The opinion of the court was delivered by: CHARLES NORGLE, District Judge
On June 24, 2004, this court entered an Order dismissing
Plaintiff J.F. Edwards Construction Company's Complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. See J.F. Edwards Construction
Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng's, No. 03-C-6058, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11803 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2004). J.F. Edwards
Construction Company ("Edwards") now moves the court to
reconsider its decision. For the following reasons, Edwards'
Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
Plaintiff Edwards, an electrical contractor, entered into a
collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with Defendant Local
Union 150 ("150") in August 1996, which incorporated by reference a Master CBA ("MCBA") between 150 and the Mid-America
Regional Bargaining Association ("MARBA"). Although the parties
disputed whether their CBA was a "pre-hire" agreement or a
"majority representation" agreement, they apparently worked
together amicably under the CBA until April 1997. On April 2,
1997, however, Edwards attempted to terminate the CBA by labeling
a "contribution report" a "final report." 150 did not agree that
the CBA was terminated; however, Edwards ceased utilizing members
of 150 at that point.
In February 2001, a representative of 150 called Edwards,
seeking to place workers at a project on which Edwards was
working. Edwards declined this offer, asserting that its
contractual agreement with 150 was terminated. 150 did not pursue
the matter further. Edwards then sent 150 a letter which asserted
that Edwards' CBA with 150 was formally terminated. 150 again did
not agree, and in July 2003 sought to place workers on an Edwards
project at Harper College. Edwards again refused, and 150 filed a
grievance with MARBA under the terms of the MCBA.
Edwards responded to the grievance by filing suit against 150
in the Northern District of Illinois. Edwards asks the court to
enter declaratory judgment against 150, asserting that because
its CBA with 150 was terminated, Edwards is no longer bound by
the MCBA, and is therefore not subject to grievance and
arbitration procedures. Edwards also asks the court to enjoin 150
from pursuing its grievance against Edwards. 150 filed a Motion
to Dismiss, which the court converted to a motion for summary
judgment. After the Motion was fully briefed, the court
determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and
dismissed the Complaint. Edwards, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11803.
Edwards then filed its Motion to Reconsider. That Motion is fully briefed and before the court.
In seeking relief from a judgment of this court, Edwards would
have to proceed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
or 60(b). However, Edwards fails to cite either Rule 59(e) or
60(b) in support of its Motion. This alone is sufficient reason
to deny Edwards' Motion. See United States v. Jones,
224 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that an undeveloped argument
speaks to its paucity, and that courts are not required to
consider such arguments). Although Edwards cites no Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure for which this Motion is brought, the court,
with an abundance of caution, construes Edwards' Motion as being
brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).
Rule 59(e) requires that "[a]ny motion to alter or amend
judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of
judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). Rule 6(a) states that "[w]hen
the period of time prescribed or allowed [for filing] is less
than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays
shall be excluded in the computation." FED. R. CIV. P. (6)(a). In
addition, "entry of judgment is not completed until it is
recorded on the docket. . . ." Dame v. Dept. of Revenue,
137 F.3d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 1998). In this particular instance, after
making the appropriate computations, the court finds that
Edwards' Motion was timely filed with the court for it to be
considered a Rule 59(e) Motion for Reconsideration.
"The only grounds for a Rule 59(e) motion . . . are newly
discovered evidence, an intervening change in the controlling
law, and manifest error of law [or fact]." Cosgrove v.
Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1998). Rule 59(e) "is
not appropriately used to advance arguments or theories that could and should have been made before
the district court rendered a judgment . . . or to present
evidence that was available earlier." LB Credit Corp. v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted); see also Moro v. Shell Oil Co.,
91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996). "The rule essentially enables a
district court to correct its own errors, sparing the parties and
the appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate
proceedings." Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. ...