United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
June 2, 2005.
OHREN SIMBURGER and CONNIE SIMBURGER, Plaintiffs,
HANOVER INSURANCE, Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: WILLIAM STIEHL, Senior District Judge
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's motion to
reconsider and vacate judgment (Doc. 27). The Court entered
summary judgment on January 14, 2005, in favor of defendant
finding that the policy provided that the appraisal process would
be binding on the parties. Plaintiffs filed their motion to
reconsider and to vacate judgment on February 14, 2005.
Initially, the Court notes that a motion for reconsideration
"allows a party to direct the district court's attention to newly
discovered material evidence or a manifest error of law or fact."
Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996).
The motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a party
to correct its own procedural failures or introduce evidence that
should have been brought to the attention of the court prior to
judgment. See, Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams
Football Co., 188 F.3d 427, 439 (7th Cir. 1999); see, also
Calumet Lumber, Inc. v. Mid-America Indus., Inc., 1996 WL
308243, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 1996).
Relief from judgment is available in a limited fashion under
the Federal Rules. There are two ways in which a party may seek
reconsideration of the merits of an order of the Court,
specifically under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). United States v.
Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 300 (7th Cir. 1992). Under Rule
59(e), a litigant may move the Court to alter or amend a
judgment, based on newly discovered evidence, an intervening
change in the controlling law or manifest error of law or fact.
See Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp.,
51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995); Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). However,
relief under Rule 59(e) must be invoked within ten days of the entry of the judgment. Id. Motions "to alter or
amend a judgment served more than ten days after the entry of
judgment are to be evaluated under Rule 60(b)." Deutsch,
981 F.2d at 301. Here, the motion for reconsideration and to vacate
judgment was filed a month after entry of judgment, and the
provisions of Rule 59, therefore, do not apply.
Rule 60(b) is similar to Rule 59(e) in that it enables a party
to seek relief from a court's order, however, a court may grant
relief only under the particular circumstances enumerated in the
Rule, including: 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void
judgment; (5) a satisfied, released, or discharged judgment; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. "Rule 60(b) is . . . an extraordinary remedy," which
does not allow for "general pleas of relief." Deutsch,
981 F.2d at 301 (internal citation omitted). Nor is Rule 60(b) the "proper
avenue to redress mistakes of law committed by the trial judge."
Parke-Chapley Constr. Co. v. Cherrington, 865 F.2d 907, 915
(7th Cir. 1989).
In their motion, plaintiffs assert no grounds which would
entitle them to the extraordinary remedy of relief under Rule
60(b). Plaintiffs assert, without reference to any authority,
that the appraisal award is not binding or final. Without more,
this Court simply cannot grant plaintiffs the relief they seek
and their motion for reconsideration or to vacate judgment is
DENIED on all grounds.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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