United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
August 2, 2005.
RAFEAL A. JACKSON, Plaintiff,
ST. CLAIR COUNTY JAIL, MEARL J. JUSTUS and T.J. COLLINS, Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: DAVID HERNDON, District Judge
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, formerly an inmate in the St. Clair County Jail
(hereinafter "the jail"), brings this action for deprivations of
his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.*fn1
Plaintiff previously was granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, and he has tendered his initial partial filing fee as
ordered. In this case, Plaintiff sets forth a litany of gripes
about conditions at the jail; he divides his complaint into 15
separate claims, as summarized and discussed below.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of
the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening. The court shall review, before
docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as
practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a
(b) Grounds for Dismissal. On review, the court
shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. An action or claim is frivolous if "it lacks
an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319
, 325 (1989). Upon careful review of the
complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it
appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; portions of
this action are legally frivolous and thus subject to summary
GENERAL PRINCIPLES: PRE-TRIAL DETAINEES
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Generally, confinement of
pretrial detainees may not be punitive, because "under the Due
Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535
(1979). Thus, conditions of pretrial confinement must be
"reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective."
Id. at 539. See also Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 717
(7th Cir. 1995); Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285 (7th
Plaintiff's first claim is that the law library at the jail is
woefully inadequate. He states that case reporters are outdated,
that pages are missing from many of the books, and there are no
certified paralegals or jailhouse law clerks employed to assist
inmates with their legal matters.
The Seventh Circuit uses a two-part test to decide if prison
administrators have violated the right of access to the courts.
Smith v. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 1995);
Jenkins v. Lane, 977 F.2d 266, 268 (7th Cir. 1992). First, the
prisoner must show that prison officials failed "to assist in the
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing
prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law." Jenkins, 977 F.2d at 268 (quoting
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)). Second, he must be
able to show "some quantum of detriment caused by the challenged
conduct of state officials resulting in the interruption and/or
delay of plaintiff's pending or contemplated litigation." Alston
v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 1994); Jenkins,
977 F.2d at 268; Shango v. Jurich, 965 F.2d 289, 291 (7th
Cir. 1992); Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 642-43 (7th
Cir. 1987); Hossman v. Sprandlin, 812 F.2d 1019, 1021 n. 2
(7th Cir. 1987). That means that a detriment must exist, a
detriment resulting from illegal conduct that affects litigation.
It does not mean that any delay is a detriment. Kincaid v.
Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 603 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 1002 (1993). Regardless of the length of an alleged delay,
a prisoner must show actual substantial prejudice to specific
litigation. Kincaid, 969 F.2d at 603.
In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered any
actual prejudice to any pending litigation due to the perceived
inadequacy of the jail's law library. Therefore, he has failed to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and Count 1 is
dismissed from this action without prejudice with leave to amend
his complaint to properly plead his case if he has one for this
Plaintiff next alleges, generically, that the disciplinary
procedures at the jail do not pass constitutional muster.
When a plaintiff brings an action under § 1983 for procedural
due process violations, he must show that the state deprived him
of a constitutionally protected interest in "life, liberty, or
property" without due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
125 (1990). See also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Generally, confinement of pretrial detainees may not be punitive,
because "under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be
punished prior to an adjudication of guilt." Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Thus, conditions of pretrial
confinement must be "reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective." Id. at 539. See also Murphy v.
Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1995); Brownell v.
Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1289 (7th Cir. 1991). However,
a pretrial detainee can be punished for misconduct
that occurs while he is awaiting trial in a pretrial
confinement status. Notably, the basis for this
punishment is not the underlying crime of which he
stands accused; rather, this punishment is based upon
the detainee's actions while in pretrial confinement.
Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999
, 1003 (7th Cir. 1999). The
Seventh Circuit has also recognized that, for pretrial detainees,
procedural protections are required prior to the imposition of
any punishment. Rapier, 172 F.3d at 1005; Whitford v.
Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 531 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1995) (indicating
in dictum that a due process hearing is required). See generally
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
In Wolff, the Supreme Court set out the minimal procedural
protections that must be provided to a prisoner in disciplinary
proceedings in which the prisoner loses good time, is confined to
a disciplinary segregation, or otherwise subjected to some
comparable deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty
interest. Id. at 556-72.
Wolff required that inmates facing disciplinary
charges for misconduct be accorded  24 hours'
advance written notice of the charges against them;
 a right to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence in defense, unless doing so would jeopardize
institutional safety or correctional goals;  the
aid of a staff member or inmate in presenting a
defense, provided the inmate is illiterate or the
issues complex;  an impartial tribunal; and  a
written statement of reasons relied on by the
tribunal. 418 U.S. at 563-572.
