The opinion of the court was delivered by: AMY J. ST. EVE, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Windsor Alexander brings this action against
Defendants alleging civil rights violations under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In prior orders, the Court dismissed all of the named
Defendants except Dr. Tanveer Shan and Cook County. Before the
Court is Dr. Shan and Cook County's Motion for Summary Judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). For the
following reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motion.
A. Northern District of Illinois Local Rules
When determining summary judgment motions, the Court derives
background facts from the parties' Northern District of Illinois
Local Rule 56.1 statements. The Local Rules provide parties with
specific details as to how litigants in the Northern District of
Illinois should approach summary judgment motions and responses.
Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving party to provide "a
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends
there is no genuine issue." Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires the non-moving
party to admit or deny every factual statement proffered by the
moving party and to concisely designate any material facts that
establish a genuine dispute for trial. The parties' statements
must contain short numbered paragraphs including references to
the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting
material. Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 583-85 (N.D.Ill.
2000). When citing to the record in legal memoranda, parties are
required to cite to the numbered paragraphs of the Local Rule
56.1 statements, not to the underlying parts of the record. Id.
Even though the parties have partially complied with the Local
Rules, both Defendants and Plaintiff did not consistently follow
the Local Rules in their statements, responses, and legal
memoranda. The Court notes that although courts construe pro se
pleadings liberally, see Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 943
(7th Cir. 2003), a plaintiff's pro se status does not absolve
him from complying with the Local Rules. Greer v. Board of Ed.
of City of Chicago, 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001); see
also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980,
124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (pro se litigants must follow clear
This leaves the Court with some statements and responses that
do not cite specific parts of the record and legal memoranda that
do not properly cite to the factual record. Statements and
responses that do not properly cite to the record are subject to
the Court's discretion as to their admission. See Brasic v.
Heinemann's Inc., 121 F.3d 281, 284 (7th Cir. 1997).
Statements that are not contested are deemed admitted. Smith v.
Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003). With these
principles in mind, the Court turns to the relevant facts of this
B. Relevant Undisputed Facts
On March 12, 2000, Alexander was arrested on charges of perjury
and forgery pursuant to an arrest warrant stemming from an indictment. (R. 99-1, Pl.'s
Response to Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 1; R. 94-1, Def.'s Rule
56.1 Statement, ¶ 1.) Alexander was then detained at Cook County
Jail in Chicago, Illinois. (Id.) Alexander's case proceeded to
trial in July of 2001, where Alexander represented himself, along
with shadow counsel, in the Circuit Court of Cook County. (Pl.'s
Resp. ¶¶ 5, 10; Def.'s Stmt. ¶¶ 3, 5, 10, Ex. C, Alexander's
Resp. to Inter. ¶ 6.) The jury found Alexander not guilty on all
criminal charges. (Pl.'s Resp. ¶ 10; Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 10.)
During Alexander's pre-trial detention in Cook County Jail, he
was admitted into the acute psychiatric unit of the Cermak
Hospital Division of Cook County Jail in May of 2000. (Pl.'s
Resp. ¶ 7; Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 7.) Although Defendant Dr. Tanveer
Shan, a psychiatrist working at Cook County Jail, did not admit
Alexander into the acute psychiatric unit, Dr. Shan diagnosed
Alexander as having bi-polar disorder. (Pl.'s Resp. ¶ 13, Def.'s
Stmt. ¶ 13, Ex. B, Shan Aff., ¶¶ 1, 9.) On October 2000, Dr. Shan
released Alexander from his daily care and control and Alexander
returned to the general population at the Cook County Jail.
(Pl.'s Resp. ¶ 9; Def's Stmt. ¶ 9.) Dr. Tanveer Shan did not
participate in Alexander's arrest, the indictment resulting in
his arrest, or the decision to set Alexander's bond. (Pl.'s Resp.
¶ 3, 4; Def.'s Stmt. ¶ 3.)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue
of material fact exists only if "the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack
of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986). The existence of a factual dispute is not sufficient to
defeat a summary judgment motion, instead the non-moving party
must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the summary
judgment motion. See Vukadinovich v. Board of Sch. Trs.,
278 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2002) (quotation and citation
Alexander brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which
creates a federal cause of action for "the deprivation, under
color of law, of a citizen's rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." See
42 U.S.C. § 1983; Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132,
114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994). Construing Alexander's pro se
Second Amended Complaint liberally as the Court is required to
do, see Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 943 (7th Cir.
2003), he alleges that the Cook County Department of Corrections
had an unwritten, but widespread policy of sending inmates to the
acute psychiatric unit of Cermak Health Services ("Cermak").
Alexander alleges that this widespread policy deprived him from
(1) defending grievances in front of the Cook County Jail Board,
and (2) accessing the law library and legal materials.
Furthermore, Alexander alleges that Dr. Shan conspired with the
Department of Corrections to keep him at the acute psychiatric
unit against his will even though Dr. Shan knew that Alexander
was representing himself in a criminal matter. Accordingly,
Alexander contends that Defendants conspired ...