United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
October 5, 2005.
RONALD ALSUP, ROBERT CREWS, and MAGNUM PROPERTIES, L.L.C., Plaintiffs,
3-DAY BLINDS, et al., Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: G. MURPHY, Chief District Judge
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This action is again before the Court on Plaintiffs' compliance
with the Court's August 24, 2005 remand order awarding fees and
costs. (Doc. 93) Mitchell Blind and Shade Company has filed a
memorandum in opposition to the request in which it disputes a
portion of the requested fees because they relate to strategy
employed by counsel to dismiss certain bankrupt defendants.
"An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs
and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a
result of the removal." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In this Circuit, as
long as removal was improper, the plaintiff is presumptively
entitled to an award of fees because § 1447(c) is a fee-shifting
statute. Sirotzky v. New York Stock Exchange, 347 F.3d 985, 987
(7th Cir. 2003), citing Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,
211 F.3d 407, 410-11 (7th Cir. 2000), Wisconsin v. Hotline
Indus., 236 F.3d 363, 367-68 (7th Cir. 2000), and Citizens
for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir.
2000). The presumption is rebuttable, Sirotzky,
347 F.3d at 987, but Mitchell Blind has not rebutted the presumption. The fact that three
bankrupt defendants were dismissed from the action was only one
of several bases upon which the Court based its remand order.
Accordingly, the Court finds all requested fees and expenses
For the foregoing reasons, the pending motion (Doc. 93) is
GRANTED, and Plaintiffs are awarded fees and costs in the
amount of $15,400.00.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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