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460
, 466 n. 3 (1983). In this case, Plaintiff does not include any allegations
suggesting that he, personally, was ever subjected to any
disciplinary proceedings for any charged misconduct, or that he,
personally, was deprived of any constitutionally protected
liberty interest. Therefore, he has failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, and Count 2 is dismissed from this
action without prejudice with leave to amend his complaint to
properly plead his case if he has one for this count.
Plaintiff alleges that virtually all of the cells at the jail
are frequented by roaches and other insects. These insects crawl
into beds and showers, roam across tables, and occasionally find
their way into meals.
The Constitution does not require the jail to ensure the
comfort of each prisoner, but only to provide such necessities as
food, medical care, sanitation, and a safe environment. Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-48 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872 (1979); compare Thompson v.
City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1448 (9th Cir. 1989)
(failure to provide bed or mattress punishment) and Hamm v.
DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986) (unsanitary food and sleeping on
mattress on floor not punishment). In a case involving conditions
of confinement in a prison, two elements are required to
establish violations of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual
punishments clause. First, an objective element requires a
showing that the conditions deny the inmate "the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities," creating an excessive
risk to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The second requirement is a subjective
element establishing a defendant's culpable state of mind.
Although the presence of roaches and other insects may be
unpleasant, the presence of a few bugs does not create an excessive risk to his health or safety.
Further, Plaintiff does not allege that he has suffered any harm
as the result of these conditions. Instead, he merely expresses
concern over exposure to "potential risks of harm." However,
"[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined
in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
Therefore, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, and Count 3 is dismissed from this action with
Plaintiff alleges that food service workers at the jail,
apparently other inmates, often prepare and handle inmates' food
without wearing gloves, hairnets or beard guards. He also alleges
that these food service workers are not screened for communicable
diseases such as AIDS, HIV, or hepatitis before being assigned to
As with Count 3, Plaintiff does not allege that he has suffered
any harm as the result of these conditions. Although he expresses
concern over exposure to "potential risks to [his] health and
safety," he has not alleged any physical injury. See
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Therefore, he has failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, and Count 4 is dismissed from this action
without prejudice with leave to amend his complaint to properly
plead case if he has one for this count.
Plaintiff alleges that the hair and beard trimmers in the
barber shop at the jail are not properly sterilized between uses,
thus creating a risk of transmitting HIV or AIDS between inmates.
For the reasons discussed above with Count 3 and Count 4, again Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Therefore, Count 5A is dismissed from this action with prejudice.
Plaintiff alleges that detainees at the jail who are mentally
ill do not receive any individual or group therapy to complement
their prescribed psychotropic medications.
A state official violates the due process rights of a
pretrial detainee when she acts with deliberate
indifference toward the detainee's serious medical
needs. Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 717 (7th
Cir. 1995); Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1289
(7th Cir. 1991); Salazar v. City of Chicago,
940 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir. 1991). The Seventh
Circuit has observed that "deliberate indifference"
is simply a synonym for intentional or reckless
conduct, and that "reckless" describes conduct so
dangerous that the deliberate nature of the
defendant's actions can be inferred. Brownell,
950 F.2d at 1290. In this sense, the due process standard
is analogous to that utilized in the Eighth Amendment
context, where prison officials may be found liable
for disregarding a substantial risk to an inmate's
health or safety. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). In both
cases, the relevant inquiry is whether the official
actually knew about the plaintiff's condition, not
whether a reasonable official should have known.
Compare Brownell, 950 F.2d at 1291 (applying a
subjective standard in the Fourteenth Amendment
context) with Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837,
114 S.Ct. 1970 (applying a subjective standard in the Eighth
Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949
, 955-56 (7th Cir. 1999).
The Seventh Circuit has found that "the need for a mental
illness to be treated could certainly be considered a serious
medical need." Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 734
(7th Cir. 2001); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269 (7th
Cir. 1983). However, Plaintiff makes no allegation that he is one
of these inmates who does not receive therapy. Further, from the
allegations in the complaint it is clear that mentally ill
detainees are receiving some treatment in the form of medication;
mere disagreement with a physician's chosen course of an inmate's
medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference
under the Eighth Amendment. See Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586,
591 (7th Cir. 1996). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, and Count 5B is dismissed from this action
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have failed to implement a
"certified detainee grievance procedure" at the jail, thus
depriving detainees of the ability to exhaust administrative
remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). However, the
Constitution requires no procedure at all, and the failure of
Defendants to implement a certified grievance procedure does not,
of itself, violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Maust v.
Headley, 959 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1992); Shango v.
Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1982). Therefore, Plaintiff
has not presented a viable constitutional claim, and Count 6 is
dismissed from this action with prejudice.
Plaintiff alleges that detainees are separated by race in the
jail's cell blocks, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He
specifically alleges that several cell blocks are designated as
"black detainee only" cell blocks.
