morrison claims to have experience and training in certain basic areas that are the focus of the instant action, his lack of expertise in such areas renders all of his conclusions suspect. Therefore, we grant State Street's motion to exclude the opinions and testimony of Morrison.

  II. State Street's Motion For Summary Judgment

  State Street moves for summary judgment on all claims brought against it. To start, the fiduciary duties under ERISA are explained in 29 U.S.C. § 1104, which provides the following:
(a) Prudent man standard of care
(1) Subject to sections 1103(c) and (d), 1342, and 1344 of this title, a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and —
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (emphasis added); see also DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 920 F.2d 457, 465 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that in assessing whether "investment strategies were prudent, . . . the ultimate outcome of an investment is not proof of imprudence" and that "[t]he fiduciary duty of care, . . . requires prudence, not prescience"). A breach of fiduciary claim can only be brought against a fiduciary recognized under ERISA. Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d 649, 660 (7th Cir. 2004); see also ...

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