United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
May 4, 2005.
DARREN WILDER, Petitioner,
FCI GREENVILLE, Respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: DAVID HERNDON, District Judge
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner, currently an inmate in the Federal Correctional
Institution in Greenville, Illinois, brings this action under the
umbrella of habeas corpus law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Typically the
writ of habeas corpus is used to completely free an inmate from
unlawful custody. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-85
(1973). The writ has been extended, under certain circumstances,
to allow a prisoner to challenge his transfer to a more
restrictive confinement. See, e.g., United States v. Harris,
12 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 1994); Graham v. Broglin,
922 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1991).
If the prisoner is seeking what can fairly be
described as a quantum change in the level of custody
whether outright freedom, or freedom subject to the
limited reporting and financial constraints of bond
or parole or probation, or the run of the prison in
contrast to the approximation to solitary confinement
that is disciplinary segregation then habeas corpus
is his remedy. But if he is seeking a different
program or location or environment, then he is
challenging the conditions rather than the fact of
his confinement and his remedy is under civil rights
law. . . .
Id. at 381 (emphasis added); Falcon v. U.S. Bureau of
Prisons, 52 F.3d 137, 138-139 (7th Cir. 1995).
In the instant case, Petitioner seeks a modification to his
security classification. He claims that he does not receive
points for participating in the financial responsibility program.
Apparently his failure to participate in that program was due to his lack of
funds, the result of his having no job assignment. His lack of a
job was due to his placement in segregation, which was due to
multiple disciplinary tickets.
Such a challenge to his security classification does not
request a "quantum change in the level of custody." This is true
even though a lower classification might result in a transfer
from Greenville to another facility, which might also result in a
decrease in the level of confinement. See Falcon,
52 F.3d at 139; Graham, 922 F.2d at 381 (civil rights action was proper
avenue "even if, as will usually be the case, the program or
location or environment that he is challenging is more
restrictive than the alternative that he seeks.").
While courts sometimes construe a mistakenly-labeled habeas
corpus petitions as a civil rights complaint, see, e.g.,
Graham, 922 F.2d at 381-82 (collecting cases), it would be
inappropriate to do so here, because Petitioner would face
obstacles under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Title VIII of
Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (effective April 26, 1996).
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Therefore, the Court is unable to provide the relief sought.
Accordingly, this habeas corpus action is DISMISSED without
prejudice, and all pending motions are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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