United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
June 10, 2005.
ERIC ADAMS, Petitioner,
RANDY DAVIS, Respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: WILLIAM STIEHL, Senior District Judge
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner brings this action under the umbrella of habeas
corpus law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Typically the writ of habeas corpus
is used to completely free an inmate from unlawful custody.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-85 (1973). The writ has
been extended, under certain circumstances, to allow a prisoner
to challenge his transfer to a more restrictive confinement.
See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 12 F.3d 735, 736 (7th
Cir. 1994); Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379 (7th Cir.
If the prisoner is seeking what can fairly be
described as a quantum change in the level of custody
whether outright freedom, or freedom subject to the
limited reporting and financial constraints of bond
or parole or probation, or the run of the prison in
contrast to the approximation to solitary confinement
that is disciplinary segregation then habeas corpus
is his remedy. But if he is seeking a different
program or location or environment, then he is
challenging the conditions rather than the fact of
his confinement and his remedy is under civil rights
law. . . .
Id. at 381; Falcon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 52 F.3d 137,
138-139 (7th Cir. 1995).
In the instant case, Petitioner challenges a disciplinary
proceeding that resulted in the loss of telephone and commissary privilege, as well as thirty days in
segregation. Thus, habeas corpus is arguably the proper manner in
which to challenge that proceeding.
However, Petitioner must show that the government deprived him
of a constitutionally protected interest in "life, liberty, or
property" without due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch,
494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). The Supreme Court has held that while a
state may create a liberty interest, such state-created liberty
interests are limited to "freedom from restraint which, while not
exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give
rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . .
nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995).
In the instant case, Petitioner alleges that he was placed in
disciplinary segregation for thirty days in violation of his
right to procedural due process. However, he has no protected
liberty interest in remaining in general population. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 760-62 (7th Cir. 1997) (70
days in segregation not atypical and significant hardship);
Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175-76 (7th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting claim that prisoner was improperly held one year in
disciplinary confinement); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527,
533 (7th Cir. 1995) (six months in segregation not atypical
and significant hardship).
In summary, this habeas action does not survive review under
Rule 4. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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