The law is clear that "racial segregation, which is
unconstitutional outside prisons, is unconstitutional within
prisons, save for the necessity of prison security and
discipline." Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). See also
Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1960); Jamison-Bey v.
Thieret, 867 F.2d 1046, 1048 (7th Cir. 1989). Therefore,
based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court is unable to
dismiss Count 7 at this point in the litigation. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff alleges that some types of inmates are routinely
denied placement in protective custody status. He specifically
states that placement in protective custody is sometimes denied
due to the criminal charges pending against a detainee, or because of
his physical characteristics.
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court
held that "prison officials have a duty . . . to protect
prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." Id.
at 833 (internal citations omitted); see also Luttrell v.
Nickel, 129 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 1997). However, not
every harm caused by another inmate translates into
constitutional liability for the corrections officers responsible
for the prisoner's safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In order
for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim for failure to protect, he
must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm, and that the defendants acted
with "deliberate indifference" to that danger. Id.; Reed v.
McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff also
must prove that prison officials were aware of a specific,
impending, and substantial threat to his safety, often by showing
that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat
to his safety. Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir.
In this case, Plaintiff makes no allegations that he,
personally, was ever denied protective custody placement, or that
he, personally, ever sought protective custody, or even that
there was any specific threat to his safety that might require
such a placement. Therefore, he has failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, and Count 8 is dismissed from this
action without prejudice with leave to amend his complaint to
properly plead his case if he has one for this count.
Plaintiff alleges that there are no video surveillance cameras
in the jail to monitor cells and walkways, despite the fact that
most fights or assaults occur in these areas. The Court is
unaware of any constitutional provision requiring surveillance
cameras, and therefore Plaintiff has not presented a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Therefore, Count 9 is dismissed from
this action with prejudice.
Plaintiff alleges that most of the cells do not have running
hot water. For the reasons discussed above with Count 3, Count 4
and Count 5A, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. Therefore, Count 10 is dismissed from this
action with prejudice.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants do not allow religious
leaders from the Muslim and Moorish faiths to conduct religious
services at the jail. Therefore, he is unable to attend Islam
religious services, although detainees of other faiths are
provided with opportunities to attend religious services.
It is well-established that "a prisoner is entitled to practice
his religion insofar as doing so does not unduly burden the
administration of the prison." Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46,
47 (7th Cir. 1990); see Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680,
686 and nn. 3-5 (7th Cir. 1991) (collecting cases). On the
other hand, a prison regulation that impinges on an inmate's
First Amendment rights is nevertheless valid "if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests." O'Lone v. Estate
of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
Applying these standards to the allegations in the complaint,
the Court is unable to dismiss Count 11 at this point in the
litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff alleges that detainees at the jail are not allowed
outdoor recreation, despite the availability of a secured outdoor
recreation area at the jail.
In recent years we have not only acknowledged that a
lack of exercise can rise to a constitutional
violation, French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255
(7th Cir. 1986), but have concluded that "exercise is now regarded in many
quarters as an indispensable component of preventive
medicine." Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 528
(7th Cir. 1995). Given current norms, exercise is
no longer considered an optional form of recreation,
but is instead a necessary requirement for physical
and mental well-being.
Although we have recognized the value of exercise and
its medicinal effects, we have also consistently held
that short-term denials of exercise may be inevitable
in the prison context and are not so detrimental as
to constitute a constitutional deprivation. Thomas
v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 764 (7th Cir. 1997)
(70-day denial permissible); Harris v. Fleming,
839 F.2d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir. 1988) (28 day denial
not deprivation); Shelby County Jail Inmates v.
Westlake, 798 F.2d 1085, 1089 (7th Cir. 1986)
(limited recreational activities sufficient, where
average prison stay was 10 days or less); Caldwell
v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 601 (7th Cir. 1986) (no
deprivation where exercise was denied for 30 days,
but then allowed one hour indoor exercise for next 6
months); but see Antonelli v. Sheahan,
81 F.3d 1422, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996) (viable constitutional
claim where prisoner denied recreational
opportunities for 7 weeks); Jamison-Bey v. Thieret,
867 F.2d 1046, 1048 (1989) (reversing summary
judgment for prison officials where segregated
prisoner denied exercise for 101 days).
Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679
, 683-84 (7th Cir. 2001).
Based on these standards, the Court is unable to dismiss Count 12
at this point in the litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff alleges that in some cell blocks, the noise level is
"excessive and unbearable." A few hours of periodic loud noises
does not implicate a constitutional violation. See Lunsford v.
Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1580 (7th Cir. 1994). However,
infliction of incessant noise, even if it causes only agony and
not enduring injury, may be a due process violation. See
Williams v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th Cir. 1988); see
also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1433 (7th Cir.
