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J.F. EDWARDS CONSTR. CO. v. INT'L UNION OF OPERATING ENGRS.

January 11, 2005.

J.F. EDWARDS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Plaintiff,
v.
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 150, AFL-CIO, Defendant.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: CHARLES NORGLE, District Judge

OPINION AND ORDER

On June 24, 2004, this court entered an Order dismissing Plaintiff J.F. Edwards Construction Company's Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See J.F. Edwards Construction Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng's, No. 03-C-6058, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11803 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2004). J.F. Edwards Construction Company ("Edwards") now moves the court to reconsider its decision. For the following reasons, Edwards' Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

I. INTRODUCTION

  A. Facts*fn1

  Plaintiff Edwards, an electrical contractor, entered into a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with Defendant Local Union 150 ("150") in August 1996, which incorporated by reference a Master CBA ("MCBA") between 150 and the Mid-America Regional Bargaining Association ("MARBA"). Although the parties disputed whether their CBA was a "pre-hire" agreement or a "majority representation" agreement, they apparently worked together amicably under the CBA until April 1997. On April 2, 1997, however, Edwards attempted to terminate the CBA by labeling a "contribution report" a "final report." 150 did not agree that the CBA was terminated; however, Edwards ceased utilizing members of 150 at that point.

  In February 2001, a representative of 150 called Edwards, seeking to place workers at a project on which Edwards was working. Edwards declined this offer, asserting that its contractual agreement with 150 was terminated. 150 did not pursue the matter further. Edwards then sent 150 a letter which asserted that Edwards' CBA with 150 was formally terminated. 150 again did not agree, and in July 2003 sought to place workers on an Edwards project at Harper College. Edwards again refused, and 150 filed a grievance with MARBA under the terms of the MCBA.

  B. Procedural History

  Edwards responded to the grievance by filing suit against 150 in the Northern District of Illinois. Edwards asks the court to enter declaratory judgment against 150, asserting that because its CBA with 150 was terminated, Edwards is no longer bound by the MCBA, and is therefore not subject to grievance and arbitration procedures. Edwards also asks the court to enjoin 150 from pursuing its grievance against Edwards. 150 filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the court converted to a motion for summary judgment. After the Motion was fully briefed, the court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and dismissed the Complaint. Edwards, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11803. Edwards then filed its Motion to Reconsider. That Motion is fully briefed and before the court.

  II. DISCUSSION

  A. Standard of Decision

  In seeking relief from a judgment of this court, Edwards would have to proceed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). However, Edwards fails to cite either Rule 59(e) or 60(b) in support of its Motion. This alone is sufficient reason to deny Edwards' Motion. See United States v. Jones, 224 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that an undeveloped argument speaks to its paucity, and that courts are not required to consider such arguments). Although Edwards cites no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure for which this Motion is brought, the court, with an abundance of caution, construes Edwards' Motion as being brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

  Rule 59(e) requires that "[a]ny motion to alter or amend judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). Rule 6(a) states that "[w]hen the period of time prescribed or allowed [for filing] is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation." FED. R. CIV. P. (6)(a). In addition, "entry of judgment is not completed until it is recorded on the docket. . . ." Dame v. Dept. of Revenue, 137 F.3d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 1998). In this particular instance, after making the appropriate computations, the court finds that Edwards' Motion was timely filed with the court for it to be considered a Rule 59(e) Motion for Reconsideration.

  "The only grounds for a Rule 59(e) motion . . . are newly discovered evidence, an intervening change in the controlling law, and manifest error of law [or fact]." Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1998). Rule 59(e) "is not appropriately used to advance arguments or theories that could and should have been made before the district court rendered a judgment . . . or to present evidence that was available earlier." LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996). "The rule essentially enables a district court to correct its own errors, sparing the parties and the appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings." Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. ...


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