Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.


September 19, 2005.

APRIL MILLER, Plaintiff,

The opinion of the court was delivered by: CHARLES KOCORAS, District Judge


This matter comes before the court on the motion of Defendant River Oaks Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. ("River Oaks") for summary judgment in its favor on the complaint of Plaintiff April Miller. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.


  River Oaks is a Lincoln-Mercury dealership that sells both new and used cars to consumers. In September 2003, Miller went to River Oaks in response to a coupon she received in the mail. It stated that she was approved to purchase a car if she presented documents such as a driver's license, proof of residency, and a utility bill. Once at River Oaks, Miller spoke with a saleswoman named Bridget Powell. After looking at several different models, Miller settled on a 1997 Ford Taurus. She provided information for a credit application and signed a retail installment contract for the car. The contract specified that Miller would trade in her current car, a Saturn, for a $500 credit toward the purchase price. She also signed a contract rider, which stated that "[t]he parties intend that this contract will be assigned by [River Oaks] to a sales finance agency of [River Oaks'] choice."

  According to Miller, before she left the dealership, she asked Powell if she had financing for the car. Powell responded that Miller would not be able to leave the lot in the Taurus if she wasn't financed. Miller left her Saturn at River Oaks and departed in the Taurus.

  River Oaks then submitted Miller's application to several potential creditors. Each notified River Oaks that they would not extend credit to Miller, but apparently only one notified Miller herself. About one month after Miller's first visit to the dealership, she was contacted by River Oaks and informed that her financing had not gone through. She returned to the dealership, and the parties executed another sales contract. For this one, River Oaks increased the trade-in allowance to $1000 but now required Miller to pay a $600 down payment. Because Miller did not have $600 to pay, she provided River Oaks with two postdated checks for the amount. By October 24, Miller returned with a combination of cash and money orders totaling $600.

  Over the ensuing three weeks, Miller had some phone contact with River Oaks employees. On November 10, 2003, River Oaks sent Miller a letter at her home address stating that she would be reported as having stolen the car if she did not return it to the dealership within 48 hours of receiving the letter. It also stated that Miller had been informed that she could not receive financing for the car. When she received the letter, Miller forwarded it to her counsel and informed River Oaks that any further attempts to communicate with her would need to be directed to her attorney.

  Despite the breakdown in the parties' relations, River Oaks continued to seek financing on Miller's behalf and ultimately succeeded in doing so in May 2004, seven months after the execution of the second sales contract. At this time, Miller still retained possession of the Taurus. On September 17, 2004, Miller filed the instant suit, alleging violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act ("ICFA") as well as common-law fraud.

  River Oaks apparently had made good on its threat to report the Taurus as stolen, because Miller was arrested for possession of a stolen vehicle during a traffic stop shortly after the complaint was filed. The police returned the Taurus to River Oaks, whereupon River Oaks returned Miller's Saturn and $600 down payment to her. The parties have completed discovery, and River Oaks now moves for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint.*fn1


  Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to show through specific evidence that a triable issue of fact remains on issues on which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial. Id. The nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings or upon conclusory statements in affidavits; it must go beyond the pleadings and support its contentions with proper documentary evidence. Id. The court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Bay v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). With these principles in mind, we consider the instant motion.


  A. ECOA Claim

  The ECOA places certain obligations on creditors, a group defined to include persons who regularly arrange for the extension, renewal, or continuation of credit. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e). Under the ECOA, an adverse action occurs with respect to a credit applicant when credit is denied or revoked, when the terms of an existing credit arrangement change, or when a creditor refuses to grant credit in substantially the amount or according to the terms requested by the credit applicant. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6). When adverse action is taken against a credit applicant, the creditor must provide the applicant with a statement of reasons why the action occurred. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2). Unless the creditor acts on fewer than 150 credit applications per year, the statement must be in writing. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2), (5). Failure to comply with these requirements exposes the creditor to liability for actual as well as punitive damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a), (b). It is undisputed in this case that Miller was twice denied credit with respect to her purchase of the Taurus. It is similarly undisputed that River Oaks did not provide her with a written statement of reasons why she was denied credit. River Oaks contends that, because it forwarded Miller's credit request to other parties, it was not a creditor within the meaning of the ECOA. As a result, it argues, it had no legal duty to supply Miller with the reasons for the denials. River Oaks concedes that it may have participated in the credit decision made with respect to the second ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.