1996). In this case, Plaintiff alleges that the noise in his cell
block persists "throughout the day and night" from other inmates
who are literally kicking and screaming in their cells, yet
Defendants take no action to correct this situation.
Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court is unable
to dismiss Count 13 at this point in the litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff alleges that paint is peeling off the walls in the
jail showers, thus potentially exposing detainees to lead
poisoning. For the reasons discussed above with Count 3, Count 4,
Count 5A and Count 10, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Therefore, Count 14 is dismissed
from this action with prejudice.
Three motions are currently pending in this action. First is
Plaintiff's motion for service (Doc. 10); this motion also seeks
a ruling on his request for counsel. There is no request for
appointment of counsel filed in this matter, and service shall be
directed as part of this order. Therefore this motion is MOOT.
Plaintiff's second motion (Doc. 11) seeks a status report on
this case, while his third motion (Doc. 12) seeks a ruling on all
pending motions. Each of these motions is also MOOT.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1, COUNT 2, COUNT 4, and
COUNT 8 are DISMISSED from this action WITHOUT PREJUDICE
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff has forty-five (45) days to amend
his complaint regarding said counts.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 3, COUNT 5A, COUNT 5B, COUNT
6, COUNT 9, COUNT 10 and COUNT 14 are DISMISSED from this
action with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall complete and
submit a USM-285 form for Defendants ST. CLAIR COUNTY JAIL,
MEARL JUSTUS and T.J. COLLINS within THIRTY (30) DAYS of the
date of entry of this Memorandum and Order. The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff THREE (3) USM-285 forms with
Plaintiff's copy of this Memorandum and Order. Plaintiff is
advised that service will not be made on a defendant until
Plaintiff submits a properly completed USM-285 form for that
The Clerk is DIRECTED to prepare Form 1A (Notice of Lawsuit
and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons) and Form 1B (Waiver
of Service of Summons) for Defendants ST. CLAIR COUNTY JAIL,
MEARL JUSTUS and T.J. COLLINS. The Clerk shall forward those
forms, USM-285 forms submitted by the Plaintiff, and sufficient
copies of the complaint to the United States Marshal for service.
The United States Marshal is DIRECTED, pursuant to Rule
4(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to serve process
on Defendants ST. CLAIR COUNTY JAIL, MEARL JUSTUS and T.J.
COLLINS in the manner specified by Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Process in this case shall consist of
the complaint, applicable forms 1A and 1B, and this Memorandum
and Order. For purposes of computing the passage of time under
Rule 4(d)(2), the Court and all parties will compute time as of
the date it is mailed by the Marshal, as noted on the USM-285
With respect to former employees of St. Clair County Jail who
no longer can be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff,
the County shall furnish the Marshal with the Defendant's
last-known address upon issuance of a court order which states
that the information shall be used only for purposes of
effectuating service (or for proof of service, should a dispute
arise) and any documentation of the address shall be retained
only by the Marshal. Address information obtained from the County
pursuant to this order shall not be maintained in the court file,
nor disclosed by the Marshal. The United States Marshal shall file returned waivers of
service as well as any requests for waivers of service that are
returned as undelivered as soon as they are received. If a waiver
of service is not returned by a defendant within THIRTY (30)
DAYS from the date of mailing the request for waiver, the United
States Marshal shall:
Request that the Clerk prepare a summons for that
defendant who has not yet returned a waiver of
service; the Clerk shall then prepare such summons as
Personally serve process upon the defendant
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 566(c).
Within ten days after personal service is effected,
the United States Marshal shall file the return of
service for the defendant, along with evidence of any
attempts to secure a waiver of service of process and
of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting
service on said defendant. Said costs shall be
enumerated on the USM-285 form and shall include the
costs incurred by the Marshal's office for
photocopying additional copies of the summons and
complaint and for preparing new USM-285 forms, if
required. Costs of service will be taxed against the
personally served defendant in accordance with the
provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2) unless the
defendant shows good cause for such failure.
Plaintiff is ORDERED to serve upon defendant or, if
appearance has been entered by counsel, upon that attorney, a
copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for
consideration by this Court. He shall include with the original
paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate
stating the date that a true and correct copy of any document was
mailed to defendant or his counsel. Any paper received by a
district judge or magistrate judge which has not been filed with
the Clerk or which fails to include a certificate of service will
be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate
responsive pleading to the complaint, and shall not waive filing
a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this cause is REFERRED to
a United States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is hereby REFERRED to a United
States Magistrate Judge for disposition, as contemplated by Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the parties
consent to such a referral.
Plaintiff is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
and each opposing party informed of any change in his
whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
seven (7) days after a transfer or other change in address
IT IS SO ORDERED.