United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
June 21, 2005.
MUNICIPAL TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK, Plaintiff,
MARIANNE CLARK, TRUSTEE ROCK CREEK TRUST, et al., Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: MILTON SHADUR, Senior District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This Court has now entered its Judgment of Foreclosure in this
case. In that regard, the respective priority claimants
mortgagee Municipal Trust and Savings Bank ("Bank") and the
United States have reached agreement on the terms of that
judgment but have asked this Court to resolve one aspect of the
first priority to which the Bank as mortgagee is entitled. That
issue relates to the includability or nonincludability of the
Bank's late charges as "any interest or carrying charges upon the
obligation secured" within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 6323(e)
("Section 6323(e)"). In turn, Section 6323 accords priority to
items that come under that rubric "to the extent that, under
local law, any such item has the same priority as the lien or
security interest to which it relates."
Neither side has been able to locate any direct authority,
either under Illinois law ("local law") or elsewhere, bearing on
the subject whether the Bank's late charges do or do not fit
within the Section 6323(e) language. That is frankly surprising, given the ease of running a productive Westlaw search of the
words "carrying charges" a subject discussed a bit later in
this opinion. But in all events, an analysis from several
perspectives leads this Court to conclude that the United States
has by far the better of the argument.
In terms of the statutory language as such, the juxtaposition
of "interest or carrying charges" in the disjunctive provides
some clue as to the meaning of the latter. It would seem logical
that "carrying charges" should be viewed as costs of the same
general nature as interest, which is the price borne by a lender
to compensate for the loss of yield stemming from nonpayment or
delayed payment of the amounts required by the mortgage. Just
such a reading is consistent with the definitions of "carrying
charge" in Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004):
1. A cost, in addition to interest, paid to a
creditor for carrying installment credit. 2. Expenses
incident to property ownership, such as taxes and
As indicated earlier, that view is fortified by a Westlaw
search of "carrying charges," which has turned up no fewer than
73 Illinois cases, all of which treat with costs of the type
suggested here, and none of which would bring the arbitrarily
quantified late charges imposed by the Bank as embraced within
the "carrying charges" concept. Indeed, one of those cases
(Harper Square Hous. Corp. v. Hayes, 305 Ill.App.3d 955
713 N.E.2d 666
(1st Dist. 1999)) actually differentiates between "carrying charges" and "late charges," while all of the mortgage
foreclosure cases as well as Harper Square and other real
estate cases included in the package (primarily involving lease
situations, including cooperative leases) uniformly equate
"carrying charges" with real estate taxes, insurance, operating
expenses, costs of repairs and the like.
"Late charges" are, it is plain, an entirely different breed of
animal. Here is the provision as to "late charges" contained in
the Promissory Note secured by the Bank's mortgage:
If a payment is 10 days or more late, Borrower will
be charged 5.000% of the regularly scheduled payment
or $10.00, whichever is greater.
Thus an 11-day delay in payment of a scheduled monthly mortgage
installment of $2,481.09 triggers a late charge of $124
(equivalent to an annual rate of interest of some 165%), while a
30-day delay costs the delinquent borrower the selfsame $124
(equivalent to an annual interest rate of some 60%).
That scenario plainly does not describe a charge that is
reflective of the cost of "carrying" the past-due indebtedness.
Instead it is clear that the purpose of the late charge, which
bears no direct financial relationship to the cost of "carrying"
the additional financial burden occasioned by the delinquency, is
simply to induce timely payment of the mortgage installments.
That has in turn led this Court to look once again at the
Illinois caselaw with which it already has great familiarity in another context the conceptually similar distinction between
liquidated damages and penalties. On that score the leading
Illinois case, which has been followed repeatedly by other
Illinois appellate caselaw, is Stride v. 120 W. Madison Bldg.
Corp., 132 Ill.App.3d 601, 605, 477 N.E.2d 1318, 1321 (1st
Where damages are difficult to ascertain, the parties
may specify a particular sum as liquidated damages (5
Corbin on Contracts, § 1054 at 319 (1964).)
However, if the clause fixing damages is merely to
secure performance of the agreement it will be
treated as a penalty and only actual damages proved
can be recovered. (Scofield v. Tompkins (1880),
95 Ill. 190.)
This Court has applied the Stride principle, as further
confirmed by other Illinois cases that follow and quote Stride,
in such decisions as Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Ridge Chrysler
Plymouth, L.L.C., 219 F.Supp.2d 945, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2002):
No matter what label the parties apply to a
contractual term, Illinois law states that contract
provisions may not serve as a "threat used to secure
performance" (Med㹛 Neck & Back Pain Ctr., S.C.
v. Noffsinger, 311 Ill.App.3d 853, 860,
244 Ill.Dec. 712, 717, 726 N.E.2d 687, 693 (2d Dist. 2000);
accord, Checkers Eight, 241 F.3d at 562). It is
well established that "if the purpose of the clause
fixing damages is merely to secure performance of the
agreement, it will not be upheld" (Hidden Grove,
318 Ill.App.3d at 947, 253 Ill.Dec. 23,
744 N.E.2d at 307).
This opinion should not be misunderstood as holding that the
Bank's late charges in this case are not collectible because they
constitute an unenforceable penalty, an issue that is not before
this Court. Instead what has just been said further corroborates the already expressed notion that the statutory reference to
"carrying charges" in Section 6323(e) does not encompass the
portion of the Bank's total claim that it has calculated as "late
When the mortgaged property is sold pursuant to the Judgment of
Foreclosure, the amount of the Bank's claim ascribable to "late
charges" will not be included in the amount as to which it stands
as the primary secured creditor, ranking ahead of the United
States' tax lien. Because the amount of that multimillion dollar
tax lien is far in excess of the market value that the parties
have projected for the mortgaged property, it would appear that
the late charges subordinate as they are to the government's
tax lien have essentially become a moot issue.
© 1992-2005 VersusLaw Inc.