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August 24, 2005.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: WAYNE ANDERSEN, District Judge


This case is before the court on the petition of Lonnie Buchanan for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the reasons stated below, the petition is denied.


  A grand jury returned a five-count indictment against Lonnie Buchanan and a co-defendant on November 2, 2000. Count One charged both defendants with conspiracy to distribute heroin and crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count Two charged Buchanan's co-defendant with distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Counts Three, Four and Five charged both defendants with distribution of heroin and crack cocaine, all in violation of 21 U.S.C § 841(a)(1). Following a jury trial commencing on September 17, 2001, the jury returned a guilty verdict against both defendants on all counts of the indictment. Buchanan was sentenced to a 151-month term of imprisonment on February 26, 2002.

  Buchanan, with his co-defendant, appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Defendants' attorneys filed a consolidated Anders brief with the Seventh Circuit asserting that they could not find a nonfrivolous basis for the appeal and seeking to withdraw from their representations of defendants. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). On March 14, 2003, the Seventh Circuit granted the motions to withdraw and dismissed the appeal. See United States v. Omar Fazal and Lonnie Buchanan, Nos. 02-1330 & 02-1756 (7th Cir. Mar. 14, 2003). Buchanan filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was denied on October 6, 2003. See Buchanan v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 171 (2003).

  On August 17, 2004, Buchanan filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In his motion, Buchanan challenges the jurisdiction of the federal courts, asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and argues that the district court erred when it allowed custodial statements of non-testifying co-defendants to be heard at trial, when it did not find that Buchanan played a minor role in the offenses, and when it found that Buchanan participated in a drug conspiracy although he was not found in physical possession of any drugs.


  Collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the federal habeas corpus statute, is available only in limited circumstances. The statute provides in relevant part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess or the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255. Such relief is therefore limited to "an error of law that is jurisdictional, constitutional, or constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Bishchel v. United States, 32 F.3d 259, 263 (7th Cir. 1994), quoting Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1991). If the reviewing court determines that such defect exists in the judgment or sentence, it "shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or re-sentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

  I. Federal Jurisdiction Is Appropriate Because Buchanan Violated a Federal Statute

  Buchanan alleges that the government did not have jurisdiction to prosecute him in federal court. However, it has long been understood that the federal and states courts have concurrent jurisdiction over certain matters. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (finding that "an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each"). Here, Buchanan was indicted, tried, and found guilty of violating federal narcotics statutes. Thus, Buchanan's allegation of no federal jurisdiction is without merit.

  II. Buchanan's Trial Counsel Provided Effective Assistance of Counsel

  Buchanan argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The standard for reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland applies a two-prong analysis: (1) whether his counsel's deficiencies prejudiced his defense (the "prejudice" prong), and (2) whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (the "performance" prong). Id. at 688-692.

  The prejudice prong requires Buchanan to "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Id. at 695. A court is not required to determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice prong. Id. at 697. "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed." Id.

  In order to satisfy the performance prong, Buchanan must specifically identify acts or omissions that form the basis of his claim of ineffective assistance. Id. at 690. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court must then determine whether the identified acts and omissions fall outside the range of professionally competent assistance. Id. Courts must begin this analysis with a strong presumption that counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance. See United States v. Morales, 964 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 1992). A defense attorney's performance is acceptable when he chooses a professionally competent strategy that secured for the accused the benefit of the adversarial process. See Kokoraleis v. Gilmore, 131 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 1997). Under Strickland, courts should not second-guess counsel with the benefit of hindsight and can require only "a professionally competent defense, not . . . the best possible defense." Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876, 883 (7th Cir. 1997). Additionally, "a lawyer's decision to call or not to call a witness is a strategic decision generally not subject to ...

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