United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
January 11, 2005.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
DARWIN MONTANA, Defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: MILTON SHADUR, Senior District Judge
On December 22, 2004 this Court summarily denied the effort by
Darwin Montana ("Montana") to invoke 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c) (2)
("Section 3582(c) (2)") to bootstrap himself into a revision of
his sentence based on the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v.
Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), as presumably applicable to
the federal sentencing guidelines as well (something that is yet
to be seen, because the Supreme Court has not yet decided that
issue). Now Montana submits a handwritten Motion for
Reconsideration, pointing to a brief statement in United States
v. Cabrera-Polo, 376 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) as
supposedly supporting his position.
It is quite true that the always careful Judge Bruce Selya,
speaking for the Court of Appeals there, listed as one ground for
possible relief under Section 3582(c) that "certain extraordinary
and compelling reasons exist that warrant a modification." But
because Cabrera-Polo admittedly did not implicate that
possibility (376 F.3d at 31), the quoted statement contained no elaboration as to what such "extraordinary and compelling
reasons" might involve.
If Montana were correct in his present contention, every
pre-Blakely sentence that did not meet the standards stated in
that opinion would be vulnerable, irrespective of its age. That
would obviously prove too much, for there is nothing in Blakely
(which the Supreme Court has not declared to be retroactive) or
in the generalized language in Cabrera-Polo that would suggest
an opening of the floodgates in a way that would subject the
federal courts to a massive and unjustified burden. And this
Court is certainly not going to countenance such a result even if
it were empowered (as Montana contends) to decree Blakely's
retroactivity. Hence Montana's motion for reconsideration is also
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