United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
October 5, 2005.
BARNES PROPERTIES, INC., Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION and SAM ABDELNOUR, Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: G. MURPHY, Chief District Judge
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This action is before the Court on Plaintiff's compliance with
the Court's August 1, 2005 remand order awarding fees and costs.
(Doc. 36) Plaintiff's motion seeks fees and expenses in the
amount of $14,875.00. Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition
to the request in which they tell the Court that "Plaintiff's
counsel have informed counsel for defendants that they shall be
withdrawing their request for attorney's fees." (Doc. 37) As of
today's date, however, the Court has received no such notice from
Plaintiff's counsel. Defendants also argue that fees are not
appropriate in this case and that the proposed award is
"An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs
and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a
result of the removal." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In this Circuit, as
long as removal was improper, the plaintiff is presumptively
entitled to an award of fees because § 1447(c) is a fee-shifting
statute. Sirotzky v. New York Stock Exchange, 347 F.3d 985, 987
(7th Cir. 2003), citing Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407,
410-11 (7th Cir. 2000), Wisconsin v. Hotline Indus.,
236 F.3d 363, 367-68 (7th Cir. 2000), and Citizens for a Better
Env't v. Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 2000). The
presumption is rebuttable, Sirotzky, 347 F.3d at 987, but
Defendants have not rebutted the presumption.
The Court stands by its analysis and conclusion that the
removal was improper. While Defendants may feel justified in
their attempt to remove this action, it is well-settled that "§
1447(c) is not a sanctions rule; it is a fee-shifting statute,
entitling the district court to make whole the victorious party.
An opponent's bad faith may strengthen the position of a party
that obtained a remand, but it is not essential to an award, any
more than under the multitude of other fee-shifting statutes."
Garbie, 211 F.3d at 410. The Court has reviewed the fees and
expenses sought and finds them to be reasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, the pending motion (Doc. 36) is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff is awarded fees and costs in the amount
IT IS SO ORDERED.
© 1992-2005 VersusLaw Inc.