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August 19, 2005.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: JEFFREY COLE, Magistrate Judge



Defendants, E.I.Du Pont de Nemours and Company, Noranda, Inc., Falconbridge Limited, and Norfalco LLC ("defendants"), have moved to compel a second round of Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of all named plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have objected on various grounds, including the defendants' failure to have obtained leave of court prior to the issuance of the 30(b)(6) notices. The relevant facts are these.

  Plaintiffs filed their Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint on September 5, 2003, alleging that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to raise, fix, maintain or stabilize the price of sulfuric acid in the United States in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. On October 14, 2003, the defendants issued deposition notices pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to all plaintiffs. The notices initially listed fifteen topics that were to be covered in the depositions. Ultimately, the number was reduced to seven. The named plaintiffs were deposed between November 14, 2003, and December 11, 2003. A Second Amended Class Action Complaint was filed on May 24, 2004, and a year later leave was sought leave to file a Third Amended Class Action Complaint. That motion is pending before Judge Coar. On June 3, 2005, DuPont issued a second Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition to all named plaintiffs and attached a list of seven topics to be covered.*fn1 The additional depositions were necessitated, DuPont said, by the filing of the Second Amended Class Action Complaint in late May 2004. On June 16th, counsel for the plaintiffs wrote to Mr. Sitarchuk objecting to the notices of deposition and informing him that "we will not be producing witnesses on the dates you have noticed." (Defendants Motion to Compel, Ex.E).*fn2 One of the sixteen "General Objections" raised by the plaintiffs was that the defendants had not obtained leave of court to take a second set of Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, as required by Rule 30(a)(2)(B). (Defendants Motion to Compel, Ex. E at ¶ 9).*fn3 ANALYSIS


  Of course, where pleadings change, the theory of the case can also change — often quite drastically — necessitating further additional discovery, including additional depositions of previously deposed witnesses. McCann v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 109 F.R.D. 363, 368 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (Nordberg, J.).*fn4 But a party's right to conduct such discovery is neither absolute, automatic, nor self-determinable. Rather, it is governed by Rule 30(a)(2)(B), which provides that a party may take the testimony of any person without leave of court unless "the person to be examined has already been deposed in the case."

  The defendants contend that they had no obligation to obtain leave of court to conduct a second set of Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. In their view, Rule 30(a)(2)(B) does not apply to Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, especially where the second deposition relates to different topics than the first. The argument ignores the text, history, and purpose of the 1993 Amendment to Rule 30.

  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which have the force of statutes, Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., 313 F.3d 385, 392 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1068 (2003), are to be accorded "their plain meaning . . . and generally with them, as with a statute, `[w]hen we find the terms . . . unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete. . . .'" Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989). The language of Rule 30(a)(2)(B) is neither vague nor fluid. Indeed, it could not be plainer: a party "must obtain leave of court" to take a second deposition "if . . . the person to be examined already has been deposed in the case". (Emphasis supplied). What Justice Holmes said long ago is an appropriate guide for decision: "the words of the statue are peremptory and must be obeyed. We do not apprehend any serious consequences, in view of the date of the change. But, whatever the consequences, we must accept the plain meaning of plain words." United States v. Brown, 206 U.S. 240, 244 (1907).

  Of course, the Rule directs that leave to take a successive deposition "shall" be granted, but only if the court — not an inevitably self-interested party — determines that the requested discovery is "consistent with the principles stated in Rule 26(b)(2)" — that is, whether it is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, is obtainable from an alternative more convenient or less burdensome source, whether the party "seeking discovery" had ample opportunity by discovery to obtain the information sought or whether the burden of proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.

  It is no answer to say that where there has been an amendment to a complaint, discovery is often allowed. "General propositions do not decide concrete cases," Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting),*fn5 and the fact that a party may ultimately be able to persuade a judge to allow successive depositions has absolutely nothing to do with the obligation to seek in the first instance a court's permission to take a deposition of a "person" who has once been deposed.

  The defendants here issued their second Rule 30(b)(6) subpoenas without leave of the court, despite the unambiguous requirement of Rule 30(a)(2)(B). The notices and subpoenas are thus invalid. See Ameristar Jet Charter, Inc. v. Signal Composites, Inc., 244 F.3d 189, 192(1st Cir. 2001); see also Innomed Labs, LLC v. Alza Corp., 211 F.R.D. 237, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying motion seeking leave to re-depose a party for failure to comply with Rule 30(a)(2)(B)).


  Nothing in Judge Nordberg's opinion in McCann v. Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 363 (N.D.Ill. 1986) suggests, let alone compels, a contrary result. The issues implicated by Rule 30(a)(2)(B) were not involved in that case. Rather, the issue was whether the defendant would be prejudiced if the court allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint on the eve of the close of discovery that would convert the suit from a simple breach of contract case into a substantial "tort action with high stakes. . . ." Id. at 368. It was in this context that Judge Nordberg said that where an amendment significantly changes the complaint, depositions which have already been taken "may" have to be repeated to pursue these additional claims." Id. Judge Nordberg did not address the question of whether leave of court is necessary to take a second 30(b)(6) deposition.*fn6

  Nor do the other cases defendants cite excuse their failure to comply with Rule 30(a)(2)(B). In Cohn v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 92 C 5852, 1993 WL 451463 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 1, 1993), there was no issue raised under that Rule, and thus the case is not controlling.*fn7 The question, which was considered under Rules 45(c)(3)(A)(iv) and 26(b)(2)(ii), was whether a non-party witness could be redeposed following the post-deposition disclosure of the witness's secret taping of the plaintiff, which led to an amendment to the complaint. The court concluded that he could and that the defendant's motion to quash should be denied. The court did at least mention the Rule in Collins ...

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